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This thesis evaluates and analyzes current strategic management planning 
methods that develop performance metrics linking supply chain management to aircraft 
readiness.  Our primary focus is the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron.  Utilizing the 
Logistics Management Institute’s DoD Supply Chain Implementation Guide and adapted 
SCOR model, we applied the six step process for developing a strategic logistics 
management plan for implementing supply chain management for use at the MALS, and 
subsequently defined the interdependencies of the Naval/Marine Corps Aviation 
Logistics Supply Chain.  The Theory of Constraints proved to be a viable tool for 
establishing aircraft readiness as the ultimate goal of Marine Corps aviation logistics, and 
provided a means for identifying and eliminating readiness constraints preventing the 
MALS from achieving its goal.  MALS-14’s successful implementation of a structured 
planning and feedback system based on the Theory of Constraints justifies the need for 
MALS strategic logistics management planning and supply chain management.  Effective 
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supply chain, but also link supply chain management to the common goal of aircraft 
readiness, provide the means for measuring supply chain performance improvements, 
identify readiness degraders, and elicit behavior from aviation logisticians to improve 






























































TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................... 1 
A. BACKGROUND............................................................................................... 1 
B. OBJECTIVE...................................................................................................... 4 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS............................................................................... 4 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS ........................................... 4 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS........................................................................ 5 
 
II. SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT AND THE MALS.............................................. 7 
A. OVERVIEW...................................................................................................... 7 
B. SIX PILLARS OF SUPPLY CHAIN SUCCESS ............................................. 9 
C. PRINCIPLES OF SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT................................. 11 
D. SIX STEP PROCESS FOR IMPLEMENTING SUPPLY CHAIN 
MANAGEMENT............................................................................................ 15 
E. SUMMARY .................................................................................................... 52 
 
III. STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND THE THEORY OF CONSTRAINTS........... 55 
A. OVERVIEW.................................................................................................... 55 
B. BACKGROUND............................................................................................. 55 
C. SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT .............................................................. 56 
1. A SYSTEMS APPROACH................................................................. 56 
2. GLOBAL GOAL OF SCM................................................................. 58 
3. IDENTIFYING CONSTRAINTS....................................................... 59 
4. MANAGING CONSTRAINTS .......................................................... 61 
D. METRICS AND THE THEORY OF CONSTRAINTS ................................. 64 
E. SUMMARY .................................................................................................... 65 
 
IV. MALS-14 STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS...................................................... 67 
A. OVERVIEW.................................................................................................... 67 
B. HISTORY OF MALS-14................................................................................ 67 
1. WHAT IT IS, WHAT IT DOES, WHY IT DOES IT? ....................... 67 
2. WHY MALS-14 MUST CHANGE? .................................................. 68 
3. CURRENT APPROACH TO READINESS....................................... 70 
C. MALS-14 STRATEGIC PLAN “ROADMAP” TO SUCCESS..................... 71 
1. PHASE I SHARING THE VISION.................................................... 71 
2. PHASE II – VALUES TRAINING .................................................... 75 
3. PHASE III - THEORY OF CONSTRAINTS TRAINING................. 75 
4. PHASE IV – PRIME TASKS AND METRICS ................................. 76 
5. PHASE V – IDENTIFY THE CONSTRAINT................................... 77 
6. PHASE VI – AN INTEGRATED REPORTING SYSTEM............... 78 
7. PHASE VII – MANAGE BY TOC METHODOLOGY .................... 80 
D. SUMMARY .................................................................................................... 81 
 
V. RECOMMENDED PERFORMANCE METRICS..................................................... 83 
 viii
A. OVERVIEW.................................................................................................... 83 
B. RECOMMENDED PERFORMANCE METRICS......................................... 83 
C. RESPONSIVENESS....................................................................................... 86 
1. RESPONSIVENESS METRIC........................................................... 86 
2. LOGISTICS ASSETS......................................................................... 92 
3. PERSONNEL...................................................................................... 93 
D. MATERIAL AVAILABILITY....................................................................... 93 
1. MATERIAL AVAILABILITY METRIC........................................... 93 
2. ALLOWANCE MANAGEMENT...................................................... 94 
3. ON-STATION MATERIAL AVAILABILITY.................................. 95 
4. OFF-STATION MATERIAL AVAILABILITY.............................. 107 
5. OTHER FACTORS........................................................................... 111 
E. SCM ORIENTED REPORTING SYSTEM ................................................. 112 
F. SUMMARY… .............................................................................................. 114 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................... 115 
APPENDIX A ...................................................................................................................... .123 
APPENDIX B ....................................................................................................................... 139 
APPENDIX C ....................................................................................................................... 147 
APPENDIX D ....................................................................................................................... 149 
APPENDIX E........................................................................................................................ 151 
REFERENCES...................................................................................................................... 153 
DISTRIBUTION LIST ......................................................................................................... 157 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 2-1 Pillars of Successful Elements  (From: Logistics Management Institute, 
2000)................................................................................................................ 10 
Figure 2- 2 Customer Service Pyramid (From Copacino, 1997) ...................................... .14 
Figure 2- 3 Navy/Marine Corps Aviation Logistics Supply Chain High Level 
Graphic(After Ref. 4:p. B-1) ........................................................................... 43 
Figure 2- 4 Navy/Marine Corps Aviation Logistics Supply Chain Process Flow 
Diagram (After Ref. 4:p. B-1)......................................................................... 45 
Figure 2- 5 Adapted SCOR Model Level 2 Process Flow Diagram Definitions (After 
Ref. 4:p. A-2) .................................................................................................. 46 
Figure 2- 6 Adapted SCOR “Deliver-Stocked Product/Make-To-Order Product”  
Level 3 Process Flow Diagram (After Ref. 4:p. A-3) ..................................... 47 
Figure 3-1 Replenishment System (AVDLR only)........................................................... 57 
Figure 3-2  Process Flow of Production System................................................................ 59 
Figure 3-3  Cause and Effect Relationship of Logistics Measures and Operational 
Availability using Logic Tree ......................................................................... 60 
Figure 3-4  Logic Tree for Delivery Branch ...................................................................... 62 
Figure 3-5  Developing Performance Metrics.................................................................... 64 
Figure 4-1 Supply Effectiveness vs. Aircraft Readiness................................................... 69 
Figure 4-2 MAG-14 Supply Chain ................................................................................... 70 
Figure 4-3  Vision of MALS-14 Success........................................................................... 72 
Figure 4-4 The Goal – Aircraft Readiness ....................................................................... .73 
Figure 4-5 Key Principles ................................................................................................. 73 
Figure 4-6  Getting the Vision ........................................................................................... 74 
Figure 4-7 Implementation Strategy ................................................................................. 75 
Figure 4-8 FRT Links to Reporting System...................................................................... 79 
Figure 4-9 Performance Charts ......................................................................................... 79 
Figure 4-10 Trend Report ................................................................................................... 80 
Figure 4-11 MALS-14 Two-pronged Approach................................................................. 81 
Figure 5-1 MALS-14 FRT for Integrated Aviation Logistics Performance ..................... 84 
Figure 5-2 Planeside Summary Chart (From: Ref 5)........................................................ 92 
Figure 5-3 MALS-14 FRT (IMA Parts).......................................................................... 102 
 x
Figure 5-4 Defense Supply Center Richmond H-53 Supply Availability Metric 
(From: Ref 11)............................................................................................... 110 
Figure 5-5 Defense Supply Center H-53 Backorder Metric (From: Ref 11) ................. .111 
Figure 5-6 NAVRIIT Planeside ILS Tool Summary and Cockpit Chart Graphic 
(From: Ref 12)............................................................................................... 113 
Figure 5-7 Web-based Planeside Assessment Tool (From: Ref 12) ............................... 114 
Figure A-1 Naval/Marine Corps Aviation Logistics Supply Chain Network Diagram... 124 
Figure A-2 FISC San Diego CA Sites ............................................................................. 128 
Figure A-3 Naval/Marine Corps Aviation Logistics Supply Chain Map (CONUS) ....... 134 
Figure A-4 Naval/Marine Corps Aviation Logistics Supply Chain Map (OCONUS-
Japan) ............................................................................................................ 135 
Figure A-5 Naval/Marine Corps Aviation Logistics Supply Chain Map (OCONUS-
Hawaii) .......................................................................................................... 136 
Figure A-6 Naval/Marine Corps Aviation Logistics Supply Chain Map (Fleet and 
Industrial Supply Center Locations-CONUS)............................................... 137 
Figure B-1 Adapted SCOR Model Level 3 “Plan-Source and Plan-Deliver” 
Subprocess Definitions (after Ref. 4:p. 217-218) ......................................... 140 
Figure B-2 Adapted SCOR Model Level 3 “Source-Stocked Material and Source-
Maintain-to-Order Material” Subprocess Definitions (after Ref. 4:p. 218-
219)................................................................................................................ 141 
Figure B-3 Adapted SCOR Model Level 3 “Maintain-to-Stock” Subprocess 
Definitions (after Ref. 4:p. 219-220)............................................................. 142 
Figure B-4 Adapted SCOR Model Level 3 “Maintain-to-Order” Subprocess 
Definitions (after Ref. 4:p. 220-221)............................................................. 143 
Figure B-5 Adapted SCOR Model Level 3 “Deliver Stocked Product” Subprocess 
Definitions (after Ref. 4:p. 222-223)............................................................. 144 
Figure B-6 Adapted SCOR Model Level 3 “Deliver Stocked Product (continued)” 
Subprocess Definitions (after Ref. 4:p. 223-224) ......................................... 145 
Figure B-7 Adapted SCOR Model Level 3 “Deliver Stocked Product (continued)” 








LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table 2- 1  MALS Supply Chain Management Core Implementation Team (After 
Logistics Management Institute, 2000)........................................................... 16 
Table 2- 2   MALS SCM Core Implementation Team Initial Focus Areas (After Ref. 1: 
p. 55)................................................................................................................ 19 
Table 2- 3   Definitions of SCOR Level 1 Processes (From Ref. 4:p 3-4)......................... 32 
Table 2- 4   Common Supply Chain Process Deficiencies (From Ref. 1:p. 123)............... 48 
Table 5-1 MALS Supply Chain Management Process Metrics....................................... 85 
Table 5-2 MALS-14 Delivery Time Analysis ................................................................. 88 
Table 5-3 IPG-1 (NMCS/PMCS) UMMIPS Time Standard (From: Ref 4).................... 89 
Table 5-4 MALS-14 Material Availability Metrics......................................................... 94 
Table 5-5 MALS-26 NMCS/PMCS Supply Effectiveness Comparison......................... 98 
Table 5-6 MALS-26 NMCS/PMCS Summary Report by Squadron............................... 99 
Table 5-7 MALS-26 NMCS/PMCS Summary Report by Type Aircraft ...................... 100 
Table 5-8 MALS-26 ZC8 Supply Effectiveness Comparison....................................... 106 
Table 5-9 MALS-26 ZC8/ZC9 Summary Report.......................................................... 107 




































































LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
Ao Operational Availability 
ACE Air Combat Element 
ALT Administrative Lead Time 
AMO Aviation Maintenance Officer 
ASL Aviation Logistics Support Branch 
ASO Aviation Supply Officer 
ATAC Advanced Traceability and Control 
AVLOG Aviation Logistics 
AWM Awaiting Maintenance 
AWP Awaiting Parts 
BCM Beyond Capability of Maintenance 
CDB Consumable Delivery Branch 
CMD Consumable Management Division 
CO Commanding Officer 
CPI Cost Price Index 
CRT Current Reality Tree 
CWT Customer Wait Time 
DDD Defense Distribution Depot 
DIFM Due in from Maintenance 
DLA Defense Logistics Agency 
DoD Department of Defense 
DTO Direct Turnover 
EIS Executive Information System 
ERP Enterprise Resource Planning 
FISC Fleet and Industrial Supply Center 
FLR Field-level Repairable 
FMC Full Mission Capable 
FRT Future Reality Tree 
ICP Inventory Control Point 
 xiv
IDTC Inter-deployment Training Cycle 
IMA Intermediate Maintenance Activity 
INMARSAT International Maritime Satellite 
LMI Logistics Management Institute 
LRT Logistics Response Time 
MALS Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 
MAG Marine Aircraft Group 
MAW Marine Aircraft Wing 
MCDP Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 
MCWP Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 
MIS Management Information System 
MTW  Major Theater War 
NADEP Naval Aviation Depot 
NALCOMIS Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management 
Information System 
NAVAIR Naval Air Systems Command 
NAVICP Navy Inventory Control Point 
NAVRIIP  Naval Aviation Readiness Integrated Improvement 
  Program 
NAVSUP  Navy Supply Systems Command 
NMC  Not Mission Capable 
OMA  Organizational Maintenance Activity 
PFD  Process Flow Diagram 
PLT  Production Lead Time 
PMC  Partial Mission Capable 
POA&M Plan of Action and Milestones 
POE Point of Entry 
RCT Repair Cycle Time 
RDB Repairable Delivery Branch 
RDD Required Delivery Date 
 xv
RMD Repairable Management Division 
SALTS Streamlines Alternative Logistics Transmission System 
SCM Supply Chain Management 
SMART Supply Maintenance Aviation Reengineering Team 
SOA Supply Officer Asset 
SRD Supply Response Division 
SUADPS-RT Shipboard Uniform Automated Processing System – 
Real Time 
TAT Turnaround Time 
TOC Theory of Constraints 
UMMIPS Uniform Material Movement and Issue Priority System 
WIP Work-in-Process 











































































The authors would like to thank the following people for their part in the 
successful completion of this thesis: 
Our advisors, Rear Admiral Donald R. Eaton, USN (Ret.) and Dr. Keebom Kang 
for providing much needed advice, support, expertise, and most significantly, patience.  
Colonel Laurin P. Eck, USMC and Lieutenant Colonel Pierre C. Garant, USMC 
for providing us the opportunity to write about their success as Commanding Officers 
who pioneered the use of Theory of Constraints management and strategic logistics 
management planning in Marine aviation logistics at MALS-12 and MALS-14.  We 
heartily appreciated their mentorship and willingness to relate their experiences with us.  
This thesis is a testament to their accomplishments, and hopefully a guidebook for use by 
other Marine aviation logisticians to improve and sustain aircraft readiness and aviation 
logistics throughout the Marine Corps. 
Lieutenant Colonel Dan C. Batt, USMC, Major Michael S. Frutsche, USMC, 
Captain Jeff M. Bolduc, USMC, Chief Warrant Officer-3 Melissa H. Hargraves, USMC, 
and the Marines of MALS-26 for providing their assistance in helping us develop supply 
chain-oriented, readiness-based performance metrics for the MALS. 
Captain Bert W. Cruz, USMC for imparting his motivation and experiences as the 
Repairables Management Division Officer at MALS-14 under the leadership of LtCol 
Garant.  His insights and experiences as a division officer executing the structured 
planning and feedback system based on the Theory of Constraints at MALS-14 were 
extremely valuable in the writing of this thesis.  
Lindsay Balestreri and Courtney McDoniel for their love and support during the 
long days and even longer nights it took to complete this tremendous effort.  We couldn’t 
have done it without you. 
 1
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Tactical AVLOG involves the coordination of functions required to sustain and move aviation 
squadrons, personnel, equipment and supplies.  These functions must deliver flexible and responsive 
AVLOG to meet the needs of the forces engaged in operations.  Therefore, the response time of tactical 
AVLOG must be flexible and capable of expeditious deployment and therefore requires anticipatory 
planning to provide this type of support (MCWP 3-21.2, pg. 1004) 
 
A.  BACKGROUND 
The DoD Logistics Strategic Plan provides top-level guidance toward a joint 
logistics infrastructure that focuses on Supply Chain Management.  The plan outlines the 
mission, vision, end-state characteristics, critical success factors, and logistics objectives 
and measures to support a joint integrated supply chain (see Appendix A).    
As the joint logistics concept continues to be developed and implemented, each 
service must strive to develop service oriented Strategic Logistics Plans that not only 
support service specific roles and missions but also fall within the scope of the DoD 
Logistics Strategic Plan in order to provide joint, seamless supply chain support to any 
unit anywhere in the World. 
To meet the requirements of the DoD Logistics Strategic Plan and to provide the 
“precision logistics” required by the Air Combat Element (ACE) throughout the full 
spectrum of conflict, Marine Corps Aviation Logistics must transform into a more 
responsive force for the 21st century.  Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 4, 
outlines four challenges facing logisticians: (1) logistics must enhance, not inhibit, 
operational designs, (2) logistics systems must anticipate requirements, (3) logistics 
systems must be flexible, and (4) logistics systems must be effective yet efficient. [Ref. 
1:p. 81]  In order to address each of these challenges, Marine Corps Aviation Logistics 
must embrace new ways of doing business without sacrificing combat effectiveness for 
logistics efficiency. 
To embrace new ways of doing business requires change or transformation.  This 
transformation forces us to answer three basic questions: (1) What to change, (2) What to 
change to, and (3) How to cause the change?  More importantly, the transformation to 
supply chain management requires us to think strategically and systematically and focus 
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the entire supply chain toward one objective – operational availability of weapons 
systems. 
In 2001 Marine Aviation logistics Squadron (MALS) 14, developed and 
implemented a strategic management plan based on the Theory of Constraints.  The 
strategic plan that MALS-14 implemented to improve aircraft readiness and logistics 
responsiveness with Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 14 is extremely similar to the 
principles of supply chain management (SCM) and the SCM implementation 
recommendations of the Logistics Management Institute’s DoD Supply Chain 
Management Implementation Guide. 
As the Marine Corps’ tactical aviation logistics organization, The MALS is the 
“retail” component of the DoN/MC Aviation Logistics Supply Chain.  The MALS is 
responsible for providing intermediate-level maintenance, supply, and 
ordnance/armament support for aircraft and aeronautical equipment.  Each MALS is 
organized to provide a core group of supervisory and support personnel that, when 
augmented by aircraft-specific maintenance personnel from aircraft squadrons, provides 
an intermediate maintenance capability for either fixed or rotary-wing aircraft. [Ref. 2: 
p.1005] 
To break from common practice requires courage.  Typically, aviation logisticians 
strive to ensure that their organizations remain busy and efficient.  Yet, as crisis 
responders, we are accustomed to crisis planning.  In turn, resources are thrown at the 
problem as a means to resolve a situation.  This method of problem solving and pursuit of 
efficiency not only builds pockets of excellence, but often prevents a unit from 
effectively accomplishing its goal. 
The goal of the MALS is to sustain weapon system availability – aircraft 
readiness.  However, current management practices and supporting information 
technology and metrics do not support this aim.  Colonel Eck, Assistant Branch Head for 
the Aviation Logistics Support Branch (ASL), states that “in the Marine Corps and in the 
MALS aiming to achieve efficiencies is what we have done well in the past, what we 
expect in the future, and how we continue to measure how successful we are.”  By 
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focusing solely on efficiencies and optimizing resources in every area, we have failed to 
maximize the overall effectiveness of the MALS. 
Current polices and practices aviation logistics uses to measure aircraft readiness 
do not accurately display how to effect positive change and prevent problems before they 
happen.  Furthermore, traditional metrics reinforce local efficiency behavior.  In fact, 
many of the traditional metrics used to measure the success of a MALS may not result in 
a MALS performing and contributing to aircraft readiness, and some metrics could even 
be detracting from optimizing aircraft readiness. 
For example, turnaround time (TAT), beyond capability of maintenance (BCM) 
rates, and supply effectiveness are current MALS performance metrics that have no 
apparent correlation to aircraft readiness.  These internal efficiency metrics lead us to 
“operate on the assumption that maximizing the performance of each component part of 
the system will automatically maximize the performance of the system as a whole”. [Ref. 
3: p.6] 
Effective performance metrics are not only critical to achieving a fully integrated 
supply chain but also to measuring the performance of supply chain improvements.       
The current trend in supply chain management is toward enterprise resource planning 
(ERP) which requires a shift from individual functional area metrics to process metrics.  
For these process metrics to be effective managerial tools to improve aircraft readiness, 
the metrics must (1) be more strategic, (2) provide insight, (3) be included in the process, 
(4) be goal-based, (5) identify trends, (6) identify drivers to aircraft readiness, and (7) 
illicit behavior from aviation logisticians that lead to improvements in aircraft readiness.  
Thus, without performance metrics that link supply chain management to aircraft 
readiness, how do we determine the successful implementation of supply chain 






B.  OBJECTIVE 
The objectives of our thesis are (1) to develop a SCOR Model of the DoN/MC 
Aviation Logistics Supply Chain, (2) to conduct a case study of the MALS-14 Strategic 
Management Plan and (3) to develop performance metrics to manage primary readiness 
degraders and to improve logistics response time through a structured planning and 
feedback system based on the Theory of Constraints. 
 
C.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Primary Research Question:  How are performance metrics established for a 
Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS)?  How are these metrics utilized to manage 
primary degraders to aircraft readiness? 
 Subsidiary Research Questions:  
1. What is the global goal for Aviation Logistics? 
2. What are primary degraders? 
3. What is the DoN/MC supply chain relative to a MALS? 
4. Does the Theory of Constraints Philosophy provide a framework for 
identifying primary degraders?  
5. What was the structured planning and feedback system utilized by MALS-14? 
 
D.  SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The scope of our thesis is the development and implementation of a strategic 
management plan for supply chain management.  First, we adopt the SCOR model to map 
the DoN/MC Supply Chain for Aviation Logistics.  It is our assessment that an 
understanding of the overall integrated supply chain is required prior to the analysis of 
any individual functional area within the supply chain.   
Second, we view the integrated supply chain as a system composed of 
interdependent parts.  Thus, we limit our case study analysis to MALS-14’s development 
and implementation of a strategic management plan for improving aircraft readiness 
within MAG-14. 
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Third, because weapons system programs are different, the supply chain for each 
weapon system is unique.  Therefore, each organization must develop and implement a 
strategic management plan with respect to the weapons system and the supporting supply 
chain.  However, we emphatically believe that weapon system availability should be the 
global goal for the integrated supply chain. 
 
E.  ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Chapter II will provide an analysis of the DoN/MC supply chain using the SCOR 
method, as well as show how aircraft readiness should be the global goal for supply chain 
management.  Chapter III will provide the background for using the Theory of 
Constraints for identifying readiness degraders.  Chapter IV will analyze MALS-14’s 
Strategic Management Plan with respect to the guiding principles of the DoD Supply 
Chain Management Implementation guide and the Theory of Constraints.  Chapter V will 
provide background information on developing performance metrics that link supply 
chain management to aircraft readiness.  Chapter VI will provide a summary, 





































II. SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT AND THE MALS 
 
A. OVERVIEW 
The basis of this chapter is first to establish a baseline for understanding the 
Marine Corps’ aviation logistics infrastructure and support pipeline from a supply chain 
management perspective.  Second, this chapter will provide the structural framework for 
developing the performance measures and outline for a strategic logistics management 
plan for improving Marine aviation logistics at the strategic and tactical level.  The 
information contained in this chapter will serve as a reference point and add value and 
justification for the case study analysis of Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 14’s 
implementation of a “structured planning and feedback system” based on the 
management philosophy of the “Theory of Constraints.”  It is our opinion that the 
strategic plan that MALS-14 implemented to improve aircraft readiness and logistics 
responsiveness with Marine Aircraft Group 14 (based on Theory of Constraints 
management) is extremely similar to the principles of supply chain management (SCM) 
and the SCM implementation recommendations of the Logistics Management Institute’s 
DoD Supply Chain Management Implementation Guide, referred to hereafter as “The 
Guide.”  The Guide and most literature regarding SCM asserts that application of supply 
chain management must be implemented from end-to-end within the entire supply and 
logistics process enterprise and that “true” SCM can only be accomplished within this 
framework.  Based on this assumption, “true” SCM cannot be partially implemented 
within a functional segment of the Naval/Marine aviation logistics infrastructure (e.g., the 
Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron).  We propose that strategic logistics planning based 
on SCM principles can still be applied within the Marine Aircraft Group and Marine 
Aviation Logistics Squadron in order to 1) improve current and future aviation logistics 
support and aircraft readiness where required, 2) help prepare the for the eventual 
implementation of SCM within Naval/Marine aviation logistics, and 3) once SCM is 
implemented, serve as the overarching logistics strategy to integrate all Naval/Marine 
Corps aviation logistics supply chain activities’ performance metrics towards a common 
goal: aircraft readiness or operational availability (Ao).  With this in mind, the main 
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objectives of this chapter are to review and analyze The Guide’s six step process for 
implementing SCM in defense department organizations and its relevancy to 
Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics and the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron, 
develop a high-level graphical model in order to map the complex Naval/Marine Corps 
aviation logistics supply chain network, and utilizing the Supply Chain Operations 
Reference (SCOR) model, adapt SCOR model process flow diagram describing the 
tactical aviation logistics operations of the Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply 
chain segment most closely linked to aircraft readiness (operational availability or Ao) 
and logistics responsiveness outside of the individual flying squadron: the Marine 
Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS).   
 Two textbooks that provide guidance and recommendations on adapting and 
implementing SCM within the Department of Defense are: “Supply Chain Management: 
A Recommended Performance Measurement Scorecard,” and the “DoD Supply Chain 
Management Implementation Guide” (or “The Guide” for short) both by the Logistics 
Management Institute.  Both texts also provide detailed methods for measuring and 
managing performance within the supply chain.  In order to measure performance of the 
MALS with respect to aircraft readiness, it is imperative to develop a strategic 
management plan first.  These two books, as well as the efforts of all the services within 
the Department of Defense implementing logistics reform (the Air Force’s Agile 
Logistics initiative, the Navy’s Expeditionary and High Yield Logistics initiatives, the 
Army’s Velocity Management initiative, and the Marine Corps’ Precision Logistics and 
Integrated Logistics Capability initiatives), prove that supply chain management is a 
critical underlying strategy for developing a successful strategic logistics management 
plan and performance measures that are intimately tied to achieving the ultimate goal 
of any logistics organization: optimizing a weapon system’s readiness/operational 





B. SIX PILLARS OF SUPPLY CHAIN SUCCESS 
The Guide was developed to serve as a “cookbook” for implementing supply 
chain management within the Department of Defense to “assist DoD logistics personnel 
at all organizational levels who want to improve material support and service to 
customers.” [Ref. 1:p. vii]  The Guide provides adaptations of commercial best business 
practices in supply chain management for application in defense logistics founded on six 
principal pillars of success elements: (Ref. 4:p. 5) 
• Determination of guiding principles to focus and validate required 
actions 
• Establishment of a team-based, coordinated organizational structure 
to complete or oversee required implementation actions 
• Development, publication, and management approval of a 
comprehensive implementation strategy 
• Identification and implementation of selected applicable best business 
practices to support DoD transition to the supply chain concept 
• Identification and application of enabling methods and technologies 
















Figure 2- 1  Pillars of Successful Elements [From Logistics Management 
Institute, 2000] 
The “six pillars of successful elements” (Figure 2-1) are necessary to accomplish 
a successful transition from a traditional multi-functional logistics and supply 
organizational structure to an integrated, cross-functional supply chain management 
organizational structure. [Ref. 4:p. 6]  These elements ultimately provide the foundation 
for the organization’s strategic logistics management plan, and development of 
performance measures through a six step process described in detail in The Guide.  
Further in this thesis we will perform a case study analysis of Marine Aviation Logistics 
Squadron 14’s (MALS-14) successful implementation of a tactical-level strategic 
logistics management plan based on the philosophy of the “Theory of Constraints” which 
drastically improved aircraft readiness and logistics responsiveness within Marine 
Aircraft Group 14 (MAG-14).  Although MALS-14 did not intend to implement SCM, 
their “structured planning and feedback system” strategic logistics management plan is 
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comparable to The Guide’s six step process of SCM implementation.  An integral part of 
the MALS-14 case study in chapter 4 will be comparing this six step process of SCM 
implementation with the MALS-14 strategic logistics management plan.  What follows is 
a description of the principles of SCM and an overview of the six step process for 
implementing SCM in a defense environment. 
C. PRINCIPLES OF SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT 
The 2000 DoD Logistics Strategic Plan defines the logistics mission as follows: 
“To provide responsive and cost-effective support to ensure readiness and sustainability 
for the total force across the spectrum of military operations.” [Ref. 5:p. 10]  Despite the 
fact that this defense-peculiar definition of logistics has not changed in recent history, 
Naval/Marine aviation logistics doctrine and strategies for accomplishing the logistics 
mission changed dramatically in recent history due to events such as the end of the cold 
war, new and emerging threats, increased global operational tempo, quadrennial defense 
reviews and force draw-downs, and the sequential decline of the defense budget.  This 
same document also provided the vision for the future of DoD logistics: “By 2010, the 
logistics process will be an efficient, integrated supply chain of private sector and organic 
providers that ensures full customer-oriented support to personnel and weapons systems.” 
[Ref. 5:p. 12]  The DoD definition of supply chain management as proposed in The 
Guide is as follows:  [Ref. 1:p. 14] 
DoD supply chain management is an integrated process that begins with 
planning the acquisition of customer-driven requirements for material and services and 
ends with the delivery of material to the operational customer, including the material 
returns segment of the process and the flow of required information in both directions 
among suppliers, logistics managers, and customers. 
The essence of the supply chain management concept is the “continuous, 
unbroken, comprehensive, and all-inclusive logistics process, from initial customer order 
for material or services to the ultimate satisfaction of the customer requirement.” [Ref. 
4:p. 13-14] 
The Guide warns against defense logistics managers falsely assuming the pre-
existing logistics infrastructure is comparable to a fully integrated supply chain because 
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of the relationships between inventory control and wholesale stock points, maintenance 
depots, distribution activities, retail-level supply and maintenance activities, and end-user 
customers.  Another false assumption is that large scale technology insertion can provide 
integrated SCM and result in streamlining, modernizing, and speeding up current 
logistics functions.  These two critical mistakes results in failure to reap the full benefits 
of “true” SCM implementation experienced by best business practices (long term 
increased performance, end-to-end integration of logistics effort, and cost savings). [Ref. 
4:p. 12-13]  Although The Guide emphatically states, “Implementation of SCM in the 
DoD cannot focus solely on individual functions within an organization but must rather 
concentrate on the end-to-end process of ensuring the warfighting and other operational 
requirements are consistently satisfied at the point of need,” our study intends to leverage 
the principles of SCM in focusing on improving tactical-level Marine aviation logistics 
support until supply chain management is eventually implemented throughout the 
Navy/Marine Corps supply and logistics enterprise. [Ref. 4:p. 15] 
The fundamental principles of SCM serve as the foundation for change and 
integration not only within the functional organization, but the enterprise as a whole.  
Prior to implementing any strategic logistics management plan or reforms based on 
supply chain management, it is important to understand the basics of supply chain 
management principles.  The Guide provides twelve adapted principles for DoD SCM 
based on industry standards and practices.  These principles are founded on “satisfying 
the logistics support requirements of the military operating forces and, as a corollary, 
making the best use of available personnel, financial, and infrastructure resources.” [Ref. 
4:p. 18]  They are: [Ref. 4:p. 18] 
• Structure logistics procedures and systems to provide an agile response 
during crisis and joint operations 
• Focus on satisfying warfighter requirements at the point of need 
• Link customers directly to the source of material and services support 
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• Balance the use of all available logistics resource elements to deliver 
customer requirements at the lowest cost 
• Measure the total supply chain performance, based on effective 
delivery of products and services to customers 
• Make maximum, effective use of competitive, global commercial 
capabilities 
• Accomplish common requirements cooperatively. 
• Provide a consistent structure, content, and presentation of logistics 
information, particularly when supporting common interfaces among 
the military services, Defense agencies, and international partners. 
• Address logistics requirements and related costs early in the 
acquisition cycle and continue to the end of the life-cycle support 
period. 
• Include all logistics requirements and costs in the program baseline 
and develop them initially without any internally or externally 
imposed financial constraints. 
• Replace the practice of information ownership with a concept of 
information stewardship (e.g., shared data). 
• Provide effective training and supporting technology to logistics 
personnel. 
These twelve DoD adapted SCM principles will help guide the process of 
implementing SCM or development of strategic logistics management plans based on the 
fundamentals and principles of SCM. 
The Guide further provides another concept to evaluate implementation of SCM 
which could prove useful to the aviation logistics manager in developing a strategic 
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logistics management plan; the Customer Service Pyramid, developed by William C. 
Copacino in Supply Chain Management, The Basics and Beyond (St. Lucie Press, 1997).  
The pyramid graphically “categorizes suppliers, internal processes, and improvement 
initiatives into logical groupings that identify the degree to which these elements 
contribute to the overall effectiveness of the supply chain-and ultimately to customer 
satisfaction.”  [Ref. 4:p. 19]  These twelve SCM operating principles and the Customer 
Service Pyramid, “provide DoD logistics managers with two tools that aid in defining and 
assessing the relative value and potential contributions of process improvement 
initiatives, actions, and technologies as part of the supply chain implementation process.” 
[Ref. 4:p. 19]  The basic framework of the Customer Service Pyramid is a three tier 
hierarchy of reliability, flexibility, and creativity (innovation).  By assessing the degree of 
change or transformation along these three tiers, aviation logistics managers can better 
develop a strategic logistics management plan founded on customer service. [Ref. 4:p. 
19-20]  The Customer Service Pyramid and definitions of each tier is depicted in Figure 
2-2 below: [Ref. 4:p. 20] 
 
Figure 2- 2 Customer Service Pyramid (From Copacino, 1997) 
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D. SIX STEP PROCESS FOR IMPLEMENTING SUPPLY CHAIN 
MANAGEMENT 
1. Step #1: Establish Your Implementation Team   
Implementing SCM requires transitioning from traditional “stove-piped” or highly 
segmented functional organizations to a cross-functional “team” orientation.  The 
Naval/Marine aviation logistics environment (e.g., natural resistance to change, command 
policies, doctrine, etc.) makes this an extremely difficult venture to accomplish.  The 
SCM implementation team must identify key groups of high level officials or command 
leadership who are the principal decision makers, and obtain their support and 
commitment to implementing SCM.  For our purposes, high level officials or command 
leadership might be the Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) Commanding General, MAW 
Assistant Chief of Staff for Aviation Logistics, MAW Aviation Supply and Aircraft 
Maintenance Officers, Marine Aircraft Group Commanding Officer, MALS 
Commanding Officer, and aircraft squadron Commanding Officers.  Marine aviation and 
logistics leaders must continually reinforce teamwork and achieving common goals.  
High level officials/command leaders also play an important role by informing and 
involving all major supply chain participants, including outside suppliers (e.g., Fleet and 
Industrial Supply Centers, the Naval Inventory Control Point, the Defense Logistics 
Agency, Naval Aviation Depots, etc.) and customers (aircraft squadrons).  “Integration 
across functional processes is at the very heart of the SCM concept.” [Ref. 4:p. 22]  The 
SCM implementation team should be composed of members representing organizations 
within the command that are inherently involved in the three sub-functions of supply 
chain management: supply, maintenance, and transportation. [Ref. 4:p. 23]   
With this in mind, at a minimum, the MALS SCM core implementation team 
should be comprised of the MALS Aviation Supply Officer (ASO), Aircraft Maintenance 
Officer (AMO), and the Logistics/Embark Officer (S-4).  The MALS Commanding 
Officer (CO) should set the pace and vision (e.g., the Commander’s Intent) for 
implementing SCM or the strategic logistics management plan.  Depending on the 
operating environment within the Marine Aircraft Group, the CO might even serve as the 
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MALS SCM core implementation team leader to ensure success.  Command leadership 
must give full and visible support to SCM implementation by linking measures and 
rewards to overall supply chain goals, rather than focusing narrowly on individual 
performance. [Ref. 4:p. 24]  The primary challenge the MALS SCM core implementation 
team will realize is to accomplish process integration and teamwork despite the 
organizational barriers. [Ref. 4:p. 27]  Table 2-1 provides the recommended participants 
for establishing a SCM implementation team at the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 
level.  This table was adapted from a similar table in The Guide representing the SCM 
implementation team’s core members. [Ref. 4:p. 26]  
Provide SCM process and aviation logistics technical support 
expertise
Aviation logistics contract 
support (as required)
Provide staff support for SCM initiative and aviation logistics 




Provide staff support for SCM initiative and financial 
management/budget expertise
Marine Aircraft Group 
Fiscal Department and 
MALS Supply Accounting 
Division
Provide staff support for the SCM initiative and aviation 
logistics expertise for organizational level supply and 




Provide staff support for SCM initiative and transportation 
expertise
MALS S-4 (Logistics 
Department) staff
Provide staff support for SCM initiative and maintenance 
expertise
MALS Aircraft Maintenance 
Department staff
Provide core team leadership and staff support for the SCM 
initiative; provide material management, procurement, and 
distribution process expertise
MALS Aviation Supply 
Department staff
Provide policy guidance and interface with senior command 
and aviation logistics officials
MALS Headquarters
PurposeOrganization
 Table 2-1 MALS Supply Chain Management Core Implementation Team (After Logistics 
Management Institute, 2000) 
Developing the implementation strategy must first begin with drafting a Team 
Concept Document containing basic information about the Supply Chain Management 
effort.  The Team Concept Document also serves the following purposes: [Ref. 4:p. 49] 
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• It provides the layperson with a basic, understandable SCM 
implementation project description 
• It is a vehicle to reinforce management’s support of the SCM initiative 
• It helps explain the process to stakeholders, customers, and outside 
activities 
• It helps institutionalize the project 
• It is the first key step to creating other documents such as the strategic 
logistics management plan and a supporting plan of action and 
milestones 
Based on recommendations from the DoD Supply Chain Management 
Implementation Guide, an adapted MALS SCM core implementation team concept 
document might include the following basic information: [Ref. 4:p. 49] 
• A statement from the Marine Aircraft Group Commanding Officer 
expressing support for the MALS’s SCM implementation project or 
strategic logistics management plan and its importance to the 
operational success and improved aviation logistics support within the 
Marine Aircraft Group.  The MALS CO should also provide a 
statement articulating his vision or commander’s intent for 
implementing SCM and the strategic logistics management plan.     
• A copy of the twelve DoD SCM guiding principles or similar material 
• A brief description of the SCM concept in terms of Marine aviation 
logistics 
• A high-level graphical depiction of the Navy/Marine Aviation 
Logistics operational supply chain map peculiar to the organization 
(see Appendix A). 
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• A brief narrative of the MALS SCM core implementation team’s 
mission and objectives (e.g., following the CO’s vision and intent). 
• A list of organizations and resources involved in the project are 
integral to the success of the recommended strategic logistics 
management plan. 
• A brief description of potential SCM performance and cost benefits to 
the organization, with quantitative examples (if available).  This could 
entail the Marine Aircraft Group or individual squadron aircraft 
readiness improvements, logistics response time reductions, improved 
customer service, minimizing flying hour program costs, minimizing 
direct maintenance man-hours per flight hour and cost, improving 
aviation logistics manpower training and certifications, etc.   
After forming the team, there are several steps that focus on developing the 
team’s skills.  Training team members on supply chain management should be conducted 
by any means available.  Chapter 4 of the DoD SCM Implementation Guide provides 
excellent ideas and resources for conducting training on the tenets of supply chain 
management. [Ref. 4:p. 50-53] 
The next step the team should focus on is identification of initial target areas of 
opportunity.  Although implementing supply chain management should be an end-to-end 
Navy/Marine Corps aviation logistics enterprise undertaking, the focus of this research is 
solely on implementing the principles of supply chain management at the tactical-level of 
Marine Corps aviation logistics only.  Therefore, we assume that these initial target areas 
of opportunity are relative to the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron only, and not to 
upstream members of the supply chain (wholesale supply activities, inventory control 
points, maintenance depots, etc.).  The MALS SCM core implementation team develops 
the initial target areas of opportunity to create momentum and “buy-in” to implementing 
supply chain management before continuing with more advanced efforts associated with 
the strategic six step implementation process.  The Logistics Management Institute 
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conducted a survey of high-level logistics managers from the military services to obtain 
key focus areas to SCM management success, which when coupled with the twelve 
guiding SCM principles, form a list of initial focus areas (see Table 2-2) for the MALS 
core implementation team to analyze: [Ref. 4:p. 54-55]  
Identification of initial group of MALS and supply chain-oriented 
performance and cost metrics for application throughout the N/MC
aviation logistics supply chain
MALS and supply chain performance metrics
Development of concept for supply chain integration with and 
management of full range of materials/service suppliers (e.g., 
FISC, NAVICP, DLA, Depots, etc.)
Supplier relationships
Development of concept for process integration/communications 
across functional and organizational boundaries (e.g. inventory 
management, budget management, depot maintenance, 
deployment planning, etc.)
Supply chain functional/organizational integration
Development of concepts for providing management and 
operational information to all supply chain participants and 
customers
Supply chain information sharing
Development of concept for establishing integrated relationships
with supported squadrons, including squadron expectations of 
aviation logistics support
Squadron relationships
Identification of applicable SCM training resources relative to 
aviation logistics support and MALS operations in support of 




Table 2- 2 MALS SCM Core Implementation Team Initial Focus Areas 
(after Ref. 4: p. 55) 
The next step for the MALS SCM core implementation team is to develop 
Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs) graphically depicting the manual and automated 
operations performed by individuals and activities within the MALS aviation logistics 
supply chain through flowcharts.  The PFDs should concentrate on the total processes 
(e.g., supply management, maintenance management, transportation and delivery 
management, etc.) rather than the specific functionality of each node within the supply 
chain (e.g., requisition process flow diagrams). [Ref. 4:p. 57]  Marine Aviation Logistics 
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Squadron 14 accomplished this through the use of current and future reality trees, to be 
discussed in chapter 4. 
Coupled with the tools highlighted above is the Plan of Action and Milestones 
(POA&M).  Utilization of a POA&M will provide not only the MALS SCM 
implementation team with a coordination tool, it will also provide high level officials 
with the necessary information and updates on the progress of implementing the SCM or 
a strategic logistics management plan.  POA&Ms are used widely in Marine aviation 
logistics, and should be an easily adapted tool for implementing SCM or a strategic 
logistics management plan. 
2. Step #2: Develop Your Own Supply Chain Implementation Strategy 
(Strategic Logistics Management Plan)   
This step describes the development of the actual strategic SCM implementation 
document, or for the purposes of the MALS utilizing SCM principles to improve aviation 
logistics support, a strategic logistics management plan.  The DoD SCM Implementation 
Guide prescribes using a format similar to that described in the 1993 Government 
Performance and Results Act for developing a strategic plan which we have adapted for 
MALS use: [Ref. 4:p. 27] 
• A comprehensive mission statement communicating the vision, focus, 
and expected commitment of all participants 
• General aviation logistics goals and objectives, including outcome-
related goals and objectives, for major functions to be covered by 
SCM or aviation logistics improvement initiatives. 
• A description of how aviation logistics goals and objectives are to be 
achieved, including a general description of operational processes, 
skills, and technology, as well as human, capital, information, and 
other resources required to meet those goals and objectives. 
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• Descriptions of how process (or functional areas of processes) 
performance goals included in this plan are related to the general goals 
and objectives of SCM or the MALS’s strategic logistics management 
plan. 
• Identification of key aviation logistics support activities and factors 
external to the MALS and beyond the MALS’s control that could 
significantly affect achievement of general goals and objectives. 
• A description of the evaluation methods to be used in managing and 
evaluating progress of the strategic logistics management plan. 
• A plan of action and milestones (may be developed over time). 
After the MALS SCM core implementation team develops the strategic logistics 
management plan, it not only must be approved by the appropriate level commander 
(e.g., MAG and MALS Commanders), but also “sold” to the major process stakeholders 
and customers (MALS aircraft maintenance and aviation supply personnel, Marine 
Aircraft Group squadron commanders, and organizational maintenance activities, etc.).  
[Ref. 4:p. 28]  The Guide provides sequential strategies for successfully implementing a 
strategic logistics management plan which we’ll discuss and adapt to Marine aviation 
logistics operations in the following paragraphs. 
a. SCM Implementation Strategy #1: Determine Desired 
Performance Metrics   
The MALS SCM core implementation team should assess the 
performance of the Marine aviation logistics supply chain beginning at the tactical level, 
and adopt objective performance measurement information.  This segment of the 
implementation strategy naturally flows and leads to SCM implementation step 3: 
measuring performance.  Examples include: [Ref. 4:p. 67-8] Issue rates (material 
readiness or supply effectiveness- tailored as required) 
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• Costs (Flying Hour Program, Non-Flying Hour Program, 
Direct Maintenance Man-Hours/Flight Hour or Dollar, etc.) 
• Quality (inventory configuration, material condition, I-level 
repairs, work requests, Packaging-Handling-Storage-
Transportation [PHS&T], etc) 
• Customer service 
• On-time delivery  
• Cycle times (Turn Around Times, Mean Time To Repair) 
• Asset utilization (aircraft, test benches, IMRL/SE, inventory, 
etc.) 
• Responsiveness (deployment supportability, logistics 
response time and total customer wait time) 
• Accurate identification of products and services offered 
(squadron material control expeditor training, supply and 
maintenance database integrity, tech pub library management, 
etc.) 
The MALS SCM core implementation team should develop high level 
performance metrics and supporting or diagnostic metrics.  According to The Guide, 
diagnostic metrics are “measures that relate to specific segments of the supply chain that 
must be quantified, managed, and improved to ensure achievement of overall 
performance and cost goals.” [Ref. 4:p. 68] Diagnostic metrics should: [Ref. 4:p. 68-9] 
• Be customer focused and assess how well customer needs are 
being met 
• Link functional performance measures and goals to overall 
(MAG/MALS) mission and operational objectives and goals; 
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promote mutual execution of functional responsibilities and 
discourage functional conflict 
• Establish process measures that monitor the use of 
(MAG/MALS) resources 
• Establish baselines to provide a context of historical 
performance for evaluating improvement initiatives 
• Establish comparison benchmarks to provide clear performance 
targets and feedback; facilitate progressive improvement 
• Establish measures to prevent the cost of information collection 
and analysis from exceeding the benefits derived 
• Assist managers in managing current operations and 
facilitating future planning by providing tools that evaluate 
program performance, cost, and management; provide a basis 
for changing the program; support planning, programming and 
budgeting 
b. SCM Implementation Strategy #2: Assess Required Process 
Changes 
In order to evaluate the performance measures derived through strategy 
#1, the MALS SCM core implementation team should proceed to designing the future 
supply chain process.  Deriving the “to be” or future supply chain process requires 
evaluating the following three principle factors from The Guide: [Ref. 4:p. 73] 
• Existing organizations, policies, procedures, and infrastructure 
assets 
• Desired future performance objectives 
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• Required process changes identified by the (MALS) SCM core 
implementation team 
The first principle, and likely the most difficult, requires the team focusing 
on the “current” logistics environment and culture.  Organizational change is difficult, 
and SCM can be viewed as a threat to the status quo that senior and experienced Marine 
aviation logisticians have strived so long and hard to become “experts” at.  Obtaining 
support from senior leadership and from the “rank and file” of aviation logisticians 
participating as members of the entire MALS supply chain team will be critical to 
breaking the barriers of organizational change. [Ref. 4:p. 73] 
The second and third principles entail the MALS SCM core 
implementation team documenting the “to be” or future supply chain performance 
objectives and developing actions that accelerate process changes in that direction.  
According to The Guide, focusing on the second and third principles by “advocating 
change and being persistent” helps overcome natural barriers experienced in the first 
principle.  [Ref. 4:p. 73]  Challenging the current Naval and Marine Corps aviation 
logistics culture and environment will be extremely difficult to implement SCM on a 
global enterprise scale.  Established and long accepted aviation logistics policies, 
procedures and processes are a large hurdle to implementing major reform and change.  
Coupled with this fact are the many separate activities within the Naval and Marine 
Corps aviation logistics supply chain primarily concerned with their own fragmented 
functional performance within the aviation logistics architecture, and not truly integrated 
with the exception of “arm’s length” relations with the next immediate partner in the 
supply chain.  The design of the future “to be” supply chain should be one that includes 
sharing of common data or real time exchange of information to optimize integrated 
enterprise-wide performance measures ultimately tied to sustaining aircraft readiness or 




c. SCM Implementation Strategy #3: Assess/Develop Supplier 
Relationships 
Addressing supplier relationships primarily deals with the external supply 
chain functions, and not the internal supply chain function of the MALS and supported 
customers.  “Upstream” members of the external aviation logistics supply chain for the 
MALS include the supply point of entry (POE) which is the host supporting Marine 
Corps Air Station or Naval Air Station Supply Department.  The next level of supply is 
the Navy Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers (FISC) responsible for the region in which 
the MALS is geographically located.    West Coast and Reserve Marine Corps Air 
Stations and Naval Air Stations also serve as FISC partnership sites under FISC San 
Diego, California.  This effort to consolidate air station inventories under the FISC 
umbrella created a virtual consolidation of Navy and Marine Corps wholesale aviation 
supply inventories.  Beyond the FISC are the inventory control points (ICP) for repairable 
and consumable materials.  The Naval Inventory Control Point Philadelphia (NAVICP-P) 
and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) provide wholesale-level repairable and 
consumables inventory management for the Navy and Marine Corps.  Naval Aviation 
Depots (NADEPs) and defense contractors provide the aviation depot level repairable 
and depot level repairable remanufacturing capability for re-supplying Naval and Marine 
Corps wholesale and retail level inventories and overhauling major weapon systems 
(aircraft) and components.   
Appendix A provides a detailed graphical depiction of the external 
aviation logistics supply chain.  Future integration of logistics information management 
systems with the Naval and Marine Corps Air Station Supply Departments, FISCs, 
NAVICP-P and DLA is the key to furthering partnerships with upstream suppliers into a 
“truly integrated” SCM concept within the Navy/Marine aviation logistics infrastructure.  
Complete integration of these logistics management information systems will further 
enable the ICPs and NADEPs to ally themselves with industry to better forecast the 
demand and logistics requirements of the operational squadrons and optimize aircraft 
readiness.  
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The following key informational factors in improving alliances with 
upstream members of the Navy and Marine aviation logistics supply chain must be based 
on Responsiveness, Cost, Cycle time, and Quality: [Ref. 4:p. 79 and 84] 
• Historical, actual, and forecast customer demands 
• Supplier production and delivery capabilities 
• Pricing information 
• Technical data 
• Forecast accuracy and support issues 
• Government and commercial inventories 
• Repair capacity and schedules  
• Planned future orders 
• Production/delivery lead times 
• Transportation capacity and channels 
• Tracking of orders and material deliveries 
d. SCM Implementation Strategy #4: Determine Customer 
Expectations 
The MALS SCM core implementation team must satisfy three questions in 
order to provide a “customer-focused supply chain.”  They are 1) who are the supply 
chain members, 2) what are their requirements, and 3) how will overall customer 
satisfaction be measured in the future supply chain?  [Ref. 4:p. 86] 
In answering the first question, there are two customers in the Marine 
aviation logistics supply chain at the tactical level: the organizational maintenance 
activity and the intermediate maintenance activity.  These two activities provide the 
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means to achieving aircraft operational availability (Ao) and sustaining aircraft readiness.  
To answer the second question, the MALS SCM core implementation team must 1) take 
into consideration the customer’s materials and services requirements more commonly 
referred to as the “seven R’s” or “the Right product delivered to the Right place, in the 
Right condition and packaging, in the Right quantity, at the Right cost, to the Right 
customer, at the Right time,” and 2) satisfy the customer’s logistics information needs 
which have, over time, increasingly become more advanced than just “order and receive.” 
[Ref. 4:p. 88 and 91]  Better information provides the end customer with the better 
capability to plan and execute actions to provide resources and capabilities to maintain 
aircraft and optimize readiness. 
e. SCM Implementation Strategy #5: Define/Redefine the Future or 
“To Be” Supply Chain 
  Using Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs), the MALS SCM core 
implementation team should construct a high level graphical depiction of the current “as 
is” supply chain, and then develop the future “to be” supply chain.  Step four in the six 
step process discusses developing the high level operational graphic of the supply chain.  
Appendix A provides a detailed high level operational graphic of the Naval/Marine Corps 
aviation logistics supply chain.  The future supply chain might not be that much different 
from the current supply chain from an activity point of view, but processes could change 
based on integration and cross-functionality across the various nodes of the supply chain.  
In our research, we propose the MALS SCM core implementation team utilize the same 
guidance proposed in The Guide in designing the future supply chain by evaluating those 
functions and processes within their span of control (basically at the MALS level and 
below).  The Guide provides the following general approach in designing the future 
supply chain: [Ref. 4:p. 95] 
• At a relatively high level, document functional activities to be 
included in the supply chain design.  These activities generally 
are referred to as process elements. 
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• Using the documentation of basic process elements of the 
supply chain, create the high level operational concept graphic. 
• Complete the identification and descriptions of supply chain 
performance and cost metrics.  Using the process element 
documentation, cross-reference these metrics to specific 
elements or element groupings. 
• Document a baseline of actual data to quantify the selected 
supply chain metrics. 
• Perform ‘gap’ analysis to document differences between the 
performance of the current process and desired performance 
goals. 
• Using the documentation of basic supply chain process 
elements, identify potentially applicable business practice 
improvements. 
• Prepare the overall initial operational node connectivity 
diagram to document the end-to-end future supply chain 
process.  Include narrative descriptions. 
• On a continuing basis, revise the operational node connectivity 
diagram to reflect further refinement of process relationships 
and application of additional business process improvements. 
Further supply chain design details will be provided in SCM 
Implementation Step #4. 
f. SCM Implementation Strategy #6: Identify and Prioritize Initial 
Targets of Opportunity 
As a part of designing the future supply chain, the MALS SCM core 
implementation team should identify areas of opportunity for improvement such as 
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“improved customer satisfaction, more effective sourcing, shortened cycle times, reduced 
inventories, or operational savings.” [Ref. 4:p. 96]  Identifying and exploiting early areas 
of improvement will provide the MALS SCM core implementation team the justification 
and means to further long range SCM implementation and/or strategic logistics 
objectives. 
g. SCM Implementation Strategy #7: Leverage Ongoing Business 
Process Reengineering and Systems Modernization Initiatives 
The MALS SCM core implementation team should identify and 
coordinate with other Navy/Marine Corps aviation logistics activities, Navy/Marine 
Corps logistics activities, DoD or other service logistics activities, and/or commercial 
activities involved with business process improvements and systems modernization 
efforts.  The MALS SCM core implementation team should be especially involved in 
business process or systems modernization efforts directly or indirectly affecting Marine 
aviation logistics or their command in particular.   Although many of these activities 
might be high-level strategic logistics organizations primarily involved in initiatives on a 
very broad logistics scope, MALS SCM core implementation team involvement can 
ensure Marine aviation logistics issues and concerns are properly addressed.  Two 
examples of current business process improvement and systems modernization efforts 
directly affecting Marine aviation logistics that the MALS SCM core implementation 
team can participate in are the Naval Aviation Readiness Integrated Improvement 
Program (NAVRIIP) and the Naval Supply Systems Command and the Naval Air 
Systems Command’s joint venture; the Supply Maintenance Aviation Reengineering 
Team (SMART) Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) pilot project.   
NAVRIIP is an Chief of Naval Operations directed initiative to 
“implement a comprehensive program to make fundamental process changes in the way 
enabling resources are provided to CONUS non-deployed aviation commands in support 
of training and readiness objectives.” [Ref. 6]  The objectives of NAVRIIP are to:  
define, attain and sustain near and long term non-deployed aviation readiness 
goals. NAVRIIP will operationalize the Aviation Maintenance and Supply 
Readiness (AMSR) group initiatives by balancing and aligning interactions 
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among O-level maintenance; I level maintenance and the logistics infrastructure 
that supports them (including D-level maintenance). A secondary objective of 
NAVRIIP is to identify opportunities for leveraging non-deployed naval 
aviation readiness process improvements in other US Navy programs including 
surface and subsurface. NAVRIIP will feature the systematic identification and 
removal of process barriers using entitled cycle time as basic driver of process 
change. The NAVRIT will focus on and accelerate, wherever possible, near and 
long-term CONUS non-deployed planeside readiness improvement initiatives, 
ensuring all initiatives are fully integrated with N43’s in-service support 
objectives. NAVRIIP will use a total Cycle Time methodology that measures 
entitled cycle time dynamically for a predictive metric that systematically 
identifies, measures and prioritizes the key drivers of critical readiness support 
process [Ref. 6] 
Although NAVRIIP is primarily, if not solely, concerned with 
improving the non-deployed readiness of Navy squadrons and aircraft in the Inter-
Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC), the MALS SCM core implementation team, 
Marine aviation logisticians, and Marine aviation logistics planners should partner 
with their Navy counter-parts to leverage aviation logistics improvements, and 
further SCM-oriented initiatives as an integrated Navy/Marine aviation logistics 
team. 
The second example, the SMART project, is the major initiative that 
support’s the Naval Supply System Command’s (NAVSUP) strategic objective of 
“developing and deploying an enterprise business solution for core business functions.”  
[Ref. 8]  As defined on the NAVSUP Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) webpage, 
 Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) is the integration of business 
processes that optimize functions across an enterprise. The “enterprise” 
in this case refers to Navy Supply and Naval Aviation Maintenance and 
means taking advantage of commercial best business practices toward 
the goal of improving supply and maintenance support to fleet 
customers.  [Ref. 8] 
The overall goal of the Navy’s SMART project is to, 
demonstrate that an ERP system can replace the Navy’s legacy 
wholesale (UICP) and stock point (U2) supply systems. As a test of the 
ability of an ERP system to handle Navy supply and maintenance 
operations, the SMART pilot has a limited scope and addresses supply 
and maintenance as it pertains to the E-2C Hawkeye aircraft and the 
maritime LM-2500 gas turbine engine. The focus is on maintenance 
planning and supply chain material management processes. The Pilot 
will go-live at the Regional Supply Office (RSO) Norfolk, the Aviation 
Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD) Norfolk, the Naval 
Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) and the Naval Aviation Depot 
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(NADEP) North Island. In addition, there will be users at DFAS 
Norfolk and FISC Norfolk. [Ref. 8]   
The SMART project is just one of several initiatives the Navy and other 
defense agencies are working on that the MALS SCM core implementation team can 
leverage in order to achieve the long term objective of SCM implementation, integrate 
with upstream members of the aviation logistics supply chain, and/or improve strategic 
logistics management. 
h. SCM Implementation Strategy #8: Select /Implement Process 
Change, Enabling Software and Technologies 
This last strategy element is the last in developing the MALS SCM 
strategic logistics management plan.  After completing the first seven strategic objectives, 
the MALS SCM core implementation team must identify process change and technology 
applications that can achieve the desired results. [Ref. 4:p. 102] As identified in strategic 
objective #7, Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) is the only current commercial off the 
shelf software system that includes nearly all the aspects of supply chain management in 
one program.  Our recommendation is the MALS SCM core implementation team 
leverage current initiatives with ERP in order to advance SCM implementation in Marine 
aviation logistics and improve strategic logistics management.   
3. Step #3: Measure Performance   
The Guide recommends DoD activities utilize performance measures or metrics 
developed through research by Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton using a “balanced 
scorecard” approach [Ref. 9] and according to the Supply Chain Council’s “Supply Chain 
Operations Reference” or SCOR model, which is based on industry best practices of 
SCM. [Ref. 4:p. 69]  Metrics based on the balanced scorecard approach measure: [Ref. 
4:p. 69-70] 
• Meeting the strategic needs of the enterprise The enterprise in this case 
is tactical Marine aviation; the strategic need being aircraft readiness 
or operational availability (Ao). 
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• Meeting the needs of the individual customers   Individual customers 
in this case are organizational and intermediate maintenance activities 
directly involved with maintaining aircraft within a Marine Aircraft 
Group or Aviation Combat Element of a Marine Air Ground Task 
Force. 
• Addressing internal business performance Internal business 
performance applies to the performance of the MALS Aviation 
Supply, Aircraft Maintenance, and Logistics (S-4) departments. 
• Addressing process improvement initiative results Measuring and 
analyzing results of process improvements via process metrics tied to 
optimizing aircraft readiness. 
The adapted SCOR model for defense use is structured around four Level-1 
processes: Plan, Source, Maintain, and Deliver.  Table 2-3 provides definitions of each 
process of the adapted SCOR model. [Ref. 10:p. 3-4]   
Processes that provide finished goods and 
services, including order management, 
transportation management, and warehouse 
management, for meeting planned or actual 
demand
Deliver
Processes that transform goods to a finished 
state for meeting planned or actual demand.  
In the defense environment, this applies to 
repairing or overhauling spare parts or 
components or outright procurement of 
finished goods from industry
Maintain (originally “Make”)
Processes that procure goods and services 
for meeting planned or actual demand
Source
Processes that balance aggregate demand 
and supply for developing the best course of 




Table 2- 3 Definitions of SCOR Level 1 Processes (from Ref. 4:p 3-4) 
 33
 
The SCOR model was designed in order to provide organizations the means to: 
[Ref. 10:p. 3-4 to 3-5] 
• Communicate with suppliers using common terminology and standard 
descriptions; 
• Use the model as a planning and forecasting tool; 
• Leverage metrics and benchmarking to determine performance goals, 
set priorities, and quantify the benefits of process changes; 
• Link functional and process metrics to enterprise performance in a 
structured way; 
• Understand practices that yield the best performance; 
• Understand the SCM process and evaluate overall performance; and 
• Identify the best software tools for their process requirements.  
The Logistics Management Institute (LMI) developed performance measures for 
DoD activities based on the balanced scorecard concept and the SCOR model gauging 
the following: customer service, cost, and readiness and sustainability measures. [Ref. 
4:p. 70]   
a. Customer Service Measures 
• Perfect Order Fulfillment Defined as the ratio of perfectly 
satisfied orders to total orders measured from the customer’s 
perspective.  A perfect order meets the following criteria: 
o Delivered complete; all items delivered in the quantities 
requested 
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o Delivered on time, using the customer’s definition of 
on-time delivery 
o Complete and accurate documentation (including 
packing slips, bills of lading, and invoices) to support 
the order 
o Delivered in perfect condition and in the perfect 
configuration to be used by the customer, faultlessly 
installed (as applicable). 
o The customer’s Required Delivery Date (RDD) or the 
Uniform Material Movement and Issue Priority System 
(UMMIPS) time standards will be used. [Ref. 11:p. 3-
46 to 3-58] 
• Supply Chain Response Time Defined as the total length of the 
supply chain measured in days.  LMI further adapted the 
SCOR model for DoD activities to only include average 
“source” and “order” cycle times because “plan” time is 
included in administrative lead time, and “maintain” time is 
included in “source” cycle time because repair activities are a 
major source of supply for aviation depot level repairables and 
depot level repairables. [Ref. 10:p. 4-4] Customer Wait Time 
(CWT) is a current DoD metric that measures the time from 
input of the customer’s requirement to delivery of the required 
material throughout the entire end-to-end supply chain 
enterprise. [Ref. 4: p. 70-1] 
o Source Cycle Time  Defined as the cumulative lead 
time (Administrative Lead Time [ALT], supplier lead 
time, receiving time, and handling time) from demand 
identification until the material is available.  For 
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repairables, source cycle time is the average dollar 
weighted time to obtain new items from new 
procurement (ALT and production lead time [PLT]) 
and repair (retrograde time and repair cycle time 
[RCT]).  For consumables, it is merely ALT and PLT.  
Source cycle time at the MALS should reflect the time 
it takes to receive material (stock and direct-turnover 
[DTO] requirements) from “off-station” or external to 
the MALS.  This would entail aggregating the time 
spent a requisition flows through the entire 
Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain, 
graphically depicted and described in Appendix A.  
Source cycle time should be filtered by:  [Ref. 10:p. 4-
4] 
9 In order: Squadron, MALS, Supply point of 
entry (POE) and/or Fleet and Industrial Supply 
Center, Inventory Control Point, Defense 
Distribution Depot (DDD), Supply POE, and 
MALS.  A separate category covering time 
accrued with the contractor (direct vendor 
delivery, contractor logistics support, or third 
party logistics) should also be included.    
9 Repairable and consumable items 
9 Weapon system or type-model-series aircraft 
(type equipment code) 
9 Commodity or cognizance code 
9 Essentiality (project code)  
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o Order Fulfillment Time or Deliver Lead Time 
Measured from the customer’s perspective, is defined 
as the average lead time from customer signature and 
authorization to order-receipt, order-receipt to order-
entry-complete, order-entry-complete to order-ready-
for-shipment, and order-ready-for-shipment to 
customer-receipt-of-order.  This process is analogous to 
the “on-station” or internal requisitioning process 
described in Appendix C between supported Marine 
Aircraft Group squadrons and the MALS.  The 
aggregated time is commonly referred to as logistics 
response time or LRT.    These values can also be 
analyzed from either a single line item requisition point 
of view, or from a job perspective (e.g., a component 
awaiting parts [AWP] in the Intermediate Maintenance 
Activity) where a weapons replaceable assembly 
(WRA) accrues time in AWP and subsequently in 
maintenance where it undergoes repair once all parts 
are received (to effect repair). [Ref. 10:p. 4-5 to 4-6]  
LRT for a MALS should reflect only those customer 
requirements satisfied “on-station” from the MALS’s 
inventory or Intermediate Maintenance Activity. 
b. Cost Measures 
• Percent Change in Customer Price Compared to Inflation 
Defined as the customer’s price (standard price for 
consumables, standard and net price in the case of repairables) 
compared with inflation.  The LMI study and The Guide both 
define this further by representing the customer’s price as a 
market basket of secondary items similar to a market basket of 
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goods in the Cost Price Index (CPI). [Ref. 10:p. 4-6]  For the 
MALS, we recommend evaluating the annual, semi-annual, 
quarterly, and monthly price change notices of individual line 
items and aggregate inventory (by end item or weapon system 
application) in the Naval Aviation Logistics Command 
Management Information System (NALCOMIS) against 
historical prices to analyze variances in spending.  Knowledge 
of inflation rates and ICP-imposed surcharges are also 
important in understanding and accurately evaluating price 
variances and their impact on the Navy/Marine Corps Flying 
Hour Program budget performance. 
• Supply Chain Management Costs as a Percent of Sales at 
Standard Price Sales revenues amount to the cost of issue 
transactions to customers.  Supply chain costs include: [Ref. 
10:p. 4-7] 
o Management Information System (MIS) Costs These 
are costs incurred maintaining and operating supply 
chain-related logistics management information 
systems and supporting automated data processing 
systems.  In the MALS, this could apply to Shipboard 
Uniform Automated Data Processing System-Real 
Time (SUADPS-RT), Intermediate Maintenance 
Activity (IMA) NALCOMIS Phase II, Optimized IMA 
(O-IMA) NALCOMIS, Relational Supply (R-Supply), 
Streamlined Alternative Logistics Transmission System 
(SALTS), and International Maritime Satellite usage 
(INMARSAT). 
o Supply Chain Planning Costs These are costs associated 
with forecasting, developing finished goods or end-item 
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inventory plans, and coordinating the demand and 
supply process throughout the supply chain, including 
all channels. 
o Inventory Carrying Costs These are costs associated 
with gross inventory adjustments due to losses and 
surveys, obsolescence and shelf life expiration for 
consumable and repairable inventories. 
o Material Acquisition Costs These are the costs of 
material management and planning, supplier quality 
engineering, inbound freight and duties, receiving and 
storage, inspection, material process engineering, and 
tooling.  
o Order Management Costs These are the costs of 
creating customer orders; order entry and maintenance 
costs; contract, program, and channel management 
costs; installation planning costs; order fulfillment or 
delivery costs; distribution costs; outbound 
transportation costs; and customer invoicing and 
accounting costs.  
• Inventory Turns Defined as the total issue costs by the value of 
the inventory at current fiscal year standard prices, excluding 
war reserves (pre-positioned stocks, Fly-In Support Packages 
and Supplemental Aviation Spares Support pack-up kits).  
Repairable transactions do not provide an accurate measure at 
the MALS level because issues “off the shelf” do not record an 
immediate standard price financial transaction (or charge).  
Costs recorded with a repairable inventory turn (issue) are 
strictly repair parts costs associated repairing the squadron’s 
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retrograde, or if the squadron’s retrograde is beyond the 
capability of IMA maintenance (BCM), the cost recorded is at 
the net (carcass turn-in value) price.  In the event of destroyed, 
missing, lost, stolen, or unrecoverable repairable retrograde 
(carcass), the standard price will be charged to the squadron for 
the material issue. When repairable retrograde is not processed 
by the MALS appropriately though the Navy’s Advanced 
Traceability and Control (ATAC) network, the squadron could 
potentially be charged standard price for the repairable 
inventory turn (issue).  This measure is not reflective of the 
entire Marine aviation logistics supply chain.  [Ref. 10:p. 4-7 to 
4-8] 
c. Readiness and Sustainability Measures 
• Upside production flexibility Defined by the SCOR model as 
the number of days to achieve an unplanned, sustainable 20 
percent increase in production.  The LMI defines this measure 
as “the number of days required to achieve a sustainable 
posture for executing the national military strategy of fighting 
two Major Theater Wars (MTWs).” [Ref. 10:p. 4-8]  This 
metric is difficult to adapt to the MALS, especially in light of 
the changing defense environment and national military 
strategy.  A similar measure might gauge the number of days 
required to surge to wartime demand rates.  The LMI uses the 
example, “if it takes 60 days to increase production to the two 
MTW demand rate, then 60 days of war reserve stock are 
needed to ensure and uninterrupted supply.” [Ref. 10:p. 4-8]  
The Guide further adds that this measure includes “the repair 
days needed to support most-demanding current operational 
scenarios.” [Ref. 4:p. 71] 
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The LMI developed three additional performance measures not addressed 
by the SCOR model.  These three measures are a cost perspective to support a weapon 
system, an additional metric to support a two MTW (or as the national military strategy 
directs), and peacetime operating performance metrics that measure wartime readiness 
and sustainability.  LMI defines each in more detail: 
d. Cost Perspective: Weapons System Logistics Costs as a Percent 
of Acquisition Price 
This metric is defined as the cost of ownership of the weapons system as a 
percent of the acquisition price adjusted for inflation, modification and upgrades. 
NAVAIR’s definition of total ownership cost is “Total Ownership Cost includes all costs 
associated with the research, development, procurement, operation, logistical support and 
disposal of an individual weapon system including the total supporting infrastructure that 
plans, manages and executes that weapon system program over its full life.” [Ref. 12]  
Some elements of total ownership cost include total secondary item costs, total depot and 
IMA end-item repair costs (material and labor), and total organizational-level 
maintenance labor.  Currently, the MALS is graded on a fractional total cost (operations 
and maintenance support costs) of ownership as a function of operating hours flown.  
This “operating cost per flight hour” is gauged against a historical benchmark (OP-20 
target cost per flight hour) by individual type-model-series aircraft.  Measuring the total 
cost of ownership against the acquisition price is not a useful measurement at the MALS 
level.   
e. Readiness and sustainability perspective; Operational 
Availability (Ao) or weapon system non-mission capable (NMC) 
rates 
Full Mission Capability rates are equipment readiness metrics the Navy 
and Marine Corps uses to measure aircraft operational availability (Ao).  The Non-
Mission Capability (NMC) rate is the inverse of the Full Mission Capability (FMC) rate, 
and represents a weapon system not capable of performing its assigned mission (aircraft 
downtime).  Aggregate NMC rates are composed of two elements: aircraft downed for 
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maintenance and aircraft downed for parts or supplies. [Ref. 10: p. 4-9]  This 
performance measure should be used in concert with other measures that can be filtered 
or assigned to a specific weapon system, or type-model-series aircraft assigned to a 
Marine Aircraft Group or an Aviation Combat Element the Marine Aviation Logistics 
Squadron is assigned to support.    
f. Readiness and sustainability perspective; war reserve ratio 
This metric is defined as the ratio of (ready for issue or condition code 
“A”) war reserve assets on-hand to war reserve requirements. [Ref. 10:p. 4-10]  The ratio 
should be filtered by:  
• Weapon system 
• Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (custodian) 
• Repairable or consumable material 
• Marine Aviation Logistics Support Program category 
• Commodity if Field-level Repairable (FLR) or consumable 
These enterprise level performance measures can be easily applied to 
measure aviation logistics operations at the tactical level within the MALS.  Current 
aviation logistics policies, procedures, and processes should be evaluated and adapted, if 
necessary, to satisfy the intent of these measures for measuring supply chain performance 
at the MALS level, but also at the enterprise level throughout all of Naval and Marine 
Corps aviation.  Appendix D of The Guide provides more detailed performance 
measurements based on SCOR model. [Ref. 4:p. 226-240]  The MALS SCM core 
implementation team may find good use of these detailed performance measures in not 
only evaluating process and functional performance of the MALS, but also for 
proactively detecting trends and primary degraders detracting the MALS from achieving 
the ultimate goal of contributing to the Marine Aircraft Group’s and individual 
squadron’s aircraft operational availability (Ao).  
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4. Step #4: Designing Your Supply Chain    
In the “Strategy Implementation” step, we discussed the strategy of designing the 
supply chain.  Designing the supply chain involves describing and graphically depicting 
the flow of material throughout the entire end-to-end logistics process.  In the case of 
designing the supply chain for Marine aviation logistics, we intend to develop the 
overarching Navy/Marine Corps aviation logistics end-to-end supply chain, and then 
focus on one specific segment of that chain, the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 
(MALS).  By utilizing the same principles in designing the overarching graphic, the 
MALS SCM core implementation team can design the supply chain internal to the MALS 
and the end customer, the aircraft squadrons.  After constructing a high level operational 
graphic of the Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain, the process flow 
diagrams (PFDs) can be mapped and performance metrics assigned to the overall aviation 
logistics process internal to the MALS and supported squadrons.  By utilizing the process 
flow diagrams, the performance metrics can also be mapped down to individual functions 
with the process flow, to detect trends and identify primary degraders preventing 
achievement of performance goals.  This section provides examples of supply chain 
designs for MALS SCM core implementation teams to use based on adapted SCOR 
methods, and recommendations from The Guide.   
 43
Figure 2-3 shows the high level graphical depiction of the end-to-end 
Navy/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain based on an adapted SCOR model by 




































Figure 2- 3 Navy/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain high level graphic 
(after Ref.104:p. B-1) 
The aviation logistics flow starts with the customer, the aircraft squadron.  Marine 
aircraft squadron organizational maintenance activities are the lowest element of the 
supply chain providing and sustaining aircraft Operational Availability (Ao) or Fully 
Mission Capable (FMC) aircraft.  The next supply chain segment is the Marine Aviation 
Logistics Squadron (MALS).  The MALS is the primary supporting retail supply point 
and intermediate maintenance activity. The next segment in the supply chain is the Navy 
wholesale and retail supply points composed of the Naval Inventory Control Point-
Philadelphia (wholesale level), Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers and their sites 
(wholesale level), Marine Corps Air Station and Naval Air Station Supply Departments 
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(wholesale and retail level), and the Naval Aviation Depots and depot-level commercial 
contract maintenance activities.  Following the Navy wholesale and retail supply points 
are the Department of Defense wholesale supply and distribution points composed of 
Defense Logistics Agency inventory control points, Defense Distribution Center Depots.  
The last segment of the supply chain is commercial suppliers: direct vendor delivery 
suppliers, 3rd party logistics providers, and other potential commercial suppliers.  
Appendix A provides an alternate and more detailed high level operational graphic of the 
current Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain.   The graphic in Appendix A 
displays the network aspects and extreme complexity of the supply chain, as well as maps 
displaying physical locations of the members of the supply chain. 
The focus of this thesis is the evaluating the performance of the MALS segment 
of the Naval/Marine aviation logistics supply chain.  The next step for the MALS SCM 
core implementation team is to develop the process flow diagrams.  Figure 2-4 is an 
example of a process flow diagram mapping the entire Navy/Marine Corps aviation 





















Adapted DoN/USMC Aviation Logistics SCOR Level 2 
Supply Chain Diagram
(Process Flow Diagram) 
Ao
 
Figure 2-4 Naval/Marine Corps Aviation Logistics Supply Chain Process Flow Diagram 
(after Ref.10:p. B-1) 
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The MALS SCM core implementation team could utilize the process flow 
diagram shown in Figure 2-4, with the corresponding process definitions based on an 
adapted SCOR model, depicted in Figure 2-5 below: [Ref. 10:p. A-2]  
 
Adapted SCOR Level 2 Process Definitions
• P2 (Plan Source) = The development and establishment of courses of action that represent a 
projected appropriation of material resources to meet supply chain requirements.
• P4 (Plan Deliver) = The development and establishment of courses of action that represent a 
projected appropriation of delivery resources to meet delivery requirements.
• S1 (Source Stocked Material) = The procurement, delivery, receipt, and transfer of raw material, 
subassemblies, and make-to-stock products in a finished goods state (Ready For Issue or 
Condition Code “A”) 
• S2 (Source Make-to-order Material) = The procurement and delivery of material built to a design 
or configured based on the requirements of a customer order (i.e. Expeditious Repair or EXREP)
• M1 (Make to Stock) = The process of manufacturing products (make-to-stock products are 
intended to be shipped from finished goods (Ready For Issue or Condition Code “A”) or “off the 
shelf,” completed before receipt of a customer order, and produced generally in accordance with a 
sales forecast).  This same concept applies to “re-manufactured” products, which in the Marine 
aviation logistics environment would be classified as Aviation Depot Level Repairables (AVDLRs), 
Depot Level Repairables (DLRs), and Field Level Repairables (FLRs). 
• M2 (Make to Order) = The process of manufacturing products (make-to-order products are 
intended to be completed after receipt of a customer order and are built or configured only in 
response to a customer’s order, i.e. EXREP). This same concept applies to “re-manufactured” 
products, which in the Marine aviation logistics environment would be classified as Aviation Depot 
Level Repairables (AVDLRs), Depot Level Repairables (DLRs), and Field Level Repairables
(FLRs). 
• D1 (Deliver Stocked Product) = The process of delivering a product maintained in a finished 
goods state (Ready For Issue or Condition Code “A”) before the receipt of a firm customer order.
• D2 (Deliver Make to Order Products) = The process of delivering a product manufactured (re-
manufactured), assembled, or configured from standard parts or subassemblies; manufacture (re-
manufacture), assembly, or configuration begins only after the receipt and validation of a firm 
customer order.  
Figure 2-5 Adapted SCOR Model Level 2 Process Flow Diagram Definitions 
(after Ref. 10:p. A-2) 
The MALS SCM core implementation team should proceed beyond the adapted 
SCOR “level 2” processes, and develop even more detailed sub-process diagrams 
(adapted SCOR “level 3”) depicting actual flow of material within the MALS to the 
supported squadrons.  Mapping the “level 3” sub-processes (plan, source, maintain and 
deliver within the MALS) will allow the team to identify where to apply performance 
measures to integrate functional areas and improve logistics responsiveness and achieve 
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increased aircraft readiness.  Figure 2-6 is a proposed example of a level 3 subprocess for 
the “Deliver” level 2 process within the MALS.  Actual process flow diagrams can be 
substantially more detailed, providing more specific descriptions of functions within a 
process (e.g., MALS-14 use of Theory of Constraints and logic trees for mapping parts 
management within the MALS).     
Adapted DoN/USMC Aviation Logistics SCOR Level 3 
Supply Chain Diagram
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Figure 2-6 Adapted SCOR “Deliver-Stocked Product/Make-To-Order Product” 
Level 3 Process Flow Diagram (after Ref.104:p. A-3) 
Appendix B provides SCOR level 3 process definitions for the “deliver-stocked 
product/make-to-order product” process at the MALS level.  Appendix C provides an 
alterative to the adapted SCOR model process flow diagram.  This alternate example 
provides a more detailed process flow diagram depicting the flow of material from a 
Marine a squadron through the MALS (requisitioning, issuing, and repair cycle process).  
After designing the supply chain, and mapping the supply chain processes and 
subordinate functions to the desired depth to apply enterprise and diagnostic performance 
metrics, the MALS SCM core implementation team can begin analyzing where supply 
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chain deficiencies occur, and apply best business practices and target performance to 
achieve improvements.  [Ref. 4:p. 122-23]  Robert Handfield and Ernest Nichols 
developed a list of common supply chain process deficiencies illustrated in Table 2-4: 
[Ref. 13:p. 54-56] 
•Waiting---inordinate wait time in 
multi-step processes
•Serial vs. parallel operations---
Activities that could be accomplished 
simultaneously
•Batching---Unnecessary combining 
of activities, causing delay
•Lack of synchronization in 
materials movement---Inefficient 
movement or poor timing of required 
movement
•Poorly designed procedures and 
forms---Inefficient design or use of 
tools that delays or disrupts supply chain
•Lack of information---Information 
not available or non-existent
•Limited coordination---Failure to 
obtain required input or action from 
employees or managers
•Limited cooperation---Lack of 
commitment or understanding from 
supply chain participants; poor 
motivation or lack of common 
objectives
•Non-value-added activities---
Activities that should be eliminated
•Repeating process activities---
Nonrequired duplication of activities
•Excessive controls---Unneeded 
approvals or reviews
•Ambiguous goals and objectives--
-Organizational objectives not 
understandable and clear to employees, 
suppliers, or customers
•Poor communication---Ineffective 
flow of information between personnel 
or systems
•Outdated technology---Failure to 
modernize equipment
•Lack of/ineffective training---
Training not available or not properly 
focused on correct subject matter
 
Table 2- 4 Common Supply Chain Process Deficiencies (from Ref. 4:p. 123) 
5. Step #5: Selecting and Applying Best Practices and Technologies 
After designing the supply chain, identifying and mapping supply chain processes 
and functions relevant to the organization, and applying supply chain performance 
metrics to processes and functions, the next logical step is to evaluate the use of best 
business practices and technology to assist in implementing SCM throughout the 
organization.  Best business practices and technology can also be used as enabling tools 
for executing and achieving the objectives and goals of a strategic logistics management 
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plan.  Although The Guide provides interesting recommendations on best practices and 
technologies for implementing SCM, they are outside the scope of this thesis.  Contrary 
to what is recommended in The Guide, we feel that many best practices and enabling 
technologies for implementing SCM are outside the scope of this thesis because 
implementing “true” supply chain management should be accomplished throughout all of 
Navy/Marine Corps aviation logistics, and not solely within the MALS.  On the other 
hand, we feel the SCM principles and implementation strategy recommended in The 
Guide not only could improve aircraft readiness and aviation logistics processes and 
functions, but also prepare the MALS for eventual SCM implementation throughout 
Navy/Marine Corps aviation logistics enterprise.  Our interpretation and adaptation of 
The Guide’s “implementing best practices and technology” is actually aggressively 
seeking out and implementing proposals identified during Step #2 “Developing the 
Supply Chain Implementation Strategy;” specifically those best practices and 
technologies identified in SCM Implementation Strategies #7 (leverage ongoing business 
process reengineering and systems modernization initiatives) and #8 (select/implement 
process change, enabling software and technologies).   
In this context, we feel the best practices and technologies identified in The 
Guide, can be applied to Marine aviation logistics in a limited fashion.  The best practices 
identified in The Guide include the near industry standard on SCM, the Supply Chain 
Operations Reference (SCOR) model, which was described in depth earlier in this 
chapter.  Our emphasis in utilizing an adapted version of the SCOR model is for the 
MALS to utilize it as a potential roadmap for utilizing supply chain management 
principles and integrating with customers and upstream supply members to improve 
logistics responsiveness and aircraft readiness at the tactical level of Marine aviation 
logistics.  The maximum benefit of utilizing the SCOR model can only be achieved 
through complete integration of SCM principles throughout all activities of the 
Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain.  A more relevant business process 
improvement initiative is naval aviation’s NAVRIIP project explained earlier in this 
chapter.   
 50
Enabling technology for implementing SCM also must not be acquired solely for 
the MALS, or even for Marine aviation logistics, but rather on a strategic venture to 
support all of Navy/Marine Corps aviation to avoid creation or continuation of 
dysfunctional, stove-piped, and stand-alone logistics management information systems, 
decision support systems, expert systems, internet-based software applications, and other 
associated software.  We recommend the MALS SCM core implementation team, and 
Marine aviation logisticians and planners throughout all levels of Marine aviation for that 
matter, become knowledgeable and proactively engage with current Department of the 
Navy Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) pilot projects.  Specifically, we recommend 
direct involvement by MALS SCM core implementation team and MALS “subject matter 
experts” in the NAVAIR/NAVSUP ERP pilot project (“SMART” initiative) also 
discussed earlier in this chapter.  Participating with the SMART Integrated Product Team 
(IPT) members and pilot project personnel at Naval Air Station Oceana Aircraft 
Intermediate Maintenance Department and Supply Department will ensure that Marine 
aviation logistics-specific processes, functions or aviation logistics doctrine peculiar to 
Marine aviation logistics is considered, tested and implemented as a part of the SMART 
pilot project development prior to fielding to the operational forces.  Failure to do so 
could result in extremely costly post-production software changes to conform to Marine 
aviation logistics requirements.  These proactive efforts will prepare the MALS and 
supported aircraft squadrons for the eventual implementation of ERP as the Navy and 
Marine Corps’ aviation logistics supply chain management information system of the 
future.  The Guide’s clear recommendation is that ERP is the only current software 
application technology designed to “consolidate the disparate functions of supply and 
logistics into a comprehensive supply chain planning suite.” [Ref. 4:p. 165]       
6. Step #6: Managing Supply Chain Implementation   
The sixth and final step of SCM implementation is management.  According to 
The Guide, most DoD logistics managers are entrenched in the “day-to-day problems of 
logistics operations, and feel they are unable to effect the changes needed to relieve near 
term problems.” [Ref. 4:p. 174]  Most DoD and Navy/Marine Corps aviation logistics 
managers focus on their own functional areas within the supply chain enterprise, or what 
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we refer to as their “spheres of influence” and “spans of control.”  For example, a Supply 
Response Division (SRD) Officer within a MALS is concerned with minimizing the 
average customer wait time for “off-station” material requirements, or direct turn-over 
requisitions external to the MALS.  Essentially, the SRD Officer’s “sphere of influence” 
resides with members of the supply chain external to the MALS (e.g., downstream 
members such as aircraft squadrons; and upstream members such as the DLA Inventory 
Control Points).  The SRDO’s “span of control” resides with managing squadron 
requirements before they are referred to upstream members of the supply chain.  This 
includes performing technical research on requirements that have been determined to be 
“not-carried” or “not-in-stock” in inventory.  The day-to-day operational concern for the 
SRDO is to eliminate direct turn-over requisitions, especially mission critical and 
readiness degrading requisitions.  Oftentimes, the SRDO is not primarily concerned about 
integrating efforts with the Repairables and Consumables Management Division (RMD 
and CMD) Officers to optimize the range and depth of inventories in order to prevent off-
station DTO requisitions from ever occurring (the best case scenario).  Integrating efforts 
with the RMDO and CMDO will improve long term readiness and logistics response time 
more than any short term readiness and customer wait time (CWT) improvements 
achieved simply through aggressively expediting DTO requisitions.    More aptly put, 
RMD and CMD should be putting SRD out of business!  In today’s cultural environment 
though, the typical SRD Officer considers RMD and CMD are separate functional areas 
within the MALS Aviation Supply Department, with “spheres of influence” and “spans 
of control” separate from his/her own.   
Considering the opportunity for dysfunctional relations between the Supply 
Response, Repairables Management and Consumables Management Division officers, it 
is no wonder that The Guide states most cross-functional logistics issues and concerns are 
addressed at only the highest levels of the organization. [Ref. 4:p. 174]  The Guide further 
states that effective management of the supply chain requires logistics managers to 
master not only knowledge and expertise in their responsible functional areas, but also 
“fully understand and work toward enterprise-wide objectives by tracking actual progress 
in attaining degrees of improvement in supply chain competencies.” [Ref. 4:p. 176] 
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Integral to properly managing the supply chain is the Marine aviation logistics 
manager’s access to performance metrics information on all aspects of the Marine 
aviation logistics supply chain.  Most metrics provide information useful only for 
functional areas, and in best case scenarios, only a process within a segment of the total 
supply chain enterprise.  Most metrics do not gauge the entire total supply chain 
performance and its contribution to achieving the goals and objectives of an organization, 
and are not “linked or correlated to one another so managers can consider important 
supply chain relationships” (e.g., supply material availability, supply effectiveness, and 
fill rate metrics of upstream supply chain members are high yet squadron readiness rates 
are declining).  [Ref. 4:p. 182]  Earlier in this chapter, we proposed SCM performance 
measures as a part of the SCM implementation strategy that capture total supply chain 
performance (adapted SCOR model performance measures).  These same measures can 
be fractionalized and used to capture the supply chain performance of segments of the 
supply chain, or in our case, the MALS.  Later in this thesis we will analyze how MALS-
14 developed and implemented their strategic logistics management plan, and developed 
a “one page management” reporting tool that enabled all “stakeholders” and members of 
the MALS aviation logistics supply chain, from the most junior IMA work center 
maintainer to the MALS Commanding Officer, to manage processes and functions 
critical to improving and sustaining aircraft readiness and logistics responsiveness within 
the entire air group.   
E. SUMMARY 
In summary, we developed in this chapter a basic foundation of understanding the 
Naval/Marine Corps’ aviation logistics infrastructure from a supply chain management 
perspective, based on the Logistics Management Institute’s DoD Supply Chain 
Management Implementation Guide.  A precipitate of this analysis was designing a high-
level graphical model mapping the complex Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply 
chain network and a detailed process flow diagram describing the tactical aviation 
logistics operations of the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS).  These two 
graphics will help provide Marine aviation logisticians a visual reference for developing 
performance measures for the MALS that can be integrated with upstream aviation 
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logistics activities, and are based on the principles of SCM.  With this in mind, this 
chapter also provides the structural framework for developing the performance measures 
and outline for a strategic logistics management plan for improving Marine aviation 
logistics at the strategic and tactical level. The basic framework was the Six Step Process 
of Implementing Supply Chain Management as proposed in The Guide.  With this 
foundation, we can now better analyze and understand in Chapter 4 how MALS-14 
successfully implemented a strategic logistics management plan based on a “structured 
planning and feedback system” and the Theory of Constraints management philosophy 
that improved aircraft readiness within MAG-14.   
Although The Guide’s impetus was to provide a plan to implement SCM 
throughout the end-to-end logistics and supply enterprise of an organization, our focus is 
on the tactical-level segment of the Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain: 
the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron.  Developing a specific strategic logistics plan 
for implementing supply chain management and performance metrics for the 
Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain enterprise is outside the scope of this 
thesis.  Most of the fundamentals discussed in The Six Step Process for Implementing 
SCM can be applied within the Marine Aircraft Group and Marine Aviation Logistics 
Squadron in order to develop SCM-oriented performance metrics that will 1) improve 
current and future aviation logistics support and aircraft readiness where required, 2) help 
prepare the for the eventual implementation of SCM within Naval/Marine aviation 
logistics, and 3) once SCM is implemented, serve as the overarching logistics strategy to 
integrate all Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain activities’ performance 
metrics towards a common goal: aircraft readiness or operational availability (Ao).   
With these strategic performance measurement objectives in mind, we conclude 
The Guide’s The Six Step Process for Implementing SCM is relevant to Naval/Marine 
Corps aviation logistics and the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron.  Chapter 5 will 
reveal the specific performance measures that are SCM oriented and are intimately tied to 





























Prior to conducting the case study of MALS-14, it is imperative for the reader to 
have a basic understanding of the philosophy of the Theory of Constraints and how it can 
be applied to supply chain management.  Therefore, the objectives for this chapter are to 
(1) establish an understanding of the Theory of Constraints, (2) substantiate the need for a 
global goal to focus the efforts of supply chain management, (3) illustrate how Logic 
Trees are used to identify system constraints, (4) show how the Five-Focusing Steps are 
used to eliminate or mitigate a constraint, and (5) illustrate how TOC can be used as a 
framework for strategic planning. 
 
B.  BACKGROUND 
Theory of Constraints (TOC) evolved from the theories and teachings of Dr. 
Eliyahu M. Goldratt, a physicist who realized that scientific principles and the rules of 
logic could be applied to processes in order to provide on-going improvement for the 
system as a whole.  A prescriptive theory, TOC aims not only to explain why (Logic 
Trees) but also offer guidance on what to do (Five Focusing Steps).  Theory of 
Constraints is “a collection of system principles and tools, or methods for solving the 
problem of improving system performance.” [Ref. 3:p. xxi]  For example, Throughput 
Accounting and Drum-Buffer-Rope are examples of TOC centered techniques used by 
many businesses in accounting and production management.  Theory of Constraints has 
one clear objective: to succeed in achieving more of an organization’s goal by focusing 
on the area(s) that have a dramatic impact on the whole organization.  This focus requires 
an understanding of (1) systems (supply chain), (2) the global goal of the organization 





C.  SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT 
 1. A Systems Approach  
A system is a “collection of interrelated, interdependent components or processes 
that act in concert to turn inputs into some kind of outputs in pursuit of some goal. [Ref. 
3:p. 3]  As the system takes inputs, acts on them through some process, and produces 
outputs, the outputs have greater value than the sum of the inputs.  Therefore, the system 
might be said to add value to the inputs as the system turns them into outputs.   
 A supply chain is a system.  Definitively, a supply chain is the “continuous, 
unbroken, comprehensive, and all-inclusive logistics process, from initial customer order 
for material or services to the ultimate satisfaction of the customer requirement.” [Ref. 
3:p. 13]  Therefore, supply chain management is the design, maintenance, and operation 
of supply-chain (logistics) processes for satisfaction of end-user needs. 
Goldratt emphasizes a systems approach to achieving more of the system’s goal.  
Specifically, TOC focuses on the interdependencies of the component processes that 
make up the system.  “Goldratt contends that systems are analogous to chains, or 
networks of chains.  Each link in the chain is a component process.” [Ref. 3:p. xxi]  The 
DoN/MC Aviation Logistics Supply Chain is a system designed to sustain and support 
aircraft weapons systems (see Appendix A). Thus, each link (DLA, MALS, etc.) within 
the supply chain is a component of the system that adds value to sustaining and 
supporting aircraft weapons systems.         
As part of an integrated supply chain, each organization (DLA, NADEP, MALS, 
etc.) within the supply chain influences or is influenced by the interdependency of the 
supply chain as a whole.  Therefore, any action taken by an individual organization must 
give consideration to the impact that action will have not only on its organization but also 
on the supply chain as a whole.  This emphasizes the need for organizations to have an 
understanding of their supply chain (macro) and how their organization fits and functions 
within the supply chain (macro and micro).  One of the first steps in developing a 
strategic plan for SCM is to develop a Process Flow Diagrams (PDFs) of the supply chain 
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end-to-end.  Figure 3-1 is the system model of the supply chain for Aviation Depot Level 
Repairables.  The arrows depict the interdependency of the system as products and 
information move throughout the supply chain.   
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Figure 3-1: Replenishment System (AVDLR only) 
 
 If each organization within the supply chain is driven to optimization without 
regard to the system as a whole, the flow of products across the system will not be 
optimized. [Ref. 14:p. 160]  Moreover, implementation of SCM in DoD cannot focus 
solely on individual functions within an organization but must rather concentrate on the 
end-to-end process.  However, before SCM can be fully adopted, organizations must 
“integrate their internal logistics processes before attempting to link operations with 
external suppliers and distributors.” [Ref. 14:p. 161]  This is the impetus behind MALS-
14’s Strategic Planning Initiative.  
 Because systems are analogous to chains, the systems performance is limited by 
the weakest link in the chain.  “If all the parts of the system are performing as well as 
they can, the system as a whole will not be – the system optimum is not the sum of the 
local optima.” [Ref. 15:p. 12]  Simply put, focusing on everything is focusing on nothing.  
This lack of focus can cause increases in inventory, cause increases in cycle time, and 
limit productivity of the system as a whole.  More importantly, by focusing solely on 
efficiencies and by optimizing resources in every area, the DoN/MC Aviation Logistics 
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Supply Chain will fail to maximize overall effectiveness of the integrated supply chain 
and will not achieve more of its goal – sustaining and supporting aircraft weapons 
systems. 
 
2.   Global Goal of Supply Chain Management 
Theory of Constraints requires the goal of the organization as a whole be clearly 
identified and brought into focus by everyone within the organization.  This goal is the 
global goal of the organization for which all decisions and actions lead to achieving.  
Therefore, identifying the global goal is imperative when developing and implementing a 
strategic management plan. 
At this point it is important to differentiate between a necessary condition and a 
goal.  A necessary condition is “a condition or state that must be satisfied in order to 
realize a system’s goal.”  A goal is “the purpose for which the system is created.” [Ref. 
15:p. 359]  Due to the interdependent nature of necessary conditions and the system goal, 
failing to satisfy necessary conditions results in system failure.  Furthermore, Dettmer 
emphasizes that the goal should be “stated in a way that implies continuum, not absolute 
destination.”  This continuum facilitates continuous improvement – the impetus of 
philosophy of Theory of Constraints.   
The DoN/MC Aviation Logistics Supply Chain is a system of interdependent 
organizations working in concert to achieve a goal.  The 2000 DoD Strategic Logistics 
Plan states the DoD Logistics goal or mission is to “provide responsive and cost effective 
support to ensure readiness and sustainability for the total force…” This goal is 
consistent throughout the strategic plans, doctrine, and operational documents of the 
supply chain.  Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-21.2 states “the O-level 
maintenance mission is to maintain assigned aircraft and aeronautical equipment in a full 
mission capable (FMC) status”.  Likewise, “the I-level mission is to enhance and sustain 
the combat readiness and mission capability of supported activities by providing quality 
and timely support”. [Ref. 2:p. 1016]  Therefore, the global goal of the DoN/MC 
Aviation Logistics Supply Chain is readiness or operational availability (Ao). 
 
 59
3.   Identifying Constraints 
Because the supply chain is a system, and systems are analogous to chains, 
constraints are the weakest link in the chain.  A constraint is a bottleneck or chokepoint, 
or anything that limits the system from achieving more of its goal.  A constraint prevents 
us from satisfying the necessary conditions that lead to achieving the goal.  Figure 3-2 is 
a simple production example of a system.  The constraint within this system is the 
throughput of Step C – 8 units per day.   
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Figure 3-2 Process Flow of Production System 
 
The throughput of the system can never be greater than 8 units per day unless 
steps are taken to eliminate the constraint and increase throughput.  Therefore, any effort 
not focused on improving Step C will not improve overall production or meet market 
demand – the goal of the product line.  Although Step C is the capacity constraint within 
the production system, another method must be used to identify the root cause of the 
constraint (ie. resource constraints).     
The constraints within the DoN/MC Aviation Logistics Supply chain are primary 
readiness degraders.  Primary readiness degraders are factors (funding, weapons system 
reliability, sparing levels, manpower, etc.) that have a direct impact on Ao.  Like the 
production system example, another method of analyzing cause and effect relationships 
has to be applied to identify the root cause of the system constraint. 
Theory of Constraints uses five distinct logic trees (Current Reality Tree, Future 
Reality Tree, Prerequisite Tree, Transition Tree, and Evaporating Cloud) and the “rules 
of logic” to map out cause and effect relationships.  The application of each type of logic 
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tree is beyond the scope of this thesis.  The purpose here is to provide an example of how 
logic trees can be applied to supply chain management and to show the cause and effect 
relationship of the logistics measures outlined by Benjamin Blanchard in Logistics 
Engineering and Management (5th ED). 
Figure 3-3 models of the logical cause and effect relationship between the 
logistics measures and the goal of aircraft readiness.       








































Figure 3-3 Cause and Effect Relationship of Logistics Measures and Operational 
Availability using Logic Tree 
The importance of reliability is apparent in the model.  The failure rate, λ, is a 
factor which impacts all three of the logistics measures.  Therefore, a cause and effect 
relationship exists between reliability (failure rate) and the operational availability of a 
weapon system.  The undesirable effect of poor reliability has a direct impact on the 
logistics support plan and life cycle cost of the weapon system.  It is imperative for the 
Program Manager and the Integrated Product Team to understand this cause and effect 
relationship when making tradeoff decisions and the down-stream affect those decisions 





4.  Managing Constraints 
Once the constraint - anything keeping a system from achieving higher 
performance versus its goal - has been identified, the next step is to either break the 
constraint or manage to the constraint using the Five Focusing Steps. [Ref. 16:p. 5] 
Goldratt has written extensively on how to use the five focusing steps.  In this section we 
will define the steps and apply them to the Level 3 SCOR model.  
Adapted DoN/USMC Aviation Logistics SCOR Level 3 
Supply Chain Diagram
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a.  Step 1: Identify the Constraints 
Identifying the constraints is the single most important step to achieving 
greater performance and continuous improvement.  Systems will typically have more 
than one constraint.  This requires you to prioritize the constraints according to their 
impact on the goal. 
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For example, customer wait time is a key performance measure linked to 
operational availability.  The Aviation Supply Officer has determined the 
Repairables/Consumables Delivery Branch is the constraint within the system.  Figure 3-
4 diagrams the requirements of the Delivery Branch. 
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Figure 3-4 Logic Tree for Delivery Branch 
 
Once the logical cause and effect relationship is developed, the factor or 
root cause of the constraint can be identified.  In this case, having two delivery sections 
was the root cause.       
 
b. Step 2: Exploit the Constraint 
Once you have identified the constraint, you have to decide how to 
manage the constraint.  If greater performance can be achieved by eliminating the 
constraint, do so.  This means the step was a non-value adding step or waste – lean 
production.  If the step is a value-adding step, you must get every bit of capability out of 
the constraint. In the Delivery Branch example, having two delivery sections was the root 
cause. Since delivering material to the squadron is a value-adding step, capability must be 
maximized to improve performance.  Therefore, RDB and CDB were combined to create 
one Delivery Branch.  The Branch was more efficient and more effective than two 
delivery sections – customer wait time decreased. 
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c. Step 3: Subordinate to the Constraint 
Once you have identified the constraint and decided how to exploit the 
constraint, the rest of the system must adjust to the constraint - Step C in the production 
example and combining the two sections in the Delivery Branch example.  In the delivery 
branch example, neither the Repairables Branch nor the Consumables Branch wanted to 
give up control of their respective delivery sections.  By subordinating to the decision to 
combine the two sections into one branch, the constraint was eliminated.   
In the production example, the throughput of Steps A, B, and D must not 
exceed the throughput of Step C (8 units/day).  If A and B are not adjusted, work-in-
process (WIP) inventory will accumulate at step C and Step D will eventually go idle 
from lack of work.  The technique used by TOC is the Drum-Rope-Buffer.  Thus, if the 
constraint cannot be eliminated all together, subordinating to the constraint makes the 
system more efficient and more effective. 
 
d. Step 4: Elevate the Constraint 
At times it may be impossible to eliminate the constraint or improve 
performance without changing the system.  Elevating the constraint may require 
reorganization, capital investment for additional resources, et cetera.  In the production 
example, investing resources in Step C to make it a parallel step would improve the 
throughput to 16units/day.  However, the improvements made to Step C would cause 
Step D to be the constraint.  Likewise in the Delivery Branch example, the need for more 
licensed drivers or more trucks would have required elevating the constraint.  NOTE:  
ALWAYS LOOK IN HOUSE FOR A SOLUTION BEFORE ELEVATING A 
CONSTRAINT! 
 
e. Step 5: Return to Step 1, BEWARE OF INERTIA 
Theory of Constraints is a continuous improvement process.  Once one 
constraint has been eliminated, another constraint will limit the system – Step D in the 
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production example.  WARNING – BEWARE OF INERTIA.  A solution to a constraint 
will deteriorate over time as the operational environment changes.  Therefore, a process 
of continuous improvement is necessary to ensure we maintain the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the system.  Therefore, we return to Step 1 and continue the process. 
 
D.   PERFORMANCE METRICS AND THEORY OF CONSTRAINTS 
Successful implementation of any SCM strategic plan requires measuring 
performance.  Goldratt asserts that performance measurements should be based on two 
criteria: (1) “measurements should induce the parts to do what is good for the system” 
and (2) “measurements should direct managers to the point that needs their attention.” 
[Ref. 17:p. 82]  Furthermore, the Theory of Constraints links performance metrics to the 
organization’s global goal through cause and effect relationships developed using Logic 
Trees.  Therefore, aviation logistics performance metrics link supply chain management 
to the global goal of AVLOG – operational availability.   
Figure 3-5 demonstrates the development of performance metrics through the 
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Figure 3-5 Developing Performance Metrics 
Although the metric is related to a specific segment or functional area of the 
supply chain, the metric (DIFM) is linked to the total process of supply chain 
management by cause and effect – increasing or decreasing the DIFM has an effect on 
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the SUPO’s ability to fill requisitions.  Thus, DIFM count directly impacts customer wait 
time and ultimately operational availability.  This substantiates the use of the Theory of 
Constraints as a framework for supply chain management. 
 
E. SUMMARY 
The DoN/MC Supply Chain is a system of interrelated, interdependent 
organizations and processes that are designed to sustain and support aircraft weapon 
systems.  Therefore, the principles, tools, and methods of the Theory of Constraints can 
be used to improve system performance through the use of Logic Trees and the Five 
Focusing Steps.  Process flow diagrams can be used to identify a bottleneck or constraint 
within the process; however, Logic Trees provide the means of identifying the root cause 
of the constraint through cause and effect relationships.  Furthermore, we used the Five 
Focusing Steps to identify and eliminate the constraint within the SCOR Level 3 Delivery 
Process.  In addition, we have shown how the Theory of Constraints and the Logic Trees 
link performance metrics to the global goal of the organization.  In Chapter 4, we will 


























































IV.  MALS-14 STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS 
 
A.       OVERVIEW 
“Strategic planning is a disciplined effort to shape and guide what an organization 
is, what it does, and why it does it.” [Ref. 18:p. 4]  The most important benefit of 
strategic planning is that it requires strategic thinking and action.  Other benefits of 
strategic planning are (1) improved decision-making, (2) enhanced organizational 
performance, and (3) fulfillment of roles and responsibilities of the people throughout the 
organization.  However, as Bryson points out, “strategic planning is not a panacea” and is 
“no substitute for leadership”.  Strategic planning is a set of concepts, procedures, and 
tools that help leaders focus on improving the performance of the organization to 
accomplish a mission, to meet mandates, and to satisfy stakeholders. 
During 2001, Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS) 14 developed and 
implemented a structured planning and feedback system based on the Theory of 
Constraints to improve aircraft readiness within Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 14.  This 
case study will review the history of MALS-14 (what it is, what it does, and why it does 
it), review the approach to aircraft readiness prior to the implementation of MALS-14’s 
plan, and review the phases of the MALS-14 Strategic Plan. 
 
B.  HISTORY OF MALS-14  
1.   What It Is, What It Does, Why It Does It? 
Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS) 14 is the tactical aviation logistics 
squadron for Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 14.  The mission of MALS-14 is to provide 
intermediate-level maintenance, supply, and ordnance/armament support to sustain 
aircraft and aeronautical equipment availability to MAG-14.  The MALS is the retail 
component of the DoN/MC Aviation Logistics Supply chain and the point of entry (POE) 
for all aviation logistics requirements for MAG-14. 
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In 1992, MAG-32 and MAG-14 merged into the largest MAG within the Marine 
Corps.  Likewise, MALS-32 and MALS-14 merged and consolidated their core group of 
supervisory and support personnel and aircraft-specific maintenance personnel to form 
MALS-14 – the largest Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron in the Marine Corps.  
        Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS) 14 supports some of the oldest 
aircraft in the largest, most deployed, and most diverse MAG in the Marine Corps – 11 
squadrons with 120 aircraft: TAV-8B, AV-8B (day, night, radar), EA-6B, and KC-
130F&R Type/Model/Series.  There are 1,170 Marines, Sailors, and Civilians assigned to 
MALS-14.  The Supply Department manages approximately 26,000 items (repairables 
and consumables) valued at $336 million.  The Maintenance Department has 44 
production work centers and inducts approximately 3000 items per month providing full 
repair capability for 928 repairables and limited repair capability for 1,604 repairables.       
 
2.  Why MALS-14 Must Change? 
Since the merger of the two Marine Aircraft Groups, readiness had never 
exceeded seventy percent for a consistent time.  Contributing factors were lack of funding 
for spares and equipment, manning and training challenges, aging aircraft, and intense 
operational tempo.   These factors, however, were not the overriding causes of poor 
aircraft readiness.  MALS-14 believed the most significant cause for poor readiness 
was wrong management focus.   
Typical approaches to aviation logistics management emphasized efficiencies and 
improvements that generated savings.   This was due, in part, to the resource-limited 
environment in which we function.  The aviation logistician’s goal was to optimize 
resources across the entire supply chain.  By focusing solely on efficiencies and by 
optimizing resources in every area, MALS-14 had failed to maximize the overall 
effectiveness of the organization.  This is due to the inherent variability and dependency 
of the supply chain.           
Current polices and practices aviation logisticians use to measure aircraft 
readiness do not accurately display how to effect positive change or prevent problems 
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before they happen.  In fact, traditional metrics reinforce local efficiency behavior.  In the 
Marine Corps and in the MALS, aiming to achieving efficiencies is what we have done 
well in the past, what we expect in the future (optimize resources in every area), and how 
we continue to measure how successful we are (reward savings and efficiencies).  For 
example, IMA turnaround time (TAT), IMA beyond capability of maintenance (BCM) 
rate, and supply effectiveness are measures that have no apparent correlation to aircraft 
readiness.  Figure 4-1 illustrates the lack of correlation between supply effectiveness (a 
MALS performance metric) and aircraft readiness for AV8Bs.  Although supply 
effectiveness is relative steady, there are large variations in aircraft readiness with no 
correlated variation in supply effectiveness.  
MALS-14 Supply Effectiveness (Net% & Gross%)
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Figure 4-1: Supply Effectiveness vs. AV8B Readiness Rates 
 
Yet, these internal efficiency metrics led MALS-14 to operate on the assumption 
that maximizing the performance of each component part of the system would 
automatically maximize the performance of the system as a whole – “Tell me how you 
are going to measure and I’ll tell you how I’m going to perform”.  No matter how good 
 70
these metrics were, there was no correlated improvement in readiness.  This led MALS-
14 to some very pointed questions about what drives readiness. 
Is the MALS measuring the right thing?  Do such efficiency metrics directly 
correlate to the overall goal of aircraft readiness?  Why, since 1992, if our efficiency 
metrics continue to meet the “standard”, do our readiness numbers lag? 
 
3.  Current Approach To Readiness 
To illustrate the typical management view, MALS-14 developed a supply chain 
model to apply to the MAG/MALS.  Readiness begins and ends with organizational level 
maintenance, as illustrated in Figure 4-2. 
M A L S  “ S u p p l y  C h a i n ”l i
O - L e v e l
M a i n t
M A L S
S u p p l y
M A L S
I M A
M a i n t
A W P S u p p l y
S t o r e
R F I ’ s
O - L e v e l
M a i n t
M A L S
I M A
M a i n t
D i s t r i b u t i o n D i s t r i b u t i o n
P r o d u c t i o n P r o d u c t i o n P r o d u c t i o n
D i s t r i b u t i o n
T y p i c a l  M a n a g e r i a l  R e s p o n s e  ( “ E f f i c i e n c y  W o r l d ” ) :
- m e t r i c s  a p p l i e d  t h r o u g h o u t
- I m p r o v e m e n t s  a t t e m p t e d  e v e r y w h e r e  
Figure 4-2: MAG –14 Supply Chain 
 
Requirements originate on the flight line as the OMA determines on-aircraft 
material requirements.  The MALS Supply Department provides a replacement part (if 
available) to the organizational level activity while simultaneously retrieving the 
retrograde part needing to be repaired.  The NRFI part is inducted into the MALS IMA 
for repair in the appropriate work center.  The part is added to the DIFM backlog and 
handled in priority order – typically first in, first out (FIFO).  During the repair process 
some delays will occur (administrative, handling, awaiting test bench or technician, 
waiting in queue, etc.).  The part may experience some considerable delays for repair 
parts and be held in “awaiting parts” (AWP) status.  Once the component is repaired, it is 
returned to the supply warehouse for subsequent use at a later date to fill other on-aircraft 
requirements.  Appendix C is the process flow diagrams for the OMA and IMA repair 
process and the repairable and consumable process flow for Supply.   
The typical way MALS-14 managed the supply chain was to attempt to manage 
the entire system and seek improvements at every link in the chain.  Supervisors were 
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rewarded for producing efficiencies within all the links in the chain.  This was not the 
best approach; yet, this was what MALS-14 was doing when they measured local 
optimums and efficiencies.  Today’s measures (TAT, Supply Effectiveness, BCM rate, 
etc.) may have no correlation to overall readiness and the management approach that 
supports the use of such metrics may not be the best for achieving readiness. 
To achieve a significantly higher level of readiness required a change in the way 
MALS-14 viewed readiness and the processes that drive readiness.  The Theory of 
Constraints philosophy was the bold approach MALS-14 employed to drive change in 
MAG-14.  The aim of MALS-14 to drive aircraft readiness was complex and burdened 
with challenges.  TOC was an approach that enabled MALS-14 to achieve superior 
results in spite of some real-world challenges (e.g., under-funded programs, spares and 
manning shortages, training deficiencies, aging systems, etc.).  TOC enabled the entire 
MAG and MALS to focus on what was the key to driving readiness (or constraining 
readiness) and TOC was ideally suited to create results in processes that were the core 
functions of the MALS (production and distribution).   
 
C.  MALS-14 STRATEGIC PLAN “ROADMAP” TO SUCCESS 
 The MALS-14 Strategic Plan consisted of seven phases: 
• Phase I – Sharing the Vision 
• Phase II – Values Training (Generating Commitment) 
• Phase III – Training in TOC management 
• Phase IV – Define MALS’ goal(s) and supporting tasks 
• Phase V – Identify Constraint 
• Phase VI – Implement integrated reporting system (link to EIS) 
• Phase VII – Manage by TOC methodology (employ 5 focusing steps) 
 
1.  Phase I - Sharing the Vision 
  a.  Implementation Team 
Phase I was the formation of the MALS-14 Implementation Team and the 
development of the MALS-14 Vision and Implementation Strategy.  The implementation 
team was a cross-functional mix of Staff Non-commissioned Officers and Officers from 
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each of the departments (Headquarters, Maintenance, and Supply).  The key members of 
the team were the Department Heads and Department Chiefs responsible for 
implementation of the strategy within their respective departments.  By building a cross-
functional team, ownership was built into the strategic planning process.  More 
importantly, commitment and support of key leaders within the squadron helped reduce 
the resistance to change. 
     b.   Vision Statement 
     MALS-14 conceptualized and communicated their success through a 
Vision Statement (Appendix E) to provide overarching guidance and motivation and to 
detail MALS-14’s vision for success, focus of effort (goal), and guiding principles.  
Figure 4-3 is the long-term vision MALS-14 developed.  The vision statement 
emphasized an integrated, people-centric approach to success. 
M A L S -1 4    V I S I O N
E v e r y  M A L S - 1 4  D r a g o n  h a s  a  c l e a r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  
M A L S  f o c u s  a n d  e a c h  i s  a  v i t a l  p a r t i c ip a n t  in  a  t o t a l  t e a m  
e f f o r t  t o w a r d  M A L S - 1 4  b e in g  r e c o g n iz e d  a s  t h e  b e s t  l a r g e  
l o g i s t i c s  a c t i v i t y  in  t h e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  D e f e n s e .
M A G - 1 4  e n j o y s  h i g h  q u a l i t y  s u p p o r t  f r o m  M A L S - 1 4 .  
M A L S - 1 4  w o r k s  v e r y  c l o s e l y  w i t h  t h e  s q u a d r o n s o f  
M A G - 1 4  a s  a n  i n t e g r a t e d  l o g i s t i c s  t e a m .
D r a g o n s  p o s s e s s  a  d e e p  s e n s e  o f  p r o f e s s i o n a l  
D R A G O N  P R I D E  a n d  e s p r i t  a s  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  M A L S - 1 4  
t e a m .
 
Figure 4-3: Vision of MALS-14 Success 
    
      The vision statement linked the goal of MALS-14 (aircraft readiness) to 
the success of MALS-14 – “Nulli Secundus” (Figure 4-4).        
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“ N U L L I  S E C U N D U S ”
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“ M A L S - 1 4 ,  S e c o n d  t o  N o n e ,
8 0  – 8 0  R e a d in e s s  t h r o u g h  2 0 0 1 ”
 
Figure 4-4: The Goal – Aircraft Readiness 
 
By formalizing aircraft readiness as the ultimate goal of the organization, 
all action, performance criteria, decisions, and strategy formulation were focused on 
aircraft readiness. 
     The Vision Statement (Figure 4-5) outlined five key principles: (1) 
Core Values, (2) Balancing People and Purpose, (3) Reinforcing Excellence, (4) a 
Relentless Positive Approach, and (5) Total Professional Competence. 
D R A G O N S a re  c o m m it t e d  t o :
C O R E V A LU ES
C ore Values are  the gu ide o f all actions, decisions, and w ork m ethods.  D o ing  the right thing  is  
consistently expected in  execution of m ission  and in personal conduct, both on  and off duty.
B AL A N C IN G  P EO PLE A N D  P U R PO SE 
M AL S-14 drives the aircraft readiness of M AG -14 – this  is  the purpose of the M AL S.  T h is m ission  
w ill be pursued in  harm ony w ith the needs of the people .  D ragons know  they w ill be taken care o f 
and thus are excited  to  be a  part of the team — a team  that includes D ragon fam ilies. 
R E IN FO R C IN G  EX C ELLE N C E
D ragons are  im m ediately rew arded for hard  w ork, for advancing the M ALS g oal, and for adhering 
to  va lues.  D ragon aw ards em phasize team  action  and recognize fam ilies  and supporting agencies.
A R EL EN T LES S PO SIT IVE  AP PR O A C H
Starts  w ith leaders setting a positive  exam ple ,  … expects a ll D ragons to  say “yes--w e can,”
… fosters  proactive thinking to prevent (not react to) problem s,  … punctuated  by positive resu lts.
T O T AL PR O FES SIO N AL C O M PET EN C E
A never-ending  cam paign to  increase m ilitary and technical skills begins w ith  perfecting the 
fundam entals of M ALS core  functions.  As a “learn ing organization,” M ALS-14 em ploys “T heory of 
C onstra in ts” m anagem ent m ethods. O pen com m unications, inform ation sharing , and continuous 
feedback enables team  grow th .
 
Figure 4-5: Five Key Principles 
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First, the principles emphasized the core values (Honor, Courage, 
Commitment).  The core values are central to the Marine ethos, and therefore, provided a 
philosophical framework from which to take action, make decisions, and work.  Second, 
MALS-14 sought to balance people and purpose substantiating the interdependency of 
the Marines and their mission.  Without the Marine, the mission doesn’t succeed, and 
without a mission, the Marine has no purpose.  Third, MALS-14 reinforced excellence 
by rewarding hard work and support of the MALS-14 Vision.  Fourth, MALS-14 took a 
positive, proactive approach starting with sound leadership.  Fifth, MALS-14 sought to 
develop a learning organization focused on professional competence.  Figure 4-6 







M eans/M ethod -- TOC
 
Figure 4-6: Getting the Vision 
 
 c.   Implementation Strategy 
 MALS-14 used a policy deployment method to implement their strategic 
plan.  Figure 4-7 illustrates the implementation strategy.  The overarching logistics 
strategic plan published by the Commanding Officer outlined the Vision, goal, and 
strategy for achieving the goal.  The goal(s) specified in the strategic plan became targets 
for the Department Heads (AMO, ASO, OPSO, etc.).  Departments Heads would develop 
their means and measures for attaining the targets.  Thus, the means to achieve a target at 
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one level became the ends at the level below.  Likewise, the measures at one level 
became the targets at the level below.  This implementation strategy aligned the 
organization (MALS-14) toward the goal (aircraft readiness) and focused human energy 
toward a desire to change.   
 
T arg e ts P lan s /M e asu re s
(e n d s ) (m e a n s )
T a rg e ts P la n s /M ea su res
(e n d s ) (m e an s )
T a rg e ts P la n s /M ea su re s
(e n d s ) (m e a n s )
D e p a r tm e n t H ea d s
D iv is io n  O ffic e rs
W /C
S u p e rv iso r




Figure 4-7: Implementation Strategy 
 
2. Phase II - Values Training 
Values and leadership training provided the foundation from which MALS-14 
could harness the human energy required to make the change process successful.  Values 
training consisted of the Core Values and Leadership Traits and Principles.  Values and 
leadership training was conducted throughout the squadron.  Because Marines and Sailors 
genuinely wanted to do great things, the training generated commitment to the plan, 
commitment to the goal, and commitment to the success of fellow Marines and Sailors. 
 
3. Phase III - Theory of Constraints Training 
The Theory of Constraints was a new concept to the Marines and Sailors of 
MALS-14. Therefore, MALS-14 had to developed a training plan to teach not only 
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Theory of Constraints but also Logic Trees.  MALS-14 utilized Eli Goldratt’s book, The 
Goal and a simulation trainer.  Lesson plans were developed using The Goal to teach the 
basic concepts of Theory of Constraints and the Five Focusing Steps.  The simulation 
trainer was a computer-based simulation of a typical production floor.  The object of the 
simulation training was to reinforce the use of the five focusing steps to identify and 
eliminate constraints within the production line in order to maximize production output 
and achieve the ultimate goal - making profit.   
The training focused on what was wrong with the current management approach 
to achieving better aircraft readiness, and taught MALS-14 to focus and synchronize their 
effort on the key constraint to achieving better aircraft readiness.  Training emphasized 
the use of logic trees to identify constraints and map the future success of the 
organization. 
 
4. Phase IV – Prime Tasks and Metrics       
Identifying core competencies and key success factors (metrics) were critical for 
MALS-14 to construct a strategic plan for success.  Core competencies are the things an 
organization does well (abilities, strengths, etc.) and are the basis for its long-term 
performance.  Critical success factors are those factors that an organization must perform 
well to be successful or in the case of MALS-14 accomplish its mission. [Ref. 18:p. 290] 
MALS-14 used a Future Reality Tree (FRT) to map out core competencies and 
identify the critical success factors and indicators required to achieve the ultimate goal – 
aircraft readiness (see Appendix C).  The future reality tree served seven basic purposes 
for MALS-14. 
• Enabled MALS-14 to test new ideas before implementation 
• Allowed MALS-14 to determine whether the changes would logically 
produce the desired effects 
• Allowed MALS-14 to identify collateral problems created by the 
changes 
• Provided MALS-14 with a means to sustain continuous improvement 
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• Provided a systems approach to assessing the impact of decisions 
• Provided a framework for MALS-14 decision makers to substantiate 
courses of action with stakeholders (internal and external) 
• Served as MALS-14’s structured planning system for achieving their 
ultimate goal (80-80 readiness through 2001) 
 
MALS-14 identified material readiness as the primary core competency for 
accomplishing their mission and achieving their goal (80-80 readiness through 2001).  
Initially, MALS-14 defined material readiness as material availability - having “at least” 
one Supply Officer asset on the shelf at all times.  MALS-14 realized material availability 
depended on allowancing, level of repair, inventory management, maintenance 
management, manning, test equipment availability, et cetera.  This is readily apparent in 
the FRT (Appendix C).  These factors were required to provide sufficiency for the cause 
and effect relationship of material availability and aircraft readiness.  Therefore, the 
critical success factor for MALS-14 was inventory management.  Inventory included 
repairable and consumable Supply Officer Assets (SOA), both RFI on the shelf and NRFI 
in the DIFM.  Thus, the two key indicators of material availability were RFI SOA 
count and DIFM count.  If the Supply Officer - working in conjunction with the 
Aircraft Maintenance Officer - could keep at least one asset on the shelf at all times, 
material would be available when required by the OMA. 
 
5. Phase V – Identify the Constraint 
MALS –14 identified material availability as the primary constraint to aircraft 
readiness.  This seemed to be a self-fulfilling answer to poor readiness.   The FRT 
MALS-14 used to map the process of sourcing, maintaining, and delivering material 
requirements substantiated cause and effect relationships of material availability.  Once 
the critical success factors were identified for each management level, the leadership used 
Current Reality Trees (CRT) to identify the root cause of the constraint and used the Five 
Focusing Steps to eliminate or mitigate the constraint.  The critical success factors were 
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linked directly to providing material availability; and therefore, were linked directly to 
improving aircraft readiness. 
 
6. Phase VI – An Integrated Reporting System  
MALS-14 worked hard to develop a web-based Executive Information System 
(EIS) that automatically linked the critical success factors to three, One Page 
Management Reports: Focus Report, what you do; Feedback Report, good and bad news 
about what you do; and Management Report, good and bad news about what your troops 
do.   
The Focus Report identified the leaders critical success factors and the minimum, 
satisfactory, and ultimate goals for each success factor.  The Feedback Report provided 
the leader with a daily status of each critical success factor.  It was from this report that 
the leader directed his decisions and action toward constraint management.  Figure 4-8 
illustrates the use of the Focus Report.  This report depicts DIFM count as a critical 
success factor for maximizing WRA’s coming from the IMA.  The Management Report 
provided upstream reporting for departmental and unit level critical success factors.  The 
Management Report was the basis for awards and performance evaluation. 
Critical success factors were identified through the use of the MALS-14 FRT and 
the CRT’s used to identify root causes for a constraint.  If a constraint was identified but 
could not be eliminated, the constraint had to be managed; and therefore, the constraint 
became a critical success factor.  Examples of critical success factors were DIFM count, 
manpower, test bench status, et cetera.  Figure 4-8 illustrates how the MALS-14 FRT 
linked to the reporting system for a specific success factor. 
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Figure 4-8: FRT Links to Reporting System 
 
The focus report was linked to performance charts for the specific critical success 
factor illustrated by Figure 4-9. 
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Figure 4-9: Performance Charts 
 
Performance charts tracked the status of the critical success factor against the 
minimum, satisfactory, and ultimate goals.  Figure 4-9 shows the work center focus 
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report.  The critical success factor was primary degraders with a status JC/SOIOU (Job 
Complete/Supply Officer IOU).  These were primary degraders that had been repaired 
but not returned to the warehouse as stock.   
By establishing a range of targets, the work center supervisor could take the 
necessary action required to keep JC/SOIOU’s below five.  A status greater than five was 
reported to the next higher echelon (Division) after a specified time period (3 reporting 
periods).  Some reporting periods were daily while others were weekly and even 
monthly.  The reporting period depended on the nature of critical success factor and was 
determined during policy deployment.  After a number of reports had been gathered, 
MALS-14 developed trend reports.  Figure 4-10 is an example of a trend report. 
20-Sep 21-Sep 22-Sep 25-Sep 26-Se p 27-Sep 28-Sep 02-Oct 03-Oct 04-Oct 05-Oct 06-Oct 11-Oct
AW M 15 19 19 14 15 15 15 16 18 18 17 17
WP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Figure 4-10: Trend Report 
 
These reports helped assess work center performance, identify constraints such as 
training deficiencies, and identify scheduling conflicts.  The reporting system as a whole 
provided the leadership with a decision support tool that linked the MALS-14 strategic 
plan to the decisions and actions needed to drive success. 
 
7. Phase VI – Manage by TOC Methodology 
The final phase of MALS-14’s Strategic Plan was management by Theory of 
Constraints methodology.  This meant full implementation of the use of logic trees to 
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identify constraints and utilization of the Five Focusing Steps in conjunction with the 
reporting system to eliminate or manage the constraint.  Figure 4-11 depicts the two-
prong approach of the MALS-14 Strategic Plan. 
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Figure 4-11: MALS-14 Two-pronged Approach 
 
D. SUMMARY 
MALS-14 established crystal-clear goals, developed a strategy to achieve the 
goals, and implemented a reporting system to manage critical success factors.  The aim 
was to integrate critical processes of the squadron toward a common goal.  The key was 
to capitalize on the power of ownership.  Every leader was instrumental in the 
development of his or her strategy to achieve the ultimate goal of the squadron.  MALS-
14 was able to cut through the complex world of Aviation Logistics and focus the effort 
of the leaders and processes toward its goal.  MALS-14 used sound leadership, strategic 
thinking, and the Theory of Constraints to develop a strategic plan and feedback system 
to improve aircraft readiness.  In November 2001, MAG-14 achieved 82 percent 




























V. RECOMMENDED PERFORMANCE METRICS 
 
A. OVERVIEW 
In analyzing MALS-14’s efforts in improving aircraft readiness within MAG-14, 
we realized the current aviation logistics performance metrics and culture can potentially 
prohibit the MALS from effectively contributing to sustaining and improving aircraft 
readiness.  Specifically in MALS-14’s case, MAG-14 readiness suffered over a 
significant timeframe despite the indication the MALS was performing successfully 
according to legacy metrics (e.g., Supply Effectiveness, Turn-Around-Time, Beyond-
Capability of Maintenance rates, etc).  MALS-14’s use of a strategic logistics 
management plan focused on tying the organization’s vision, ultimate goal, and logistics 
performance with aircraft readiness significantly improved MAG-14’s Full Mission 
Capable and Partial Mission Capable rates.  Utilizing lessons learned from the MALS-14 
case study analysis, new performance metrics based on the overarching principles of 
SCM can be implemented via a strategic logistics management plan and policy 
deployment method to maximize any MALS’s contribution to optimizing aircraft 
readiness within a Marine Aircraft Group.  
 
B. RECOMMENDED PERFORMANCE METRICS  
Before defining specific performance metrics, we refer back to MALS-14’s 
“Future Reality Tree” (Figure 5-1) to focus on activities within the MALS that “own” 
aircraft readiness.  As stated in chapter 4, Material Readiness was the primary core 
competency of MALS-14 tied to achieving the ultimate goal of “80/80 readiness through 
2001.”  As a result, the primary critical success factors tied to aircraft readiness and 
material readiness were inventory and production management.  Logistics 
Responsiveness and Material Availability were key conditions for achieving success.  
Logistics Responsiveness was simply expeditiously delivering parts to the customer when 
requested, and material availability was comprised of 1) ensuring at least one part was 
available for issue off the shelf and 2) reducing DIFM material (due-in-from-maintenance 
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or work in process inventory).  Referring back to chapter 2, these concepts follow the 
adapted SCOR logistic performance metrics of Supply Chain Response Time and 














































Figure 5- 1  MALS-14 Future Reality Tree for Integrated Aviation Logistics Performance 
Performance begins with the organization’s ultimate goal of 60 Fully Mission 
Capable AV-8B Harriers, or more precisely, 80% Full Mission Capable and 80% Partial 
Mission Capable aircraft by 2001.  The associated adapted SCOR model performance 
metric identified earlier in chapter 2 that is most closely related to what MALS-14 did 
here is measuring the Operational Availability (Ao) or the weapon system’s Non-
Mission Capable (NMC) rates (opposite of FMC rate).  The overall goal is to 
minimize aircraft NMC time, and maximize aircraft Ao. In order to accomplish this 
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daunting task, the following three aviation logistics processes must be coordinated in a 
cross-functional and integrated fashion: 
• Material Readiness or Parts Management (the primary focus of 
performance measurement in this chapter) 
• O-Level Maintenance  
• I-Level Support 
Utilizing MALS-14’s “Future Reality Tree,” the following performance metrics 
(Table 5-1) can be applied (via the policy deployment method identified in chapter 4) to 
the above processes and corresponding functional and sub-functional activities used to 
























































1. Responsiveness Metric 
The SCOR model metric used to manage responsiveness is “Measure Supply 
Chain Response Time.”  This metric is not used by the MALS in current aviation 
logistics doctrine.  The current aviation logistics management information systems also 
do not provide broad or detailed calculations of supply chain response time.  If a MALS 
wishes to measure Supply Chain Response Time, it has to tailor specially written ad-hoc 
reports to extract requisition transaction history information from R-Supply.  In this case, 
the Supply Chain Response Time value merely represents the total time from initiation of 
the requisition (requisition julian date) to completion of the requisition in R-Supply.  This 
time measurement does not provide any details on the time the requisition spends at 
different links in the Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain.   
Measuring and reducing supply chain response time directly increases aircraft 
Operational Availability.  Aircraft Operational Availability is defined as MDTMTBM
MTBM
oA +=  
where MTBM in the Mean-Time-Between-Maintenance and MDT is the total 
Maintenance Downtime.  MDT is a function of active maintenance time ( M ), Logistics 
Delay Time (LDT), and Administrative Delay Time (ADT).  LDT is that part of MDT 
that is attributed to waiting for a spare part to become available (Ref. 19:p. 57).  MDT for 
MALS aviation logistics operations can be redefined as the average Logistics Response 
Time (LRT) and/or average Customer Wait Time (CWT).  We define LRT as the total 
average time spent “on-station” from initiation of a squadron’s requisition (e.g., N601 
transmitted in Optimized OMA NALCOMIS) to the delivery and completion of that 
requisition (e.g., N615 Proof of Delivery completed in Optimized IMA NALCOMIS).  
We also define Customer Wait Time as the total average time spent processing a 
customer’s requisition “on-station” (e.g., N601 initiated, requisition processed as a “not-
in-stock,” “not-carried,” or beyond the IMA’s repair capability of-maintenance and 
referred to upstream members of the Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain 
for action) and ultimately satisfying that requisition from “off-station” or upstream 
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members of the Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain (e.g., N615 Proof of 
Delivery completed in Optimized IMA NALCOMIS).    
We contend LRT and CWT are the most significant metrics the MALS can utilize 
to improve aircraft Ao with respect to responsiveness.  One specific example of a MALS 
utilizing LRT as a performance metric to improve aircraft readiness was at MALS-14. 
The largest perception among the Organizational Maintenance Activities in MAG-14 was 
poor delivery time (only one fraction of total LRT) from MALS-14 when a squadron 
ordered a repairable component.  The chief complaint from the squadron Maintenance 
Material Control Officers in MAG-14 was that when a requisition was ordered for a part 
that was “in-stock” in the MALS Repairables Management Division, the status of the 
requisition remained “ISSIP” (issue-in-process) far too long.  The RMD Officer at 
MALS-14, First Lieutenant Bert Cruz, and his Staff Non-Commissioned Officer in 
Charge (SNCOIC), conducted an in-depth covert analysis of their Repairables Storage 
Branch (RSB) and Repairables Delivery Branch (RDB) operations to determine what the 
average delivery statistics were for satisfying repairable requirements for MAG-14 
squadrons.  The RDB for the MALS-14 Aviation Supply Department consisted of six 
enlisted delivery drivers and one SNCOIC.  First Lieutenant Cruz and his SNCOIC spent 
six hours a day during March, 2001 observing all activities of the RDB including time 
spent during “smoke breaks” and lunch breaks, types of vehicles used, delivery routes 
used, turn-over routines between all three shifts (MALS-14 RMD operated 24 hours a 
day on three 8-hour shifts), and time spent inducting not-ready-for-issue (NRFI) 
repairable components into the MALS repair cycle.  First Lieutenant Cruz concluded that 
the perception of poor delivery response times was unfounded, and that MALS leadership 
needed to focus its attention elsewhere to identify the true constraint in the MALS repair 
cycle. (Ref. 20)  The average delivery response time (from the time a requisition “picking 
ticket” printed in the warehouse to delivery) during this evolution was roughly 55 
minutes (see Table 5-2), which was within the one hour response time standard 
























( In Minutes)# of Requisitions March
29-Mar-01
Delivery Time Analysis
MALS-14 Repairables Management Division
 
Table 5- 2  MALS-14 Delivery Time Analysis 
First Lieutenant Cruz’s example of measuring delivery response times is only one 
portion of the LRT metric.  In order to best gauge the performance of the MALS, as well 
as identify constraints to supply chain response time, more than delivery response time 
must be measured.  All aspects of Logistics Response Time (elapsed time spent 
processing “on-station” requirements) and Customer Wait Time (elapsed time spent 
processing “off-station” requirements) should be evaluated.  As of now, measuring the 
total average supply chain response time (e.g., LRT and CWT) is not a MALS 
performance metric.  Based on guidance provided in the Fiscal Year 2000 and 2001 DoD 
Strategic Logistics Plans, and the DoD Instruction 4140.61 (Customer Wait Time and 
Time Definite Delivery) dated December 14, 2000, we propose supply chain response 
time (LRT and CWT) should be a metric integrated between the strategic level of 
 89
logistics (e.g., NAVICP, DLA, etc) to the tactical level of logistics (e.g., MALS).  For 
this metric to be most effective, Logistics Response Time and Customer Wait Time 
should be an integrated performance metric embedded within not only existing MALS 
aviation logistics management information systems (e.g., NALCOMIS, R-Supply, etc), 
but also with logistics management information systems of the upstream members of the 
Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain (e.g., the FISC, DLA, NAVICP-P, 
Defense Distribution Depots, etc.)   
The future challenge for this metric is to track the total average customer wait 
time or on-station logistics response time for an individual part, vice the aggregation of 
all requirements for all parts from squadrons processed through the MALS.  The MALS, 
and all upstream members of the Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain, can 
bring resources to bear on problematic parts that are not meeting supply chain response 
time standards in order to increase aircraft readiness.  Table 5-3 shows time standards for 
upstream elements in the supply chain according to DoD Regulation 4140.1-R, Material 




1Storage site (or base):  processing, packaging, and transportation hold time
.5ICP processing time
.5Requisition submission time
Time Standard (Days)Pipeline Segment
Area (CONUS)
 
Table 5- 3 IPG-1 (NMCS/PMCS) UMMIPS Time Standards (from Ref. 21:App. 8) 
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Of particular importance is that for NMCS/PMCS requirements referred to the 
upstream members of the Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain, the total 
customer wait time standard is 3.5 days (DoD UMMIPS goal).  The internal DoN 
customer wait time requirement is 24 hours if the supply supporting activity is within 35 
miles of the requisitioning activity, and 23 days for all other requirements submitted to 
upstream suppliers (OPNAVINST 4441.12C dated 26 Oct 1999).  Stated in other terms, 
the MALS “owns” merely 1 hour of aircraft readiness downtime associated with waiting 
for spare parts to be issued that were available in inventory (54 minutes on average for 
MALS-14 repairables), while the rest of the supply chain “owns” a variation of aircraft 
readiness downtime awaiting issuance of parts from upstream supplier’s inventories 
depending on which standard is applied (24 hours within 35 miles, 23 days for all 
activities, or the DoD UMMIPS standard of 3.5 days).  An analysis of the Defense 
Logistics Agency’s “Logistics Metrics Analysis Reporting System,” a web-based 
Customer Wait Time database used for analyzing Customer Wait Time trends throughout 
DoD, revealed interesting results.  The Atlantic Fleet’s Issue Priority Group 1 requisitions 
(including 2d MAW MALS NMCS/PMCS requisitions) processed during the month of 
July, 2002 revealed the average customer wait time for 1,305 wholesale level requisitions 
processed (compiled of immediate issues, backorders, planned direct vendor deliveries, 
unplanned direct vendor deliveries, and other pipeline activity reports) was 36.8 days. 
(Ref. 22)   
Although this figure represents a group of activities more than just the east-coast 
based Marine Aviation Logistics Squadrons (including MALS-14) and the Marine 
squadrons they are supporting (including MAG-14 squadrons), the important point 
remains that the overall average represents a much longer average wait time than the 
average 3.5 day goal for IPG-1 requisitions.  By utilizing the responsiveness metric, we 
realize the average customer wait time of 36.8 days represents a much greater potential 
impact of the Logistics Delay Time (LDT) of the upstream members of the supply chain 
on aircraft readiness.   
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The lesson learned in this example is that the MALS only truly “owns” a small 
amount of LDT compared to that of the upstream members of the supply chain.  Marginal 
improvements in LRT by the MALS will not drastically improve aircraft readiness within 
the MAG, but rather marginal improvements in reducing CWT should result in larger 
improvements in aircraft readiness.   Upstream members of the supply chain must take 
responsibility of excessive CWT for individual parts degrading unit readiness, and not 
continue to analyze CWT in aggregate (e.g., individual requirements for an individual 
squadron or MALS vice all requirements for the entire Atlantic Fleet).  Current reporting 
requirements and data analysis of the LMARS system does not support in-depth analysis 
of the total average CWT of only MALS-14’s requisitions, which is outside the scope of 
this thesis.  We recommend this as a potential follow on thesis topic for the “supply 
chain response time” or responsiveness metric.  Customer Wait Time (in aggregate) is 
currently a primary readiness metric employed by “Producers” Customer Focus Team 
(CFT-2) of the Naval Aviation Readiness Improvement Team (NAVRIT).  Figure 5-2 is 
the “Planeside Integrated Logistics Support” Summary Chart which defines the goals for 
average customer wait time metric for a squadron or air station.      
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Planeside Performance Summary
   Planeside Performance (NMCS/PMCS) GOAL GREEN YELLOW RED
      Percentage First Day Issue 75% 75% OR ABOVE > 70% & < 75% 70% AND BELOW
 Average Customer Wait Time (ACWT) 4 D 4 DAYS OR LESS > 4 & < 7 DAYS 7 OR > DAYS
     Consumable ACWT (NMCS/PMCS) 4 D 4 DAYS OR LESS > 4 & < 7 DAYS 7 OR > DAYS
     Repairable ACWT (NMCS/PMCS) 4 D 4 DAYS OR LESS > 4 & < 7 DAYS 7 OR > DAYS
Sustainability
RMS/PEB fills as a % of consumable RQNS 25% 25% OR ABOVE < 25% & > 20% 20% AND BELOW
 Wholesale Stock ACWT
     Repairable 23 D 23 DAYS OR LESS > 23 & < 29 DAYS 29 OR > DAYS
     Consumable 23 D 23 DAYS OR LESS > 23 & < 29 DAYS 29 OR > DAYS
 Unfilled Initial Issues N/A
Production
      WRA TAT (excluding 400) 6.9 D 7 DAYS OR < > 7 & < 11 DAYS 11 OR > DAYS
      Engine Cycle Time 25 D 25 DAYS OR < > 25 & < 31 DAYS 31 OR > DAYS
      Repair Rate (All BCM) N/A
      Repair Rate (Less BCM-1) 80% 80% OR ABOVE > 75% & < 80% 75% AND BELOW
Production Resources (non-engine)
      Percentage First Day Issue AWP 75% 75% OR ABOVE > 70% & < 75% 70% AND BELOW
 ACWT AWP (non-engine) 4 D 4 DAYS OR LESS > 4 & < 7 DAYS 7 OR > DAYS
     Consumable ACWT AWP (non-engine) 4 D 4 DAYS OR LESS > 4 & < 7 DAYS 7 OR > DAYS
     Repairable ACWT AWP (non-engine) 4 D 4 DAYS OR LESS > 4 & < 7 DAYS 7 OR > DAYS
 ACWT AWP (engine) 4 D 4 DAYS OR LESS > 4 & < 7 DAYS 7 OR > DAYS
     Consumable ACWT AWP (engine) 4 D 4 DAYS OR LESS > 4 & < 7 DAYS 7 OR > DAYS
     Repairable ACWT AWP (engine) 4 D 4 DAYS OR LESS > 4 & < 7 DAYS 7 OR > DAYS
Manning Posture
      CORE Rating COB as a percentage of BA 100% 90% OR ABOVE > 80% & < 90% 80% AND BELOW
      CORE Rating DNEC/MOS as a percent of BA 100% 90% OR ABOVE > 80% & < 90% 80% AND BELOW
      ASD Manning (Civilian/Mititary) 100% 90% OR ABOVE > 80% & < 90% 80% AND BELOW
Aircraft, Engine and Support Equipment Inventory
      PAI as a percent of PAA 100% 90% OR ABOVE > 80% & < 90% 80% AND BELOW
      Bare Firewalls 0 AT GOAL 1-5 >5
      Broad Arrows N/A
      CAT I TPDR Cycle time 7 D 7 DAYS OR LESS > 7 & < 12 DAYS 12 OR > DAYS
      IRAC Cycle Time 35 D 35 DAYS OR LESS > 35 & < 45 DAYS 45 OR > DAYS
Planeside Summary
 
Figure 5- 2  Planeside Summary Chart (from Ref. 23) 
2. Logistics Assets 
These are the vehicles, material handling equipment (MHE), and Support 
Equipment (SE) the Aviation Supply and Aircraft Maintenance Departments utilize to 
respond to a squadron’s aviation logistics requirements.  Ensuring that sufficient 
MHE/SE assets are available is crucial to ensuring the MALS can provide responsive 
aviation logistics support.  SE is organic to the MALS, and is their responsibility to 
maximize availability (e.g., Pettibone crane).  Ensuring MHE and light-, medium-, and 
heavy-lift Motor Transport (MT) asset availability requires coordinating efforts with the 
MALS S-4 (Logistics Department), MAG S-4 (Logistics Department), Marine Wing 
Support Squadron Motor Transport Operations Division (Ref. 24:p. 2-23), and in certain 
arrangements, the Marine Corps Air Station/Naval Air Station Supply Department’s 
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Transportation Division.  Sub-Metric:  Asset Readiness or Operational Availability 
(Ao). 
3. Personnel   
Even with 100% availability of transportation and MHE/SE assets, a MALS can 
fail in providing responsive aviation logistics support if there is a manpower shortage or 
training and certification deficiencies.  Aviation logistics leadership within the MALS 
should focus on the personnel readiness of their work centers, divisions, and departments 
in order to provide the “human factor” of responsive aviation logistics support.  Sub-
Metric: Personnel Readiness. 
 
D. MATERIAL AVAILABILITY (INVENTORY AND DIFM 
MANAGEMENT) 
1. Material Availability Metric:  Perfect Order Fulfillment 
“Perfect Order Fulfillment” is defined as the ratio of perfectly satisfied orders to 
total orders measured.  From the squadron’s perspective, the most important orders are 
those that are directly tied to aircraft readiness.  Requisitions that are processed for NMC 
aircraft are the single most important requirements to satisfy.  As a result, and as 
indicated in MALS-14’s Future Reality Tree, inventory and DIFM management become 
the performance metrics for the Aviation Supply and Aircraft Maintenance Department 
of the MALS directly tied to improving aircraft readiness.  Unfortunately, current MALS 
performance metrics do not correlate trends between improved inventory and production 
management with decreased aircraft readiness (e.g., Supply Effectiveness and Turn-
Around-Time).  As explained in chapter 4, supply effectiveness and TAT trends may be 
meeting policy goals, but aircraft readiness could be declining or well under established 
readiness goals.  Table 5-4 displays the recommend MALS material availability 
performance metrics under the SCM metric of “perfect order fulfillment” to better 
correlate between the MALS’ inventory and production management efforts and 
improving aircraft readiness:     
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RMD: R-Pool Range and Depth 
Percentage and Inventory “Holes” Count 
(Zero On Hand Available for Issue)




DIFM count (Overall and for Primary 
Readiness Degraders)Turn-Around-Time (TAT)AMD/ASD








New Readiness-Based MetricsOld Efficiency Metrics
 
Table 5- 4  MALS Material Availability Metrics 
2. Allowance Management 
The first of three elements to “material availability” begins with allowance 
management.  Without proper allowance management, the MALS will always be 
fighting a losing battle with regards to sustaining aircraft readiness.  Current material 
management policy for MALS allowance management is contained in the Aviation 
Supply Desktop Procedures (MCO P4400.177C).  The MALS Supply Management, 
Repairables Management, and Consumables Management Divisions all share a great deal 
of responsibility in ensuring the proper inventory levels within the MALS ASD to 
support their customers.  In the case of internal allowance reviewing performed by the 
individual MALS, repairable allowances are reviewed at a minimum on a quarterly basis 
for allowance increases, decreases, additions, and deletions. (Ref. 25:p. 4-19)  
Consumable inventory level settings are directed by the cognizant Marine Aircraft Wing 
and/or Naval Aviation Type Commander. (Ref. 25:p. 6-40)  From our experience, 
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consumable level settings are usually reviewed and adjusted for demand at a minimum, 
once a quarter, but usually performed on a monthly basis.  The Supply Management 
Division (SMD) also coordinates with both RMD and CMD on the frequency and 
validity of their inventory management level setting and allowance change review efforts.  
Specifically, SMD performs Repairable Asset Management Assist Team (RAMAT) 
reviews either with the assistance of the Naval Inventory Control Point-Philadelphia, or 
on their own accord.  The RAMAT program, is a detailed allowance reconciliation with 
the planned program requirements (PPR) inventory records held officially at NAVICP-P.  
This effort ensures the allowances on their inventory records are the same as reflected in 
the PPRs on file with NAVICP-P. (Ref. 25:p. 4-20)   
In order for the MALS ASD and AMD to gauge whether proper allowancing is 
being performed by the inventory managers, the Supply Effectiveness metric is a good 
tool for determining how well the supply department, as a whole, is satisfying customer 
demand.  To better gauge how well an inventory is performing with respect to satisfying 
aircraft readiness degrading requirements, the MALS should use a more defined metric 
other than overall net and gross supply effectiveness.  The MALS should analyze the fill 
rate effectiveness of NMCS/PMCS demands.  This new metric, NMCS/PMCS supply 
effectiveness, will provide MALS aviation logisticians a snapshot of how well (or not so 
well) their inventory is supporting aircraft readiness.  NAVRIT currently is using a 
similar metric that focuses on the NMCS/PMCS fill rate for first-day issues (see Figure 5-
2). 
3. On-Station Material Availability 
Metrics: inventory management (parts coming from the aviation supply 
department) and DIFM count (parts coming from the IMA).  The second element of 
“material availability” is “on-station material availability.”  To optimize overall material 
availability, proper allowance management must also be coupled with “on-station” and 
“off-station” material availability.  On-station material availability, as depicted in Figure 
5-1, is defined as “parts coming from the aviation supply department” and “parts coming 
from the Intermediate Maintenance Activity or IMA.”   
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a) Inventory Management (Parts Provided by the Aviation Supply 
Department) 
Metrics:  NMCS/PMCS Supply Effectiveness, R-Pool Range and 
Depth (RMD), and Readiness-Critical Inventory Range and Depth (CMD)  The 
traditional performance metric for the aviation supply department with reference to 
inventory management is the “Range and Depth” metric.  Range corresponds to the 
number of line items of material stocked.  To increase the range of stock is to add new 
line items of material to the inventory.  The “Range” metric describes the percentage of 
items in the inventory that have on hand assets greater than or equal to the requisitioning 
objective (the typical goal is 90%). Depth corresponds to the quantity of a specific part 
(NSN) carried in stock.  Increasing the depth of stock is increasing the quantity on hand.  
The “Depth” metric describes the percentage of items in the inventory that have on hand 
assets greater than zero (the typical goal is 87%).    
With MALS-14, their primary goal was to ensure at least one repairable 
part was on the shelf for parts that were constraining aircraft readiness.  Although the 
“Range and Depth” metric gives you a snapshot of the overall material availability of the 
inventory, it does not provide any indication how well inventory management is 
sustaining aircraft readiness.  One possible method of improving the traditional range and 
depth metric is to adapt it to evaluate the range and depth of “readiness driving” parts in 
the supply officer’s inventory.  The Navy utilizes the Local Repair Cycle Asset (LRCA) 
or Rotatable Pool (R-Pool) concept to segregate the supply officer’s inventory to better 
manage readiness degrading repairable parts.  Measuring the range and depth of the 
LRCA/R-Pool should also be coupled with a metric that measures “holes on the supply 
officer’s shelf.”  This metric would provide a list of those parts that have zero RFI assets 
on the shelf (minus the FISP assets).  We recommend the MALS use the Navy’s Local 
Repair Cycle Asset (LRCA) or Rotatable Pool (R-Pool) concept.  The LRCA/R-Pool 
concept can be summarized as intense micro-management of the most routinely ordered 
readiness impacting repairables which the IMA is capable of repairing.  The Navy’s R-
Pool range and depth goals are 100% and 96% respectively. (CNAPINST 4423.8C dated 
March 21, 2000) The MALS should also focus on the allowance levels and range and 
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depth percentages of “readiness-critical” consumable parts that are aircraft NMCS/PMCS 
requirements or are used in repair of NMCS/PMCS repairable components in the MALS 
repair cycle.  This would include consumable parts in the supply officer’s inventory as 
well as consumable parts located in squadron and IMA pre-expended bins.      
Another metric that correlates inventory management with aircraft 
readiness under the SCM measurement of “Perfect Order Fulfillment” is the 
NMCS/PMCS Supply Effectiveness metric mentioned earlier under “allowance 
management.” This metric indicates positive or negative trends in inventory 
management.  Poor (good) allowancing and inventory management will directly result in 
low (high) NMCS/PMCS supply effectiveness.  The MALS should use the NMCS/PMCS 
supply effectiveness metric to identify those parts that are causing low effectiveness rates 
and degrading aircraft readiness.  Data collected from MALS-26 (July, 2001 to July, 
2002) displays how the NMCS/PMCS supply effectiveness metric can vary significantly 













Table 5- 5  MALS-26 NMCS/PMCS Supply Effectiveness Comparison 
The 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing Aviation Logistics Department currently 
utilizes a similar NMCS/PMCS supply effectiveness metric.  Table 5-7 and 5-8 are the 
NMCS/PMCS supply effectiveness summaries for the month of June, 2002 for MAG-26 
squadrons and type-model-series aircraft respectively. 
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MAG-26 SQUADRON NMCS/PMCS Summary
Report Period: June 2002
NMCS
MALS SUPPLY ACTION MALS MAINT ACTIONS
CONSUMABLE REPAIRABLE
ISSUED PASS TO PASS TO SUPPLY                   EXREPS IMA CONSUMABLE REPAIRABLE
SQUADRON RQMT FROM STK SYSTEM MALS MAINT EFFECT INDUCTS AUTO BCM EXREP REPAIR BCM EFFECT RQMT RQMT
HMH461 252 168 76 8 66.67% 8 3 5 2 3 40.00% 226 26
HML167 191 139 43 9 72.77% 9 0 9 4 5 44.44% 161 30
HMM261 0 0 0 0 0.00% 0 0 0 0 0 0.00% 0 0
HMM264 208 155 41 12 74.52% 12 3 9 3 6 33.33% 156 52
HMM266 164 134 23 7 81.71% 7 1 6 4 2 66.67% 135 29
HMT204 10 3 7 0 30.00% 0 0 0 0 0 0.00% 10 0
TOTALS 825 599 190 36 72.61% 36 7 29 13 16 44.83% 688 137
PMCS
MALS SUPPLY ACTION MALS MAINT ACTIONS
CONSUMABLE REPAIRABLE
ISSUED PASS TO PASS TO SUPPLY                   EXREPS IMA CONSUMABLE REPAIRABLE
TMS RQMT FROM STK SYSTEM MALS MAINT EFFECT INDUCTS AUTO BCM EXREP REPAIR BCM EFFECT RQMT RQMT
HMH461 83 54 22 7 65.06% 7 2 5 4 1 80.00% 63 20
HML167 66 40 18 8 60.61% 8 5 3 0 3 0.00% 47 19
HMM261 0 0 0 0 0.00% 0 0 0 0 0 0.00% 0 0
HMM264 90 67 8 15 74.44% 15 5 10 8 2 80.00% 51 39
HMM266 32 24 5 3 75.00% 3 1 2 1 1 50.00% 19 13
HMT204 0 0 0 0 0.00% 0 0 0 0 0 0.00% 0 0
TOTALS 271 185 53 33 68.27% 33 13 20 13 7 65.00% 180 91
MAG TOTALS 1096 784 243 69 71.53% 69 20 49 26 23 53.06% 868 228
 
Table 5- 6  MAG-26 NMCS/PMCS Summary Report by Squadron (from Ref.26) 
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MAG-26 TMS NMCS/PMCS Summary
Report Period: June 2002
NMCS
MALS SUPPLY ACTION MALS MAINT ACTIONS
CONSUMABLE REPAIRABLE
ISSUED PASS TO PASS TO SUPPLY                   EXREPS IMA CONSUMABLE REPAIRABLE
TMS RQMT FROM STK SYSTEM MALS MAINT EFFECT INDUCTS AUTO BCM EXREP REPAIR BCM EFFECT RQMT RQMT
UH1N 56 34 16 6 60.71% 6 0 6 2 4 33.33% 49 7
AH1W 178 136 37 5 76.40% 5 1 4 2 2 50.00% 147 31
CH46E 299 240 44 15 80.27% 15 2 13 7 6 53.85% 228 71
CH53E 282 186 86 10 65.96% 10 4 6 2 4 33.33% 254 28
MV22 10 3 7 0 30.00% 0 0 0 0 0 0.00% 10 0
TOTALS 815 596 183 36 73.13% 36 7 29 13 16 44.83% 678 137
PMCS
MALS SUPPLY ACTION MALS MAINT ACTIONS
CONSUMABLE REPAIRABLE
ISSUED PASS TO PASS TO SUPPLY                   EXREPS IMA CONSUMABLE REPAIRABLE
TMS RQMT FROM STK SYSTEM MALS MAINT EFFECT INDUCTS AUTO BCM EXREP REPAIR BCM EFFECT RQMT RQMT
UH1N 30 17 8 5 56.67% 5 3 2 0 2 0.00% 20 10
AH1W 51 36 12 3 70.59% 3 2 1 0 1 0.00% 36 15
CH46E 84 59 9 16 70.24% 16 5 11 8 3 72.73% 42 42
CH53E 106 73 24 9 68.87% 9 3 6 5 1 83.33% 82 24
MV22 0 0 0 0 0.00% 0 0 0 0 0 0.00% 0 0
TOTALS 271 185 53 33 68.27% 33 13 20 13 7 65.00% 180 91
MAG TOTAL 1086 781 236 69 71.92% 69 20 49 26 23 53.06% 858 228
 
Table 5- 7 MAG-26 NMCS/PMCS Summary Report by Aircraft Type (from Ref. 26) 
b) DIFM Management (Parts Provided Jointly by the Aircraft 
Maintenance and Supply Departments) 
Metric: DIFM count.  Reducing the overall DIFM count ultimately 
results in more repairable assets on the supply officer’s shelves, and fewer aircraft 
downed for lack of spare parts.  Utilizing the right strategy for managing the DIFM count 
is crucial.  Part of the strategy would entail focusing on those items in the DIFM that are 
driving aircraft readiness (high NMCS and PMCS cycle times).  Another aspect of the 
strategy would also include repairing components with the Shortest Processing Time 
[SPT] vice the current traditional method of processing components on a First-In-First-
Out [FIFO] basis by requisition priority.   
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A condition of poor allowance and inventory management is degraded 
aircraft readiness or Ao, evidenced by a low NMCS/PMCS supply effectiveness rate. This 
degraded readiness can be identified by accrued aircraft downtime due to lack of parts on 
the shelf (non-mission capable for supply or NMCS) and subsequently aircraft downtime 
due to I-level maintenance repair actions (non-mission capable for maintenance or 
NMCM).  The MALS utilizes AV-3M (Naval Aviation Maintenance and Material 
Management) reporting to track the amount of aircraft downtime due to supply or 
maintenance factors (NMCS or NMCM).    The Naval Air Systems Command maintains 
a repository of AV-3M information on the internet, in database format, that can be used 
to analyze NMCS data, NMCM data, and other reliability, maintainability, and 
supportability trends.   
DIFM management and the corresponding metric “DIFM count” can be 
applied throughout the MALS-14 future reality tree for “parts from the IMA” process 
depicted in Figure 5-3.   
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Figure 5- 3  MALS-14 Future Reality Tree (IMA Parts) 
As discussed earlier, Material Readiness (Responsiveness and Material 
Availability) not only applies to the Aviation Supply Department’s ability to satisfy 
readiness degrading requirements “off the shelf” (inventory management), it also applies 
to the joint efforts of the Aircraft Maintenance and Aviation Supply Department’s repair 
cycle efforts (DIFM management) for replenishing inventory and repairing squadron 
EXREP requirements.  Figure 5-3 displays how Material Readiness (Repair Parts) flows 
down through the MALS repair cycle.    
Parts Produced by the IMA.  Equally as important as having spare parts to 
satisfy a squadron’s on-aircraft weapons replaceable assembly (WRA) or consumable 
requirements is the availability of spare parts (shop replaceable assemblies or SRAs and 
consumable bit-piece-parts parts) to sustain the MALS intermediate maintenance 
activity’s WRA and SRA repair efforts to replenish deficiencies in the supply officer’s 
inventory and squadrons’ expeditious repair (EXREP) requirements for downed aircraft.  
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As depicted in Figure 5-3, we can further assign supply chain response time and perfect 
order fulfillment metrics for the material readiness aspect of the MALS’ production 
effort: DIFM management.  The following is an example where the MALS supply chain 
can focus on the DIFM count in order to improve aircraft readiness: 
Example #1:  Per LMDSS, the top MAG-26 NMCS driver (July 01 to July 
02) for CH-53E aircraft is the digital computer, NIIN 01-328-0266, WUC 5742100, C3 I-
level repair capability, SMR code PAOGK. (Refs. 27 & 28)  This part accrued 5,066 
hours aircraft downtime for 81% of MAG-26 CH-53E reporting aircraft (total 3,094 
flight hours flown). (Ref. 27) Analysis of the MALS-26 DIFM report dated 8/21/2002 
revealed 3 digital computers in-work under repair (status M2) for inventory 
replenishment (Supply Officer assets).  No squadron EXREPs (NMCS) were reported in 
the MALS repair cycle at that snapshot in time.   
Further LMDSS research revealed more MALS-26 IMA production 
information about the digital computer: 35 digital computers were processed at the I-
Level (seven components processed BCM, 28 components repaired, ten processed with 
no defects or A799, Average TAT was seven days, and Average AWP was 8.54 days).  
The Actual reliability data showed 18 verified failures for a Mean Flight Hour Between 
Failure of 171.89 hours (out of 3,094 hours flown).  Utilizing O-level remove and replace 
actions (no defects included) as a reference point vice verified failures, the adjusted 
“realized” MFHBF is 88.4 hours (3,094/35 items replaced at the o-level and inducted into 
the I-level), which is significantly less from an organizational-level maintenance 
standpoint.  MALS-26 inventory information is as follows: six (6) total assets in 
inventory; five (5) on the shelf available for issue and one (1) restricted from issue held in 
war-time reserves (FISP).  2d MAW’s FY-2002 Top 25 degrader report for MALS-26 
covering the period 10/01/2001 to 03/31/2002 (Ref. 26) showed the digital computer as 
the 22nd top degrader, with 63% supply effectiveness (16 demands, 10 issues, 6 
EXREPs).  Of the 6 EXREPs during this timeframe, 5 were repaired, and 1 beyond the 
capability of I-Level repair.  LMDSS data for this timeframe revealed the digital 
computer as MAL-26’s top NMCS degrader for MAG-26 CH-53E aircraft: 1,593 NMCS 
hours accrued based on 1,594 flight hours flown for 83% of reporting aircraft. (Ref. 27)     
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Example #1 Summary:  it appears there is a repair parts constraint 
(possibly SRA and bit-piece-part material availability problems) with the digital 
computer that is preventing them from ensuring there are enough digital computers on the 
shelf to match demand, when they are needed.  Although 63% of digital computers were 
issued during the first half of FY-02, it was still the top NMCS driver for MAG-26’s CH-
53E aircraft during that timeframe accruing roughly one hour aircraft downtime for every 
flight hour flown.  For the most part, MALS-26 repairs the defective computers, and in 
10 instances, there were actually no defects found at the I-level.  The MALS should focus 
on reducing the amount of NMCS time accrued for this item by ensuring digital 
computers are always on the shelf, and placing supply officer assets in DIFM as a top 
priority for repair.  As of the 8/21/2002 MALS-26 DIFM report, work center 620’s 
(responsible for repairing the digital computer) DIFM count was 119.  The three (3) 
digital computer supply officer’s assets in DIFM represented merely 2.5% of their total 
DIFM count.  Work center 620 must not lose focus of digital computers (historically 
MAG-26’s and the fleet-wide #1 NMCS driver) regardless of the number of other assets 
in their DIFM (except for EXREPs which always have top priority). 
Supply Chain Response Time and Responsiveness Metrics for Parts 
Produced by the IMA.  Responsiveness is also crucial to the MALS repair cycle effort.  
The Aviation Supply Department must also be responsive in satisfying the Intermediate 
Maintenance Activity’s spare parts requirements to repair components in DIFM (work in 
process inventory).  The same principles and standards apply to these requirements, as 
previously discussed with respect to satisfying NMCS/PMCS requirements from 
supported Marine squadrons.  Heightened responsiveness to the IMA’s spare parts 
requirements will eventually lead to a reduced DIFM count, higher NMCS/PMCS supply 
effectiveness, increased inventory depth, and ultimately higher aircraft readiness.    
Perfect Order Fulfillment and Material Availability Metrics for Parts 
Produced by the IMA.  These metrics also apply to the MALS repair cycle effort.  
Allowance and inventory management must be focused towards providing the IMA the 
right part, at the right place, at the right time.  The Repairables and Consumables 
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Management Divisions are the key members of the MALS supply chain that influence the 
allowance inventory management of the IMA’s spare parts requirements.  The same 
metrics applied for NMCS/PMCS requirements from the Marine squadrons can be 
applied to MALS IMA repair cycle efforts.  Specifically, those SRA and consumable 
requirements critical for enabling repair of readiness degraders must be the focus of 
RMD and CMD.  We recommend the MALS utilize an adjusted version of the 
NMCS/PMCS supply effectiveness metric in order to analyze the Aviation Supply 
Department’s effectiveness in satisfying the IMA’s repair requirements.  This new metric 
should analyze, at a minimum, those requisitions that utilize the project code “ZC8” 
which corresponds to the IMA’s material requirements for repairing components in 
DIFM (non-engine [ZQ9] and non-test bench related [ZF7]).  Utilizing this “ZC8 Supply 
Effectiveness” metric should identify those spare parts (SRAs and consumables) that are 
preventing the IMA from repairing squadron EXREP requirements as well as those WRA 
and SRAs in DIFM ultimately bound to replenish the supply officer’s inventory and 
prevent future stock out conditions.  Applying the DIFM management principles and 
DIFM count metric discussed earlier to SRAs in the MALS repair cycle will ultimately 
increase aircraft readiness by reducing the cycle time associated with WRAs in the DIFM 
work in process inventory and putting them back in the MALS inventory to satisfy future 
NMCS/PMCS demands.  Data collected from MALS-26 (July, 2001 to July, 2002) 
displays how the ZC8 supply effectiveness metric can vary significantly from the 
traditional supply effectiveness metric (Table 5-6).  One particular note is that the ZC8 
project code not only includes those SRA and consumable requirements directly required 
for NMCS/PMCS EXREP repairs, but also those SRA and consumable requirements for 
other DIFM repairs.  It would be extremely difficult to segregate those ZC8 project coded 
requisitions directly related to NMCS/PMCS EXREP repairs, and directly tied to aircraft 
readiness.  The metric as it stands, is a good metric for identifying parts constraints to 













Table 5- 8  MALS-26 ZC8 Supply Effectiveness Comparison 
The 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing Aviation Logistics Department currently 
utilizes a ZC8 project code requisition supply effectiveness metric.  Table 5-9 is the 
MALS-26 ZC8/ZQ9 supply effectiveness summary for the period covering the first half 
of fiscal year 2002 (10/01/2001 to 03/31/2002).  The report displays those parts ordered 
with the ZC8 and ZQ9 (engine requirements) project codes that have the lowest supply 
effectiveness per type-model-series-aircraft and type-engine.  Also included in the report 
is basic inventory management information, which can help the aviation logistician 
determine root causes to DIFM management awaiting parts problems that are driving 
aircraft readiness.  This report also provides details for low ZC8 supply effectiveness 
rates.  For viewing purposes, the ZQ9 project coded requirements were hidden in the 
Excel spreadsheet, as well as some amplifying inventory management data. 
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DUE AMD AMFD AT NICP SMR
09167 AH1W 013333149 9N 4 4 0% 0 0 CONNECTOR-SWITCH 0 EA 0 0 0 1.3 8
09167 AH1W 006126993 9N 4 4 0% 0 0 SWITCH,SUBASSY 0 EA 0 0 0.1 1.3 8
09167 AH1W 000824643 9G 4 4 0% 0 0 COVER 0 EA 0 0 0 1.3 8
09167 AH1W LLQ485141 9P 3 3 0% 0 0 RESISTOR ASSY 0 EA 0 0 0 1 8
09167 AH1W 013160761 9Z 2 2 0% 0 0 RING,RETAINI 2 EA 2 0 0.4 0.7 2
09167 CH46E 013888592 05A 7R 6 6 0% 0 6 X1 CIRCUIT CARD ASSEMB 0 EA 0 0 0.2 2 8 PAGDD
09167 CH46E 001829481 9Z 3 3 0% 0 0 SCREW,MACHINE 0 EA 0 0 0 1 8
09167 CH46E 002312037 9Z 3 3 0% 0 0 BAR,METAL 0 FT 0 0 0 1 8
09167 CH46E 002879754 9G 3 3 0% 0 0 BUSHING,SLEEVE 3 PG 0 3 0.3 1 2
09167 CH46E 007269640 9Z 2 2 0% 0 0 O-RING 0 EA 0 0 0 0.7 8
09167 CH53E 011318725 9G 5 5 0% 0 0 PRISM,LIGHTING 0 EA 0 0 0 1.7 8
09167 CH53E 010172077 9N 5 5 0% 0 0 TRANSISTOR 0 EA 0 0 0 1.7 8
09167 CH53E 011487574 9N 4 4 0% 0 0 TRANSISTOR 0 EA 0 0 0 1.3 8
09167 CH53E 013984389 9W 4 4 0% 0 0 CABLE ASSY 0 EA 0 0 0 1.3 8
09167 CH53E 002485754 9G 4 4 0% 0 0 RING, WIPER 0 EA 0 0 0 1.3 8
09167 UH1N 010520312 9Z 4 4 0% 0 0 SEAL,TAIL ROTOR 6 EA 0 6 1.2 1.3 2
09167 UH1N 012781396 9N 2 2 0% 0 0 RESISTOR,FIXED, WIRE, 0 EA 0 0 0 0.7 8
09167 UH1N 006032397 9G 2 2 0% 0 0 FASTENER BELT 0 EA 0 0 0 0.7 8
09167 UH1N 006355878 9G 2 2 0% 0 0 MOTOR,DIRECT 0 EA 0 0 0.1 0.7 8
09167 UH1N 013291751 9Z 1 1 0% 0 0 LAMP, INCANDESCENT 0 EA 0 0 0 0.3 8
 
Table 5- 9  MALS-26 ZC8/ZQ9 Summary Report Spreadsheet (from Ref. 26) 
4. Off-Station Material Availability 
Metrics:  Responsiveness or Supply Chain Response Time, NMCS/PMCS 
count, and AWP count.  Off-station material availability is the third element of material 
readiness.  Off-station availability is also included in the material readiness aspect of 
DIFM management (parts from the IMA).  When the Aviation Supply Department cannot 
immediately fulfill a squadron’s requirement from on-station inventory, the requirement 
(after extensive research and screening) is passed “off-station” to the upstream members 
of the Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain.  The MALS Supply Response 
Division, Repairables Management Division, and Consumables Management Division 
are all critical players in reducing the amount of NMCS/PMCS readiness degrading 
requisitions referred “off-station.”  As shown in MALS-14’s Future Reality Tree (Figure 
5-1), the Aviation Supply Department sought to reduce off-station requirements through 
proper allowances and on-station material availability.  This triad of aviation logistics 
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processes, coupled with personnel and equipment readiness, ultimately is the key to 
improving aircraft readiness.  When proper allowancing and on-station material 
availability cannot satisfy a squadron’s or the IMA’s repair parts requirements, the 
Supply Response Division and the Repairables Management Division expedite the 
requirements.  The goal is to reduce the overall customer wait time by expediting 
delivery of the requirement from the upstream members of the Naval/Marine Corps 
aviation logistics supply chain.  For off-station material availability, average customer 
wait time provides the aviation logistician a starting point for analyzing trends in 
decreased aircraft readiness.  The MALS must focus on those parts that are continually 
long lead time readiness degraders, and communicate with the proper inventory control 
point to engage in efforts to reduce procurement cycle times. 
NMCS/PMCS and AWP counts are traditional metrics the MALS Aviation 
Supply Department uses to monitor the amount of off-station requirements any point in 
time.  Increasing NMCS/PMCS counts usually corresponds with a trend in increased 
aircraft NMC and PMC rates while an increasing AWP count usually corresponds with a 
trend in increased components in DIFM awaiting parts.  Both conditions directly drive 
NMCS/PMCS cycle time and aircraft readiness.  With this in mind, reducing the 
NMCS/PMCS count and AWP count will result in decreased NMC and PMC aircraft, 
and components awaiting parts in the IMA.  2d MAW ALD utilizes a daily high priority 
requisition report to track the number of outstanding NMCS/PMCS requisitions 
segregated by age (Table 5-10).     
Integral to reducing the overall NMCS/PMCS and AWP count is reliable 
information systems, and personnel readiness.  The Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics 
supply chain is saturated with a myriad of web-based logistics information systems that 
provide asset availability, requisition status, and technical information.  Mastering the 
many different logistics information systems will increase the opportunity of reducing the 
amount of requisitions with long lead times.  Skilled expediters can drastically reduce not 
only the amount of off-station NMCS/PMCS and AWP requisitions, but also the number 
of invalid requirements.  Reconciliation is a hallmark of good expediting, and must be 
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frequently accomplished to ensure the right parts and requisitions are getting the attention 
they deserve.  Expediting invalid requisitions results in opportunity costs of lost time and 
funding.  With limited time, personnel, and resources (funding), requisition validity is 
critical to aircraft readiness.  
AK0 AK7 730 AK0 AK7 730 AK0 AK7 730 AK0 AK7 730 AK0 AK7 730 AK0 AK7 730
2217 2214
17 1 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 21 2 0 44 3 0 ▲3 0 0
3 0 0 5 1 0 2 0 0 13 2 0 23 3 0 ▼2 ▼1 0
11 1 0 6 0 0 6 0 0 6 5 0 29 6 0 ▼3 ▲1 0
3 3 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 6 9 0 ▼1 ▼2 0
2 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 ▼1 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 ▲2 0 0
5 1 0 1 0 0 4 0 0 7 0 0 17 1 0 ▼4 ▲1 0
2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 3 0 ▲1 0 0
45 9 0 17 3 0 16 2 0 47 15 0 125 29 0 ▼4 ▼2 0
2217 2214
5 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 ▼1 ▼2 0
8 6 0 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 8 0 ▼3 ▲1 0
7 5 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 8 8 0 ▲3 0 0
0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 2 0 ▼5 0 0
20 13 0 9 4 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 32 18 0 ▼6 ▼1 0
2217 2214
5 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 6 2 0 ▲2 ▼1 0
7 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 1 0 ▲2 0 0
12 1 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 0 17 4 0 ▲5 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 0
25 3 0 5 1 0 2 0 0 4 4 0 36 8 0 ▲9 ▼1 0
2217 2214
13 14 0 3 1 0 2 0 0 6 0 2 24 15 2 0 ▼3 0
12 3 0 11 6 0 2 1 0 5 1 0 30 11 0 ▼2 ▲1 0
14 14 0 6 3 0 6 3 0 7 3 1 33 23 1 ▼1 ▲1 0
39 31 0 20 10 0 10 4 0 18 4 3 87 49 3 ▼3 ▼1 0






AH1W      
UH1N      
MAG-29
AH1W      
UH1N      
MAG-31
Up/Down
2D MAW CRITICAL SUPPLY REPORT
NMCS/PMC/SDLM (AK0/AK7/730) AIRCRAFT RQNS
Days Old
Totals1-10 11-20 12-30
 Date Created: 08/05/2002
CH46E     
MAG Totals
CH46E     
CH53E     
MAG-26
MAG Totals
EA6B      
KC130F    
KC130R    
UAV       
F/A18A    
F/A18C    
F/A18D    
MAG Totals
CH53E     
Extended TMS
>30
TAV8B     
MAG-14 Report Date:
MAG/
AV8B      
AV8B II + 
AV8BR     
 
Table 5- 10  2d MAW Daily High Priority Report (from Ref. 26) 
  Reducing administrative and procurement lead times (ALT and PLT) for 
aircraft readiness degrading requirements for an individual squadron or MALS must also 
be the goal of the upstream members of the aviation supply chain.  Current performance 
metrics of the upstream members of the supply chain track the readiness levels of aircraft 
in aggregate, and not by individual squadrons (e.g., all AV-8B aircraft, not individual 
MALS or squadron).  As a result, situations could arise where readiness for a certain type 
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aircraft is satisfactory, yet readiness for an individual Marine squadron is less than 
satisfactory.  In this case, the upstream member’s performance metrics must be able to 
indicate this degraded readiness condition, and allow the inventory control point to act 
accordingly to provide the necessary resources to eliminate parts constraints or expedite 
procurement.  Figure 5-4 displays how Defense Supply Center Richmond, Virginia 
(DSCR), the lead center for DoD aviation, measures DLA’s material availability (all 
DLA inventory control points) with respect to how well they are supporting the 
Navy/Marine Corps H-53 community.  Specifically, Figure 5-4 represents the aggregate 
fill rate percentage of Defense Supply Centers Richmond (Virginia), Columbus (Ohio), 
and Philadelphia (Pennsylvania) based on demand from the Navy/Marine Corps H-53 
community.  In the figure, the term “operational units” refers to a ship, air station, or 
MALS (e.g., USS Tarawa, NASJRB Willow Grove, or MALS-16), and not an individual 
Marine squadron (e.g., HMH-465).  
John Crabtree 6/21/2002 6Right Item, Right Time, Right Place, Right Price ... Every Time








Operational 88.4 87.0 85.3 86.3 89.9 91.4 90.5 87.5 87.3 88.7 89.5 88.9
NADEP 77.8 74.9 78.9 79.5 79.1 79.1 78.9 81.8 80.6 75.7 78.9 81.1
DLA Total 85.7 83.0 83.3 84.4 87.5 89.6 88.6 86.2 85.8 86.6 87.4 86.9




Figure 5- 4  Defense Supply Center Richmond H-53 Supply Availability Metric 
(from Ref. 29) 
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        Figure 5-5 displays another metric used by DSCR that provides the total 
stocked material backorders for Navy/Marine Corps H-53 operational units, for all DLA 
inventory control points in aggregate.  The total backorders are separated by age (0-30 
days, 31-60 days, etc.).  The term “NSNs” represents the individual line items of stock 
(National Stock Number) specific to the Navy/Marine Corps H-53 community.  This 
metric gives depth to the material availability metric by providing stock out trends.  
Although this metric provides a decent indicator of stock out trends for the entire 
Navy/Marine Corps H-53 operational community, it fails to correlate with the readiness 
level of the individual Marine squadron.  










AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL
NSNs
TOTAL B/O
NSNs TOT B/O 0-30 31-60 61-90 91-180 180+
Feb-02 1011 3385 1097 640 290 735 623
Mar-02 951 3289 890 707 488 631 573
Apr-02 979 3382 966 611 512 658 635
May-02 968 3249 984 646 385 641 593
Jun-02 860 3288 792 741 511 707 537





Figure 5- 5  Defense Supply Center Richmond H-53 Backorder Metric 
(from Ref. 29) 
5. Other Factors 
As noted in the MALS-14 Future Reality Tree (Figures 5-1 and 5-3), Material 
Readiness cannot solely account for the successful performance of the MALS in 
achieving improved aircraft readiness with the MAG.  Personnel and equipment resource 
metrics must also be focused on to achieve a total supply chain management success.  If 
 112
material readiness is optimized (responsive and available parts) without the proper 
personnel and equipment resources within the MALS, the MALS will almost surely fail 
in any effort to achieve their strategic logistics management plan goal of improved 
aircraft readiness.  Appropriate metrics must also be developed to assure optimal 
personnel and equipment resource levels within the MALS to support corresponding 
material readiness metrics.    
 
E. A “SCM” ORIENTED REPORTING SYSTEM  
The performance metrics of perfect order fulfillment and supply chain 
response time must be integrated throughout not only the MALS, but also throughout the 
entire Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain.  Utilizing these two 
performance metrics throughout the entire enterprise will focus all members of the 
supply chain on the common goal of aircraft readiness.  Without supply chain-focused 
performance metrics, the MALS will only be able to influence marginal improvements in 
aircraft readiness.  We recommend utilizing a web-based reporting system similar to the 
one used by MALS-14.  The only shortfall to MALS-14’s reporting system is that it 
restricted itself to the processes and performance metrics solely within the MALS.  
Upstream members of the supply chain are not integrated within this reporting system.  
The “cockpit charts” and web-based Planeside Assessment Tool (web-PAT) used by the 
NAVRIT and CFT-2 members provide a better example of a reporting system that 
integrates the performance of upstream members of the aviation supply chain towards 
improving aircraft readiness.  Unfortunately, this reporting system does not integrate all 
members of the supply chain (e.g., DLA ICPs, Distribution Depots, etc) which can 




Leveraging the Planeside Tool
• Tool “feeds” cockpit chart
• And documents “actionable” 
degraders at squadron level
• Cockpit chart reveals 
readiness at fleet level
• And helps to further 
validate planeside tool
Planeside Performance Summary
   Planeside Performance (NMCS/PMCS) GOAL LEMOORE NI WHIDBEY PT MUGU
      Percentage First Day Issue 75% 61.8 48.3 73.8 41.9 75% OR ABOVE > 70% & < 75% 70% AND BELOW
 Average Customer Wait Time (ACWT) 4 D 13.2 9.4 7.1 18.5 4 DAYS OR LESS > 4 & < 7 DAYS 7 OR > DAYS
     Consumable ACWT 4 D 14.8 10.4 10.0 22.6 4 DAYS OR LESS > 4 & < 7 DAYS 7 OR > DAYS
     Repairable ACWT 4 D 12.1 8.5 6.1 16.1 4 DAYS OR LESS > 4 & < 7 DAYS 7 OR > DAYS
Sustainability
PEB/RMS fi lls as a % of total consumable  RQNS 25% 39.0% 20.0% 59.0% 30.0% 25% OR LESS < 25% & >20% 20% OR LESS
Wholesale Stock Replenishment Time 23 D 19 39 23 31 23 DAYS OR LESS >  23 & < 29 DAYS 29 OR > DAYS
 Unfilled Initial Issues N/A 202 217 282 231
Production
      WRA TAT 6.9 D 11.4 12.3 7.6 18.4 7 DAYS OR < > 7 & < 11 DAYS 11 OR > DAYS
      Bare Firewalls 0 4 15 2 2 0 1 TO 5 6 OR MORE
      Repair Rate (All BCM) N/A 61.1% 64.1% 70.4% 65.0%
      Repair Rate (Less BCM-1) 80% 78.4% 79.1% 85.2% 79.7% 80% OR ABOVE > 75% & < 80% 75% AND BELOW
Production Resources (non-engine)
      Percentage First Day Issue AWP 75% 66.8 35.6 44.6 38.9 75% OR ABOVE > 70% & < 75% 70% AND BELOW
 ACWT AWP 4 D 8.1 14.1 9.7 11.6 4 DAYS OR LESS > 4 & < 7 DAYS 7 OR > DAYS
     Consumable ACWT AWP 4 D 4.8 13.7 8.8 11.3 4 DAYS OR LESS > 4 & < 7 DAYS 7 OR > DAYS
     Repairable ACWT AWP 4 D 14.0 15.2 12.3 12.3 4 DAYS OR LESS > 4 & < 7 DAYS 7 OR > DAYS
Manning Posture
      CORE Rating COB as a percentage of BA 100% 68% 78% 81% 118% 90% OR ABOVE > 80% & < 90% 80% AND BELOW
      CORE Rating DNEC/MOS as a percent of BA 100% 73% 85% 88% 114% 90% OR ABOVE > 80% & < 90% 80% AND BELOW
      ASD Manning (Civilian/Mititary) 100% 94% 80% 65% 83% 90% OR ABOVE > 80% & < 90% 80% AND BELOW
Aircraft, Engine and Support Equipment Inventory
      PAI as a percent of PAA 100% 86% 87% 76% 90% 90% OR ABOVE > 80% & < 90% 80% AND BELOW
      Bare Firewalls 0 4 15 2 2 AT GOAL 1-5 >5
      Broad Arrows N/A 16 7 21 9
      Active CAT I TPDRs for TMS Supported 0 12 53 33 25 0 N/A 1 AND ABOVE
      Issued/Unincorporated IRACs N/A 33 129 51 67

























will be difficult to 
classify
Percentage of squadrons 
with the number of aircraft 
required in the IDTC
Number of bare engine fire 
walls
Percentage of time engine 
and QECE are available 
when required
Percentage NMCS/PMCS 
demand filled in 0 or 1 day 
…current data collection 
does not support measuring 
to 2 hour goal.
Test Bench 






…Initial Cat 1 
TPDR … 
moving to Cat 
1 TPDR dCT
CFT 2 Cockpit Chart
 
Figure 5- 6  NAVRIT Planeside ILS Tool Summary and Cockpit Chart Graphic 
(from Ref. 30) 
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30
tmdl wuc3 creqs oreqs new tdays sfill acwt tier_1% wrt difm wra_bcm_pc bcm_pc bcm1_pc con_awp_wt tat
F-14 47X 5 2 6 4975 3 710.7 50 836.2 14 0 64.29 0 43.8 3.4
F-14 277 17 20 18 2537 10 68.6 55.6 53.1 39 12.9 56.99 51.61 39.1 2.9
FA-18 274 39 42 50 2217 22 27.4 44 67.7 326 13.11 60.66 60.66 30.7 21.4
FA-18 111 8 15 8 1938 0 84.3 0 118.3 0 50 50 50 39 0
FA-18 146 10 13 10 1521 0 66.1 0 86 4 29.41 47.06 11.76 67.5 16.6
FA-18 145 21 15 20 1480 11 41.1 55 72.2 17 50 56.67 40 100.7 18.2
F-14 62X 12 5 13 940 12 55.3 92.3 231.8 4 10 50 40 29 0.4
FA-18 75H 0 4 0 936 0 234 0 234 0 0 0 0 292.3 0.8
FA-18 74B 8 7 7 894 1 59.6 14.3 118.7 3 0 9.09 9.09 20 10.3
FA-18 142 18 9 18 820 10 30.4 55.6 52.1 7 29.17 50 33.33 10.2 4.4
E/C-2 415 0 1 0 762 0 762 0 762 0 0 0 0 0 0
FA-18 742 116 24 127 705 42 5 33.1 79.1 83 1.43 4.29 2.86 20.9 5.6
F-14 741 30 8 32 696 8 18.3 25 151.4 18 0 2.63 2.63 56.7 11
FA-18 411 42 15 52 693 27 12.2 51.9 28.2 4 64.29 66.67 66.67 8.1 0.4
FA-18 653 9 2 9 688 6 62.5 66.7 174 4 0 0 0 0 38.6
FA-18 74D 45 17 46 685 17 11 37 74.9 66 0.91 24.55 21.82 13.3 15.7
F-14 451 24 3 23 665 17 24.6 73.9 125.4 7 19.35 19.35 12.9 13.6 0.8
FA-18 57X 3 6 5 647 1 71.9 20 114 3 0 25 25 2 1.5
F-14 577 29 2 27 633 23 20.4 85.2 595 12 3.45 3.45 0 0.9 1.2
F-14 74A 199 24 211 611 151 2.7 71.6 104.1 219 2.95 4.43 2.58 30.2 9
F-14 691 56 4 55 539 45 9 81.8 77.4 37 0.83 5.79 0.83 3.3 5.6
 
Figure 5- 7  Web-based Planeside Assessment Tool (from Ref. 30) 
 
F. SUMMARY 
Measuring aviation logistics responsiveness (supply chain response time) and 
material availability (perfect order fulfillment), coupled with personnel and equipment 
readiness, are the two most important aviation logistics metrics for improving aircraft 
readiness.  These metrics should not only be used by the MALS, but also integrated with 
ALL upstream members of the Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain.  
Without total supply chain integration, the MALS can only hope for marginal 
improvements in aircraft readiness.  Even more important, metrics alone cannot help a 
MALS improve aircraft readiness without a strategic logistics management plan, as 
proven by MALS-14 success. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The scope of this thesis was developing performance metrics that link supply 
chain management to aircraft readiness.  Inherent in this effort was evaluating and 
analyzing current strategic logistics management planning methods grounded in the 
overarching principles of supply chain management.  This further required mapping and 
defining the entire Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain.  Our primary 
focus was solely on the tactical segment of the Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics 
supply chain: the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron.  Only by first understanding the 
interdependent relationships of all the members of the Naval/Marine Corps aviation 
logistics supply chain could we begin to understand developing performance metrics that 
link supply chain management to aircraft readiness at tactical level of aviation logistics. 
To supplement our firm understanding of strategic logistics management planning 
grounded in the principles of supply chain management, we analyzed the tenets of the 
Theory of Constraints management method and its applicability to Marine Corps aviation 
logistics.  Building on this knowledge we conducted a case study analysis of the 
implementation of a structured planning and feedback system coupled with the Theory of 
Constraints method to improve aircraft readiness in Marine Aircraft Group 14, Marine 
Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina.  The specific unit analyzed, Marine 
Aviation Logistics Squadron 14, successfully implemented a strategic logistics 
management plan, optimized aviation logistics operations, and achieved increased aircraft 
readiness within MAG-14.  As a result, MALS-14 was the second MALS utilizing 
strategic logistics management planning and the Theory of Constraints to improve 
aircraft readiness, and subsequently won official recognition as the Marine Aviation 
Logistics Squadron of the Year for 2001 by Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Marine 
Corps Aviation Association (MALS-12 won the MALS of the year award in 1999 
utilizing the Theory of Constraints). 
Drawing lessons learned during the MALS-14 case study analysis, we developed 
performance metrics that the MALS can implement to tie supply chain management to 
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aircraft readiness.  The metrics, Supply Chain Response Time and Perfect Order 
Fulfillment, can be implemented not only at the MALS level (the focus of our thesis), but 
also integrated with and applied by the upstream members of the Naval/Marine Corps 
aviation logistics supply chain.  Our research indicated that by employing strategic 
logistics planning and focusing on these supply chain oriented metrics at the MALS, 
aviation logisticians can identify primary aircraft readiness degraders, and take the 
appropriate steps to eliminate them.  Our research also indicated that by using these 
metrics, the MALS can identify the level of aircraft readiness “owned” by the upstream 
members of the Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain.  From a supply chain 
management perspective, we realized the MALS “owns” only a small share of degraded 
aircraft readiness.  
 
A. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Conclusion #1: The Logistics Management Institute’s Six Step Process 
for Implementing Supply Chain Management in the Department of 
Defense and Adapted SCOR Model  Provides a Basis for Strategic 
Logistics Management Planning, and is Relevant and Applicable to 
Naval/Marine Corps Aviation Logistics and the MALS. 
We developed a basic foundation of understanding the Naval/Marine Corps’ 
aviation logistics infrastructure from a supply chain management perspective, based on 
the Logistics Management Institute’s DoD Supply Chain Management Implementation 
Guide.  A precipitate of this analysis was designing a high-level graphical model 
mapping and defining the complex interdependencies of the Naval/Marine Corps aviation 
logistics supply chain network and a detailed process flow diagram describing the tactical 
aviation logistics operations of the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS).  These 
two graphics can help provide Marine aviation logisticians a visual reference for 
developing supply chain-oriented performance metrics for the MALS that can 
integrate with upstream aviation logistics supply chain activities.  Utilizing The Guide, 
we adapted a strategic logistics management plan for improving aircraft readiness and 
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Marine aviation logistics at the tactical level, and provided the structural framework for 
developing readiness-based performance measures.  Although The Guide’s impetus was 
to provide a plan to implement SCM throughout the end-to-end logistics and supply 
enterprise of an organization, our focus was on the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron.  
Developing a specific strategic logistics plan for implementing supply chain management 
and performance metrics for the Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain 
enterprise is outside the scope of this thesis, and a much larger and complex undertaking.  
Most of the fundamentals discussed in The Six Step Process for Implementing SCM is 
relevant and can be applied within the Marine Aircraft Group and Marine Aviation 
Logistics Squadron in order to develop SCM-oriented, readiness-based performance 
metrics that will 1) improve current and future aviation logistics support and aircraft 
readiness where required, 2) help prepare the MALS for the eventual implementation of 
SCM within Naval/Marine aviation logistics, and 3) once SCM is implemented, serve as 
the overarching logistics strategy to integrate all Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics 
supply chain activities’ performance metrics towards a common goal: aircraft readiness 
or operational availability (Ao). 
2. Recommendation #1: Implement Supply Chain Management within 
Naval/Marine Corps Aviation Logistics and Require Strategic 
Logistics Management Planning at the MALS. 
In order to integrate the performance and metrics of all members of the 
Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain towards the common goal of 
achieving optimized aircraft readiness, the Department of the Navy and the Marine Corps 
should implement supply chain management as recommended in The Guide.  These same 
principles of supply chain management should also be implemented at the MALS.  In 
order to implement supply chain management principles, we recommend that the 
leadership of Marine Corps aviation require all MALS Commanding Officers submit 
Strategic Logistics Management Plans to their immediate (Marine Aircraft Group 
Commander) and next higher headquarters (Marine Aircraft Wing Commanding 
Generals) within 45 days after assuming command delineating how their organization 
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will improve and sustain aircraft readiness and aviation logistics support during their 
tenure.  We further recommend that training modules for Strategic Logistics Management 
Planning and supply chain management be implemented as a part of the curricula taught 
at entry-level (officer) and career-level (officer and enlisted) aviation logistics Military 
Occupational Specialty (MOS) schools, and in officer and staff non-commissioned 
officer professional military education resident and distance learning courses.  One 
possible alternative solution could be to develop a Marine Corps Institute (MCI) distance-
learning course for “Marine Aviation Logistics Strategic Management Planning” similar 
to the Marine Corps Planning Process course (8805).  Marine Aircraft Wing Logistics 
Management Assistance and Training (LOGMAT) and Aviation Supply LOGMAT 
Teams should also provide the MALS sustainment training in Strategic Logistics 
Management Planning and supply chain management. 
3.   Conclusion #2: The Theory of Constraints is a Viable Tool for 
Defining the Ultimate Goal of Marine Aviation Logistics and 
Identifying and Eliminating Constraints (Readiness Degraders) that 
Prevent the MALS from Achieving that Goal. 
The Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain is a system of 
interrelated, interdependent organizations and processes that are designed to sustain and 
support aircraft weapon systems.  Therefore, the principles, tools, and methods of the 
Theory of Constraints can be used to improve supply chain and weapon system 
performance through the use of Logic Trees and the Five Focusing Steps.  Process flow 
diagrams can be used to identify a bottleneck or constraint within the aviation logistics 
support process; however, Logic Trees provide the means of identifying the root cause of 
the constraint (degraded readiness) through cause and effect relationships.  Furthermore, 
we used the Five Focusing Steps to identify and eliminate a constraint within an adapted 
SCOR Level 3 Delivery Process.  In addition, we showed how the Theory of Constraints 




4. Recommendation #2: Supplement Strategic Logistics Management 
Planning with Theory of Constraints management to help the MALS 
(and Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain) focus on and 
improve aircraft readiness and aviation logistics. 
We recommend the MALS supplement their Strategic Logistics Management 
Plan with the principles, tools, and methods of the Theory of Constraints.  Utilizing Logic 
Trees and the Five Focusing Steps of Theory of Constraints management will provide the 
MALS a means of identifying and eliminating constraints to achieving improved aircraft 
readiness and aviation logistics support.  Theory of Constraints management training 
should be supplemented within the training proposal outlined in recommendation #1.  
Numerous commercial consulting firms specializing in the Theory of Constraints 
management method can provide more detailed training.                 
5.   Conclusion #3: MALS-14’s Successful Implementation of a 
Structured Planning and Feedback System Based on the Theory of 
Constraints Justifies the Need for a Strategic Logistics Management 
Plan Rooted in the Fundamentals of Supply Chain Management. 
MALS-14 established crystal-clear goals, developed a strategy to achieve the 
goals, and implemented a reporting system to manage critical success factors.  The aim 
was to integrate critical processes of the squadron toward a common goal.  The key was 
to capitalize on the power of ownership.  Every leader was instrumental in the 
development of his or her strategy to achieve the ultimate goal of the squadron.  MALS-
14 was able to cut through the complex world of Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics 
and focus the effort of its leaders on the processes towards achieving the goal.  MALS-14 
used sound leadership, strategic thinking, and the Theory of Constraints to develop a 
strategic plan and feedback system to improve aircraft readiness.  In November 2001, 
MAG-14 achieved 82 percent readiness.  Additionally, MALS-14 was selected as the 




6. Recommendation #3: Establish MALS-14’s Successful Efforts as the 
Marine Corps Aviation Logistics Benchmark for Implementing 
Strategic Planning and Theory of Constraints Management in the 
MALS. 
We conclude that MALS-14’s structured planning and feedback system was a 
successful implementation of a Strategic Logistics Management Plan.  MALS-14’s 
success should be used as a benchmark for all Marine Aviation Logistics Squadrons to 
strive towards in developing and implementing their own Strategic Logistics 
Management Plans. 
7. Conclusion #4: Employing Supply Chain-Oriented, Readiness-Based 
Performance Metrics (Supply Chain Response Time and Perfect 
Order Fulfillment) Are Critical to Improving Aircraft Readiness.    
Measuring aviation logistics responsiveness (supply chain response time) and 
material availability (perfect order fulfillment), coupled with personnel and equipment 
readiness, are the two most important aviation logistics metrics for improving aircraft 
readiness.  These metrics should not only be used by the MALS, but also integrated with 
ALL upstream members of the Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain.  
Without total supply chain integration, the MALS can only hope for marginal 
improvements in aircraft readiness since the majority of degraded aircraft readiness is 
“owned” by upstream members of the supply chain.  Even more important, metrics alone 
cannot help a MALS improve aircraft readiness without a Strategic Logistics 
Management Plan, as proven by MALS-14’s success. 
8. Recommendation #4: Implement Supply Chain Response Time and 
Perfect Order Fulfillment as the Preferred Performance Metrics for 
the MALS and the Naval/Marine Corps Aviation Logistics Supply 
Chain. 
Supply Chain Response Time and Perfect Order Fulfillment should be 
implemented at the MALS, and integrated with ALL members of the Naval/Marine 
Corps aviation logistics supply chain for improving aircraft readiness.  Every activity 
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within the Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain should focus priorities of 
effort and resources on reducing Customer Wait Time/Logistics Response Time and 
increasing Material Availability for readiness degraders affecting not only all of 
Naval/Marine Corps aviation, but also readiness degraders impacting an individual 
squadron.  We further recommend that the MALS implement the following peculiar 
performance metrics to help focus on improving aircraft readiness: 
a. Inventory Management 
• Proper Allowance Management. 
• On-station Availability: Implement R-Pool repairables 
management procedures, NMCS/PMCS/ZC8 Supply 
Effectiveness, R-Pool Range and Depth, Readiness-Critical 
Consumables Range and Depth.  
• Off-station Availability:  NMCS/PMCS/AWP count 
b. DIFM Management 
• DIFM count for readiness degraders. 
c. Responsiveness 
• Logistics Response Time:  modify current aviation logistics 
management information systems to track Supply Chain Response 
Time by each individual activity in the Naval/Marine Corps 
aviation logistics supply chain.  Furthermore, Supply Chain 
Response Time should be measured for an individual NSN, group 
of NSNs (weapon system), aircraft, flying squadron, and/or 



















































MAPPING THE NAVAL/MARINE CORPS 
AVIATION LOGISTICS SUPPLY CHAIN 
 
A. OVERVIEW 
Steps two and four in the six step process of implementing SCM in DoD logistics 
involved developing the supply chain implementation strategy and designing the supply 
chain.  One of the key elements in developing a strategic logistics management plan is  
defining (or re-defining) the future or “to-be” supply chain.  Before determining what the 
future supply chain should look like, we recommended the organization “map” their 
current supply chain.  Mapping the supply chain helps the aviation logistician to better 
understand and potentially manage and influence improved performance of not only the 
entire supply chain process, but more importantly, optimize their functional performance 
as a segment within that architecture based on SCM principles and the six step process. 
Step four, “Designing your supply chain,” recommended designing a high level 
operational graphic based on an adapted SCOR model.  This model displayed the basic 
linear aspect of the aviation logistics supply chain from end-to-end.  Unfortunately, a 
unique aspect of the Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain organizational 
structure is that it is a very network oriented, especially depending on the geographic 
location of the MALS and its supported squadrons.  The MALS relies on aviation 
logistics support from many other members external to the basic linear supply chain 
depicted in the adapted SCOR model.  The upstream supply chain members depicted in 
the adapted SCOR model in chapter 2 are also organized as complex networks of 
logistics activities.   This appendix provides an alternate high level operational graphic 
displaying the complex network and physical locations of members external to the basic 
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linear Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain depicted in the adapted SCOR 
model in chapter 2.     





























































Figure A- 1  Naval/Marine Corps Aviation Logistics Supply Chain Network 
Diagram 
1. The Squadron (Customer)   
As shown in Figure A-1, the Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply 
chain begins with the end-user: the aircraft squadron.  Marine aircraft squadrons are 
located aboard Marine Corps Air Stations throughout the continental United States, as 
well as overseas in Japan.  Marine reserve squadrons are located aboard Marine Corps 
and Naval Air Stations, an Air Force Base, Joint Reserve Bases, an Air National Guard 
Base, and in one extreme case, separated from a military installation (HMLA-775 
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Detachment Alpha located at Cambria County Regional Airport in Johnstown, 
Pennsylvania).  This graphical depiction displays the supply chain relationships between 
squadrons and their primary supporting activity: the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 
(MALS).  There are many scenarios when Marine squadrons are not directly supported 
by a MALS, adding to the complexity of the Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics 
supply chain.  Marine helicopter squadrons and rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft 
detachments consolidate and deploy as Aviation Combat Elements of Marine 
Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) aboard L-class amphibious ships.  
Marine fixed wing squadrons also deploy with Carrier Air Wings aboard Nuclear Aircraft 
Carriers (CVNs).  In both of these instances, the Marine squadrons do not receive support 
their primary aviation logistics support from a MALS.  The ship’s (L-class or CVN) 
Supply Department and Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Departments (augmented with 
MALS aviation supply and aircraft maintenance personnel) provide primary aviation 
logistics support to the embarked Marine squadron.  In recent history, Marine squadrons 
deployed with Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces (SPMAGTF) to remote 
regions of the world participating in Joint Task Force exercises and operations.  In some 
of these scenarios, the squadrons received their primary aviation logistics support from a 
MALS deployed aboard aviation logistics support ships (T-AVB) [e.g., Somalia 
operations], ashore in Mobile Facility complexes (e.g., Desert Shield and Storm, Bosnia 
and Kosovo operations), and from Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) operating in the 
Area of Responsibility (AOR) while the embarked squadron is operating ashore (e.g., 
Afghanistan operations). 
2. The Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS) 
The first link in the Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain 
network for the Marine squadron is the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS).  
All active duty Marine squadrons are directly supported by the MALS in garrison aboard 
Marine Corps Air Stations.  A MALS provides intermediate-level maintenance, aviation 
supply, and ordnance/armament support for aircraft and aeronautical equipment. (Ref. 2:p 
1005)  The following is a list of the locations of all the Marine Aviation Logistics 
Squadrons: 
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• Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA 
o MALS-16 and MALS-11 
• Marine Corps Air Facility Camp Pendleton, CA 
o MALS-39 
• Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, AZ 
o MALS-13 
• Marine Corps Air Station New River, N.C. 
o MALS-26 and MALS-29 
• Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, N.C. 
o MALS-14 
• Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, S.C. 
o MALS-31 
• Marine Corps Air Station Futemna, Japan 
o MALS-36 
• Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan 
o MALS-12 
• Stewart Air National Guard Base, NY 
o MALS-49 
• Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Atlanta, GA 
o MALS-42 
• Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX 
o MALS-41
The MALS is a deployable unit that can provide aviation logistics support 
to Marine squadrons in a remote environment.  As stated earlier, the MALS deploys and 
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operates in aviation logistics support ships (T-AVBs), out of Mobile Facility (MF) 
complexes ashore, in suitable facilities in a remote operating environment, or as a task 
organized detachment augmenting a Marine squadron or Aviation Combat Element.  In 
certain situations, the MALS is not the activity providing a Marine squadron aviation 
logistics support in the second link in the Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply 
chain.  Other activities that might be providing the same level of support are the Supply 
Department and Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department of a Naval Air Station, 
Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base, L-class amphibious ship, or nuclear aircraft carrier 
(CVN).  Figure A-1 also shows how complex the aviation logistics supply chain can be at 
the MALS’ level by depicting the activities the MALS can receive additional “lateral or 
horizontal” aviation logistics support from (external to the traditional supply chain 
process flow).    
3. The Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (or Designated Supply 
Point of Entry) 
The MALS receives its primary supply support from a designated supply 
point of entry (POE).  This can be the host Marine Corps or Naval Air Station Supply 
Department, or the regional Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC).  On the east coast, 
primary supply points of entry for an active duty MALS are the host Marine Corps Air 
Station supply departments (e.g., MCAS Cherry Point Station Supply Department), 
which in turn are supported by the appropriate regional FISC (e.g., FISC Norfolk VA).  
The Navy’s FISCs are located in San Diego CA, Norfolk VA, Jacksonville FL, Puget 
Sound WA, and Yokosuka Japan.  Marine Corps and Naval Air Stations inventories are 
primarily replenished by the FISCs, and FISC inventories are primarily replenished by 
the Defense Logistics Agency and Naval Aviation Depots (some repair and overhaul 
work for aviation depot level repairable spare parts is outsourced under contract logistics 
support).  The Naval Aviation Depots (NADEPs) are located at MCAS Cherry Point NC, 
NAS North Island CA, and NAS Jacksonville FL. 
FISC San Diego, California partnered with the Commander, Naval Air Forces 
Pacific Fleet (CNAP) and Commander, Naval Air Reserve Forces (CNARF) to 
consolidate inventories with their Naval Air Station Supply Departments’ (except 
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selected “W” purpose retail inventories).  The effect resulted in a “virtual inventory 
consolidation” to support CNAP and CNARF squadrons, including Marine Squadrons 
supported by CNAP and CNARF air stations.  Marine Corps Air Station Supply 
Departments also participate in this joint venture (e.g., MCAS Miramar and Yuma).  As a 
result, a Marine squadron based at MCAS Miramar ordering a consumable part through 
MALS-16 (collocated at MCAS Miramar) that is “not carried” or “not in stock” will be 
passed to FISC San Diego, not MCAS Miramar station supply department.  If the part is 
stocked in MCAS Miramar’s inventory, FISC San Diego’s inventory management system 
directs MCAS Miramar station supply department to issue the part (the closest supply 
supporting activity).  If the part is “not carried” or “not in stock” at MCAS Miramar 
station supply department, the squadron’s requisition can be satisfied by any wholesale 
level inventory maintained by other Marine Corps or Naval Air Station supply 
departments within the FISC San Diego partnership.  Figure A-2 lists activities that are 
members of the FISC San Diego partnership: 
• FISC San Diego CA
• Shore Intermediate 
Maintenance Activity San 
Diego CA
• Naval Air Weapons Station 
China Lake CA
• Marine Corps Air Station 
Miramar CA
• Naval Aviation Depot 
North Island CA
• Naval Warfare Assessment 
Station Corona CA
• Naval Air Station Point
Mugu CA
• Marine Corps Air Station 
Yuma AZ
• Naval Air Station Joint 
Reserve Base Fort Worth 
TX
• Naval Air Station Joint 
Reserve Base New 
Orleans LA
• Naval Air Station Joint 
Reserve Base Atlanta GA
• Naval Air Station Joint 
Reserve Base Willow 
Grove PA
• Naval Air Facility 
Washington DC
• Marine Aviation Logistics 
Squadron 49 Stewart Air 
National Guard Base NY
 
Figure A- 2  FISC San Diego CA Sites
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4. Inventory Control Points (ICPs)   
The fourth link in the Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain is the 
inventory control point.  If by this level, the Marine squadron’s requisition has not been 
satisfied by the host Marine Corps or Naval Air Station, or the regional FISC, the 
requisition is then passed to the inventory control point (ICP) for the material ordered.  
For most Aviation Depot Level Repairable (AVDLR) [7R_ and 0R_ cognizance 
material], Field Level Repairable (FLR) [1RD cognizance material], and certain 
consumable requirements (1RM and 0QM cognizance material) requirements for Marine 
Corps aircraft, the ICP is the Naval Inventory Control Point-Philadelphia (NAVICP-P).  
NAVICP-P procures wholesale aviation material from commercial vendors, and stocks 
the material at the FISCs.  NAVICP-P also procures retail aviation material for initial 
outfitting and replacement inventory allowance requirements for the MALS, NAS, and 
NASJRB Supply Departments.  NAVICP-P also coordinates AVDLR repair and overhaul 
level scheduling with the NADEPs and contracted commercial repair activities to 
replenish wholesale and retail AVDLR inventories.    Consumable and certain FLR 
requirements (9_ and 3_D cognizance material) are managed by the Defense Logistics 
Agency (DLA) network of ICPs, depending on the commodity of material requested.  At 
present, there are three primary DLA ICPs that provide supply support to Marine Corps 
and Naval Air Stations and FISCs; Defense Supply Center Richmond VA (9G and 3GD 
cognizance material), Defense Supply Center Columbus OH (9C, 9N, 3CD, and 3ND 
cognizance material), Defense Supply Center Philadelphia PA (9Z, 3ZD and 9D 
cognizance material).  The Air Force Material Command (Dayton OH) provides supply 
support and depot-level maintenance support (USAF Air Logistics Centers at Ogden UT, 
Warner Robins GA) for Marine aircraft (KC-130_ variants) in coordination with 
NAVICP-P.  NAVICP-P and the Naval Air Systems Command also coordinate with the 
Air Force Material Command aircraft preservation and demilitarization/disposal at the 
Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center (AMARC) located at Davis Monthan 
Air Force Base, AZ.  In fact, it is not too uncommon for fleet aviation units to request 
(from NAVICP-P) cannibalization of parts off aircraft stricken from the naval inventory 
marked for disposal to satisfy urgent aircraft readiness degrading requirements.  The 
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Army Material Command’s Aviation and Missile Command (Redstone Arsenal AL) 
provides supply and depot-level maintenance support (Corpus Christi Army Depot) for 
Marine aircraft (AH-1W and UH-1N) in coordination with NAVICP-P.   
Current initiatives by both DLA and NAVICP-P include coordinating with 
commercial activities to provide direct vendor delivery, 3rd party logistics, and contract 
logistics support to improve reliability of weapons systems and decrease logistics 
response time for Navy and Marine Corps aviation customers.  The following is a quick 
synopsis of these initiatives: 
• Direct Vendor Delivery (DVD):  “The benefits of Direct Vendor 
Delivery (DVD) come from reducing the logistics response time 
(LRT) by shipping directly from the vendor to the user. In the case 
where a DVD contract includes repairable support, effectiveness 
increases by combining the procurement and repair pipelines. Long-
term DVD contracts ideally reduce the Navy’s investment in spare 
parts inventory. The goal is to manage suppliers, not parts. However, 
when a DVD is put in place with initial system acquisition, 
government investment in spare parts may be deferred or eliminated 
entirely.”  (Ref. 31)  DVD acquisition advice coded material 
requisitioned by the Marine squadron flows through the ICP, and is 
referred directly to the vendor for delivery to the Marine squadron.   
• Contractor Logistics Support (CLS):  “In Contactor Logistics Support 
(CLS), the contractor provides all maintenance, material management, 
and associated system support. The benefits of CLS are similar to 
direct vendor delivery (DVD) with the added benefit of focusing on 
system performance metrics such as reliability and maintainability. 
CLS should be approached as a partnering arrangement between 
commercial entities and program management and supply support 
communities, since maintenance, repair, and supply support functions 
are involved.” (Ref. 32)  A current example of a CLS initiative is the 
Joint Strike Fighter program. 
 131
• 3rd Party Logistics (3PL):   “An organization that manages and 
executes a particular logistics function, using its own assets and 
resources, on behalf of another company. Provides physical assets and 
technology to execute the logistics for companies without that 
capability or that have decided logistics is not a core competency. 
These activities include warehousing, transportation, and freight-
forwarding.” (Ref. 32)  An example of a 3PL provider would be 
Federal Express’s Premium Service facility contract with the Defense 
Logistics Agency. 
5. The Defense Distribution Depot   
The fifth link in the Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain 
network is the Defense Distribution Depot.  The DDD stocks and delivers wholesale DoD 
supplies to not only Navy and Marine Corps wholesale and retail inventory stockpoints 
and end-user customers (e.g., Marine squadrons, MALS intermediate maintenance 
activities).  According to the Defense Distribution Center headquarters internet webpage, 
their mission is as follows: 
The DLA distribution operation responsibilities include receipt, storage, issue, 
packing, preservation, worldwide transportation, in-transit visibility and 
redirecting en-route, when required, of all items placed under its accountability 
by the DLA and the military services. The Defense Distribution Center (DDC) is 
headquarters to the 22 DLA Distribution Centers located throughout the United 
States, Europe, Japan, and Hawaii.  The 22 sites hold over 3.6 million stock 
numbers in 325 million cubic feet of storage space and process over 24 million 
transactions annually. Clothing and textiles, electronics, industrial, general and 
construction supplies, subsistence, medical material and the military services’ 
principle end items are among the commodities for which the distribution 
function and personnel are responsible. (Ref. 33)   
Not all Defense Distribution Depots are organized the same.  In fact, four 
distribution depots’ operations have been outsourced to civilian contractors under the 
Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 study concept (Barstow, Warner 
Robins, Jacksonville and Cherry Point). (Ref. 33)  The Defense Distribution Center 
organizes its depots according to the following strategy: 
All DLA Distribution Centers perform similar functions to service and maintain 
stock, but their missions can be identified in one of three distinct categories: 
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• Strategic Distribution Platforms (SDPs) are large facilities that 
serve as the primary source for the majority of material shipped to 
customers within their areas of responsibility. Defense Distribution 
Susquehanna PA (DDSP) has primary responsibility for all DLA 
customers east of the Mississippi River, in Europe, Southwest 
Asia, South America, the Caribbean, Canada, Africa and 
Antarctica.  Defense Distribution San Joaquin CA provides this 
same support to customers west of the Mississippi River, in Asia, 
the Pacific and Australia. 
• Collocated Distribution Centers (CDCs) provide local support to 
the Services maintenance missions located at or very near each 
Center. These Distribution Centers may also serve as the primary 
center for the storage, maintenance and issue of a specific 
commodity (e.g., Ozone Depleting Substances that require unique 
facilities or handling procedures). 
• Theater Distribution Platforms (TDPs) include Defense 
Distribution Germersheim, Germany (DDDE) and Defense 
Distribution Yokosuka, Japan (DDYJ) provide in theater supply 
support for high demand or critical stock that is needed to support 
military units in their assigned area of responsibility.  By placing 
stock close to the overseas customers, DLA can provide faster 
delivery to customers at a lower overall cost.  These TDPs increase 
the Theater Readiness of all services. 
• Premium Service Facility is a contractor owned contractor 
operated (COCO) unique facility providing storage and shipment 
of high dollar value, low stock level and exceptionally critical 
stocks for DLA customers.  The contractor (Federal Express 
Memphis Hub) stores these critical items and ships upon demand 
directly into the commercial overnight delivery system.” (Ref. 33) 
The locations of the 22 Defense Distribution Centers (DDCs) are: 
• Albany, GA • Jacksonville, FL • San Joaquin, CA 
• Anniston, AL • Norfolk, VA • Susquehanna, PA 
• Barstow, CA • Oklahoma City, OK • Tobyhanna, PA 
• Cherry Point, NC • Pearl Harbor, HI • Warner Robins, GA 
• Columbus, OH • Puget Sound, WA • Yokosuka, Japan 
• Corpus Christi, TX • Red River, TX • Map Support (Richmond) 
• Germersheim, Germany • Richmond, VA  
• Hill, UT • San Diego, CA  
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As shown in Figure A-1, the DDC also coordinates with the Unites States 
Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and the military services in distributing 
customer requirements globally.  Elements of USTRANSCOM (Military Traffic 
Management Command, Military Sealift Command, Air Mobility Command, and Civil 
Air Reserve Force) or military service-unique cargo transportation assets expeditiously 
transport material requirements to a centralized receiving point (point of debarkation) in 
the area of operations for a MALS or Marine squadron in a forward deployed area.  
Figure A-3 shows the locations of the two Air Mobility Command (AMC) air force bases 
(points of embarkation) that provide the most airlifted cargo transport to overseas 
Navy/Marine Corps aviation activities and deployed units (Travis CA and Dover DE).  
AMC flights also originate out of Naval Station Norfolk’s Chamber’s Field in Virginia.  
Intra-theater deliveries to the actual operating location of the forward deployed MALS or 
Marine squadron is usually accomplished by organic military and sometimes contracted 
civilian or host nation support cargo transportation assets.    
6. Inbound Transportation Segments of the Supply Chain  
Once the distribution depot (or vendor) ships the material (segment 5 in Figure A-
1), it is delivered initially to the regional FISC site or designated supply point of entry 
supporting the MALS (segment 6 in Figure A-1).  One example of this relationship is 
MCAS Miramar Station Supply Department, which services MALS-16 and MALS-11.  
Once the MALS receives the inbound shipment of material from the regional FISC site or 
the supply point of entry (segment 7 in Figure A-1), it then delivers the material to the 
right customer (segment 8 in Figure A-1). 
 
C. NAVAL/MARINE CORPS AVIATION LOGISTICS SUPPLY CHAIN 
MAPS    
The following figures graphically display the physical locations of the members 
of the Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics supply chain network.  Figure A-3 displays 
the locations (in the continental United States) of Marine Aviation Logistics Squadrons, 
Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers, Naval Aviation Depots and other service 
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maintenance depots, Inventory Control Points, Defense Distribution Centers supporting 
Marine aviation.  Air Mobility Command air force bases Travis, CA and Dover, DE are 
also depicted in Figure A-3 for their role in the Naval/Marine Corps aviation logistics 
supply chain network delivering cargo to overseas and forward deployed units.  Figures 
A-4 and A-5 provide similar maps of the Japan and Hawaii based Naval/Marine aviation 
logistics activities.  Figure A-6 displays the complex network of partnership sites within 
the FISC San Diego CA claimancy.  Of particular note is the fact that Marine Aviation 
Logistics Squadron 49 (the only fully functional, individually operating reserve MALS) 
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Figure A- 4  Naval/Marine Corps Aviation Logistics Supply Chain Map  
(OCONUS-Japan) 
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N/MC Aviation Logistics Supply Chain Map
(OCONUS-Hawaii)
MALS-24 MCAF Kaneohe HI
FISC Pearl Harbor HI
Hickam Air Base HI 
(AMC)
Defense Distribution Depot 
Pearl Harbor HI (DDPH)
 
Figure A- 5  Naval/Marine Corps Aviation Logistics Supply Chain Map  
(OCONUS-Hawaii) 
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N/MC Aviation Logistics Supply Chain Map
Detailed Locations of Fleet and Industrial
Supply Centers Supporting CONUS-MALS
[including partner sites]
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NAF Washington DC
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MALS-49 Stewart ANGB NY
 
Figure A- 6  Naval/Marine Corps Aviation Logistics Supply Chain Map  




































ADAPTED SCOR MODEL LEVEL 3 DEFINITIONS 
In Chapter 2, Supply Chain Management and the MALS, we provided an example 
of an adapted SCOR level 3 “Deliver” process flow diagram (Figure 2-6).  Specifically, 
this process flow diagram depicted the MALS delivering “stocked products” or 
“maintain-to-order products” to a Marine squadron.  In short, delivering “stocked 
products” refers to issuing parts off-the-shelf from the MALS inventory to the Marine 
squadron.  This process could just as easily apply to satisfying the MALS’s Intermediate 
Maintenance Activity (IMA) requirements.  Delivering “maintain-to-order products” 
refers to the expeditious repair (EXREP) requisitioning process.  An EXREP is a 
repairable requisition that cannot be filled from the MALS inventory.  As a result of this 
“stock-out” condition, the component ordered must be removed from the aircraft, and 
inducted into the IMA repair cycle for “expeditious repair.”  Once the item is repaired, it 
is then delivered back to the squadron for installation back onto the aircraft.  The 
following figures (B-1 through B-7) provide definitions of the adapted SCOR level 3 
subprocess definitions derived from the Level 2 process definition described in Chapter 2 
(Figure 2-5): 
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Adapted MALS SCOR Level 3 Plan Subprocesses
• P2.1 (Identify, Prioritize, and Aggregate Material Requirements) = The process of 
identifying, prioritizing, and considering all sources of demand, as a whole with constituent 
parts, for material in the supply chain of a product or service.
• P2.2 (Identify, Assess, and Aggregate Material Resources) = The process of identifying, 
evaluating, and considering all material, as a whole with constituent parts, used to add value 
in the supply chain of a product or service.
• P2.3 (Balance Material Resources with Material Requirements) = The process of 
developing a time-phased course of action that commits material resources to meet material 
requirements.
• P2.4 (Establish Detailed Sourcing Plans) = The establishment of courses of action that 
represent a projected appropriation of supply resources to meet sourcing plan requirements.
• P4.1 (Identify, Prioritize, and Aggregate Delivery Requirements) = The process of 
identifying, prioritizing, and considering all sources of demand, as a whole with constituent 
parts, in the delivery of a product or service.
• P4.2 (Identify, Assess, and Aggregate Material Resources) = The process of identifying, 
evaluating, and considering all aspects, as a whole with constituent parts, that add value in the 
delivery of a product.
• P4.3 (Balance Delivery Resources with Delivery Requirements) = The process of 
developing a time-phased course of action that commits delivery resources to meet delivery 
requirements.
• P4.4 (Establish Detailed Delivery Plans) = The establishment of courses of action that 
represent a projected appropriation of delivery resources to meet delivery requirements.
 
Figure B- 1  Adapted SCOR Model Level 3 “Plan-Source and Plan-Deliver” Subprocess 
Definitions (after Ref. 4:p. 217-218) 
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Adapted MALS SCOR Level 3 Source Subprocesses
• S1.1 (Schedule Material Deliveries) = Scheduling and managing the deliveries of material 
for a contract, purchase order, or requisition (the requirements for material releases are based 
on the sourcing plan or other types of material pull signals).  Equivalent to initial issue and 
allowance provisioning.
• S1.2 (Receive and Verify Material) = The receipt and acceptance of material deliveries, 
including all activities associated with receiving, verifying, and accepting material deliveries. 
• S1.3 (Transfer Material) = The transfer of accepted material to the appropriate stocking
location in the supply chain (including all activities associated with repackaging, staging, 
transferring, and stocking material).
• S2.1 (Schedule Material Deliveries) = Scheduling and managing the deliveries of material 
for the contract; the requirements for deliveries are based on the sourcing plan; this function 
includes all aspects of managing the contract schedule, including prototypes and 
qualifications.
• S2.2 (Receive and verify material) = The receipt and acceptance of material deliveries for 
the contract requirements (including all activities associated with receiving, qualifying, 
verifying, and accepting material deliveries).
• S2.3 (Transfer Material) = The transfer of accepted material to the appropriate stocking
location in the supply chain (including all activities associated with repackaging, staging, 
transferring, and stocking material).
 
Figure B- 2 Adapted SCOR Model Level 3 “Source-Stocked Material and Source-
Maintain-to-Order Material” Subprocess Definitions (after Ref. 4:p. 218-219) 
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Adapted MALS SCOR Level 3 Maintain Subprocesses
• M1.1 (Schedule Manufacturing Activities) = The scheduling of operations to be performed 
in accordance with plans for the manufacture (re-manufacture) of parts, products, and 
formulations in quantities and planned availability of required material (scheduling includes 
sequencing and, depending on the factory layout, standards for set-up and run; intermediate 
manufacturing activities are generally coordinated before scheduling operations performed in 
producing a finished product).
• M1.2 (Issue Material) = The physical movement of material (e.g., raw material, fabricated 
components, manufactured subassemblies, required ingredients or intermediate formulations) 
from a stocking location (e.g., stockroom, a location on the production floor, a supplier) to a 
point of use (issuing material includes the corresponding system transaction; the bill of 
material or BOM, routing information, or recipe-production instructions determine the 
material to be issued to support manufacturing/re-manufacturing operations).  This could 
include Shop Replaceable Assemblies (SRAs) and bit-piece-parts received from either Pre-
Expended Bins, Phase Kits, Supply Officer’s stores, or upstream wholesale suppliers.
• M1.3 (Manufacture and Test) = The activities to convert material from the raw or semi-
finished state to a state of completion and greater value; the processes associated with the 
validation of product performance to ensure conformance to defined specifications and 
requirements.  Equivalent to repair by maintainer and test by Collateral Duty Inspector (CDI).
• M1.4 (Package) = The activities that containerize completed products for storage or sale to 
users; packaging in some industries includes cleaning and sterilization.
• M1.5 (Stage Product) = The movement of packaged products to a temporary holding 
location to await movement to a finished goods location (products made to order may remain 
in the holding location to await shipment per the associated customer order; the actual move 
transaction is part of the deliver process). 
 
Figure B- 3  Adapted SCOR Model Level 3 “Maintain-to-Stock” Subprocess Definitions 
(after Ref. 4:p. 219-220) 
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Adapted MALS SCOR Level 3 Maintain Subprocesses
• M2.1 (Schedule Manufacturing Activities) = The scheduling of operations to be performed 
in accordance with plans for the manufacture (re-manufacture) of parts, products, and 
formulations in quantities and planned availability of required material (scheduling includes 
sequencing and, depending on the factory layout, standards for set-up and run; intermediate 
manufacturing activities are generally coordinated before scheduling operations performed in 
producing a finished product).
• M2.2 (Issue Material) = The physical movement of material (e.g., raw material, fabricated 
components, manufactured subassemblies, required ingredients or intermediate formulations) 
from a stocking location (e.g., stockroom, a location on the production floor, a supplier) to a 
point of use (issuing material includes the corresponding system transaction; the bill of 
material or BOM, routing information, or recipe-production instructions determine the 
material to be issued to support manufacturing/re-manufacturing operations).  This could 
include Shop Replaceable Assemblies (SRAs) and bit-piece-parts received from either Pre-
Expended Bins, Phase Kits, Supply Officer’s stores, or upstream wholesale suppliers.
• M2.3 (Manufacture and Test) = The activities to convert material from the raw or semi-
finished state to a state of completion and greater value; the processes associated with the 
validation of product performance to ensure conformance to defined specifications and 
requirements.  Equivalent to repair by maintainer and test by Collateral Duty Inspector (CDI).
• M2.4 (Package) = The activities that containerize completed products for storage or sale to 
users; packaging in some industries includes cleaning and sterilization.
• M2.5 (Stage Product) = The movement of packaged products to a temporary holding 
location to await movement to a finished goods location (products made to order may remain 
in the holding location to await shipment per the associated customer order; the actual move 
transaction is part of the deliver process). 
 
Figure B- 4  Adapted SCOR Model Level 3 “Maintain-to-Order” Subprocess Definitions 
(after Ref. 4:p. 220-221) 
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Adapted MALS SCOR Level 3 Deliver Subprocesses
• D1.1 (Process Inquiry and Quote) = The actions to receive and respond to customer 
inquiries and request for quotes.
• D1.2 (Receive, Enter, and Validate Order) = The actions to receive orders from a customer 
and enter them in a company’s order processing system (orders can be received through 
phone, fax, or electronic media); examine orders “technically” to ensure an orderable 
configuration and provide accurate price, and check the customer’s credit.
• D1.3 (Reserve Inventory and Determine Delivery Date) = The actions to identify and 
reserve inventory (on-hand and scheduled) for orders and schedule a delivery date.
• D1.4 (Consolidate Orders) = The process of analyzing orders to determine the groupings 
that result in least cost and best services fulfillment and transportation.
• D1.5 (Plan and Build Loads) = The actions to select transportation modes and build efficient 
loads.
• D1.6 (Route Shipments) = The actions to consolidate and route loads by mode, lane and 
location.
• D1.7 (Select Carriers and Rate Shipments) = The actions to select carriers by lowest cost 
per route and rate and tender shipments.
• D1.8 (Receive Product) = The activities (e.g., receiving product, verifying, recording product 
receipt, determining stow location, stowing, and recording location) that a company performs 
at its warehouses and that sometimes includes quality inspections.
• D1.9 (Pick Product) = The activities (e.g., including retrieving orders to pick, determining 
inventory availability, building the pick wave, picking  the product, recording the pick, and 
delivering the product to shipping) in response to an order.
 
Figure B- 5  Adapted SCOR Model Level 3 “Deliver Stocked Product” Subprocess 
Definitions (after Ref. 4:p. 222-223) 
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Adapted MALS SCOR Level 3 Deliver Subprocesses
• D1.10 (Load Vehicle, Generate Shipping Documents, and Ship) = The tasks of placing 
products on vehicles; generating the documentation to meet internal, customer, carrier, and 
government needs; and sending the product to the customer.
• D1.11 (Receive and Verify Product at Customer’s Site) = The process of receiving the 
shipment at the customer’s site and verifying that the shipped order is complete and the 
product meets quality requirements.
• D1.12 (Install Product) = The process of preparing and installing the product at the 
customer’s site (the product is fully functional after completion).
• D1.13 (Invoice and Receive Payment) = The actions to send a signal to the financial 
organization that the order has been shipped and that the billing process should begin 
(payment is received from the customer within the payment terms of the invoice).
• D2.1 (Process Inquiry and quote) = The actions to receive and respond to customer inquiries 
and requests for quotes.
• D2.2 (Receive, configure, enter, and validate order) = The actions to receive orders from a 
customer and enter them into a company’s order processing system (orders can be received 
through phone, fax or electronic media), configure product to the customer’s needs based on 
standard available parts or options, examine order to ensure an orderable configuration and 
provide accurate price, and check customer’s credit.
• D2.3 (Reserve resources and determine delivery date) = The actions to identify and reserve 
inventory or planned capacity for orders and schedule a delivery date.
• D2.4 (Consolidate orders) = The process of analyzing orders to determine the groupings that 
result in least-cost and best service fulfillment and transportation.
 
Figure B- 6  Adapted SCOR Model Level 3 “Deliver Stocked Product (continued)” 
Subprocess Definitions (after Ref. 4:p. 223-224) 
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Adapted MALS SCOR Level 3 Deliver Subprocesses
• D2.5 (Plan and build loads) = The actions to select transportation modes and build efficient 
loads.
• D2.6 (Route shipments) = the actions to consolidate and route loads by mode, lane and 
location.
• D2.7 (Select carriers and rate shipments) = the actions to select carriers by lowest cost per 
route and rate and tender shipments.
• D2.8 (Pick staged product) = The activities (including retrieving orders to pick, verifying 
inventory availability, building the pick wave, picking the product, recording the pick, and 
delivering product to shipping) performed in the distribution center in response to an order.
• D2.9 (Load vehicle, generate shipping documents, and ship) = The tasks of placing product 
on vehicles; generating the documentation to meet internal, customer and government needs; 
and sending the product to the customer.
• D2.10 (Receive and verify product at customer’s site) = The process of receiving the 
shipment at the customer’s site and verifying that the shipped order is complete and the 
product meets quality requirements.
• D2.11 (Test and install product) = The process of preparing, testing, and installing the 
product at the customer’s site; the product is fully functional after completion.
• D2.12 (Invoice and receive payment) = The actions to send a signal to the financial 
organization that the order has been shipped and that the billing process should begin 
(payment is received from the customer within the payment terms of the invoice.
 
Figure B- 7  Adapted SCOR Model Level 3 “Deliver Stocked Product (continued)” 
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APPENDIX D.  
PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAMS 
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MALS-14 VISION STATEMENT 
M A LS -1 4    V IS IO N
E v e r y  M A L S -1 4  D ra g o n  h a s  a  c le a r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  th e  
M A L S  fo c u s  a n d  e a c h  is  a  v ita l p a r t ic ip a n t  in  a  to ta l  te a m  
e ffo r t  to w a rd  M A L S -1 4  b e in g  re c o g n iz e d  a s  th e  b e s t  la rg e  
lo g is t ic s  a c t iv ity  in  th e  D e p a r tm e n t o f  D e fe n s e .
M A G -1 4  e n jo y s  h ig h  q u a lity  s u p p o r t  fro m  M A L S -1 4 . 
M A L S -1 4  w o rk s  v e ry  c lo s e ly  w ith  th e  s q u a d ro n s o f 
M A G -1 4  a s  a n  in te g ra te d  lo g is t ic s  te a m .
D r a g o n s  p o s s e s s  a  d e e p  s e n s e  o f  p ro fe s s io n a l 
D R A G O N  P R ID E  a n d  e s p r it  a s  m e m b e rs  o f  th e  M A L S -1 4  
te a m .
 
F O C U S
“ N U L L I  S E C U N D U S ”
S e c o n d  t o  n o n e ,  M A L S - 1 4  is  f o r m a l ly  r e c o g n iz e d  f o r  lo g is t ic s  
e x c e l le n c e  in  2 0 0 1 .
M A L S - 1 4  d r iv e s  t h e  M A G - 1 4  in c r e a s e  in  a ir c r a f t  r e a d in e s s  t h a t  
s u r p a s s e s  8 0  p e r c e n t  f u l l  m is s io n  c a p a b le  a n d  8 0  p e r c e n t  m is s io n
c a p a b le  r a t e s  a t  t h e  t u r n  o f  2 0 0 1  t o  2 0 0 2 ,  a n d  b e y o n d .
A IR C R A F T  R E A D IN E S S
M A L S - 1 4  D r a g o n s  t a k e  c a r e  o f  e a c h  o t h e r  w it h  “ p e o p le  p r o g r a m s ”
t h a t  a r e  m e a s u r a b ly  a m o n g  t h e  b e s t  in  t h e  M a r in e  C o r p s .
“ M A L S - 1 4 ,  S e c o n d  t o  N o n e ,
8 0  – 8 0  R e a d in e s s  t h r o u g h  2 0 0 1 ”
 
D R A G O N S  a r e  c o m m i t t e d  t o :
C O R E  V A L U E S
C o r e  V a l u e s  a r e  t h e  g u i d e  o f  a l l  a c t i o n s ,  d e c i s i o n s ,  a n d  w o r k  m e t h o d s .   D o i n g  t h e  r i g h t  t h i n g  i s  
c o n s i s t e n t l y  e x p e c t e d  i n  e x e c u t i o n  o f  m i s s i o n  a n d  i n  p e r s o n a l  c o n d u c t ,  b o t h  o n  a n d  o f f  d u t y .
B A L A N C IN G  P E O P L E  A N D  P U R P O S E  
M A L S - 1 4  d r i v e s  t h e  a i r c r a f t  r e a d i n e s s  o f  M A G - 1 4  – t h i s  i s  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h e  M A L S .   T h i s  m i s s i o n  
w i l l  b e  p u r s u e d  i n  h a r m o n y  w i t h  t h e  n e e d s  o f  t h e  p e o p l e .   D r a g o n s  k n o w  t h e y  w i l l  b e  t a k e n  c a r e  o f  a n d  
t h u s  a r e  e x c i t e d  t o  b e  a  p a r t  o f  t h e  t e a m — a  t e a m  t h a t  i n c l u d e s  D r a g o n  f a m i l i e s .  
R E IN F O R C IN G  E X C E L L E N C E
D r a g o n s  a r e  i m m e d i a t e l y  r e w a r d e d  f o r  h a r d  w o r k ,  f o r  a d v a n c i n g  t h e  M A L S  g o a l ,  a n d  f o r  a d h e r i n g  t o  
v a l u e s .   D r a g o n  a w a r d s  e m p h a s i z e  t e a m  a c t i o n  a n d  r e c o g n i z e  f a m i l i e s  a n d  s u p p o r t i n g  a g e n c i e s .
A  R E L E N T L E S S  P O S IT IV E  A P P R O A C H
S t a r t s  w i t h  l e a d e r s  s e t t i n g  a  p o s i t i v e  e x a m p l e ,   … e x p e c t s  a l l  D r a g o n s  t o  s a y  “ y e s - - w e  c a n , ” … f o s t e r s  
p r o a c t i v e  t h i n k i n g  t o  p r e v e n t  ( n o t  r e a c t  t o )  p r o b l e m s ,     … p u n c t u a t e d  b y  p o s i t i v e  r e s u l t s .
T O T A L  P R O F E S S IO N A L  C O M P E T E N C E
A  n e v e r - e n d i n g  c a m p a i g n  t o  i n c r e a s e  m i l i t a r y  a n d  t e c h n i c a l  s k i l l s  b e g i n s w i t h  p e r f e c t i n g  t h e  
f u n d a m e n t a l s  o f  M A L S  c o r e  f u n c t i o n s .   A s  a  “ l e a r n i n g  o r g a n i z a t i o n , ” M A L S - 1 4  e m p l o y s  “ T h e o r y  o f  
C o n s t r a i n t s ” m a n a g e m e n t  m e t h o d s . O p e n  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ,  i n f o r m a t i o n  s h a r i n g ,  a n d  c o n t i n u o u s  
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